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Abstract
Elections have been found to increase the risk of conflict recurrence. In this thesis I
investigate how institutions that constrain election winners mitigate the destabilizing
effects of elections. I propose that post-conflict elections will only increase the chances
of conflict recurrences in cases where institutional constraints on elected governments
are weak. In these cases the post-conflict commitment problem makes it difficult for
election winners to reassure elections losers that the settlement of the conflict will be
respected. This makes it less likely that the losing side will be willing to hand over power
to an elected government. Where the broader institutional framework is strong enough
to constrain election winners after they assume office, elections may help pave the way
for durable peace.
I employ a set of Cox regression models on a dataset of all peace spells in the 1972-
2005 period to test this proposition empirically. The analysis finds robust support for
the interaction between post-conflict elections and institutional constraints on elected
governments. Where no such constraints are in place, post-conflict elections significantly
increase the risk of conflict recurrence. If these institutions are strong, post-conflict
elections are related to durable peace. Thus, whereas existing studies have found either a
negative or no effect of post-conflict elections, I demonstrate that the effect of post-conflict
elections is conditioned by the broader institutional context. This finding is robust to
various model specifications, suggesting that a post-conflict democracy where competitive
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Is democracy the solution to civil conflict? If so, why do post-conflict elections sometimes
lead to recurrent conflict while elections in other settings provide an arena for peaceful
settlements of disputes? Are post-conflict elections more likely to produce conflict re-
currences where other democratic institutions are not yet in place? These are the broad
questions this thesis grapples with. While previous quantitative research has found what
is at best mixed evidence for any peace building potential of post-conflict democracy, pol-
icy makers typically present democracy as crucial for lasting peace. US President George
Bush (2003) did for instance put his faith in “the global expansion of democracy and the
hope and progress it brings as the alternative to instability and hatred and terror” and
posited that “[l]asting peace is gained as justice and democracy advance”.
I argue that variation in the institutional makeup of post-conflict democracies may
be important. More specifically, the effect of holding elections in the post-conflict setting
may largely be determined by which other democratic institutions are in place. Electoral
democracy can only serve as a mechanism for peace if there are institutions that constrain
the power of elected governments.
1.1 The Puzzle
Democratic elections have come to be seen as important milestones for countries emerging
from armed conflict (Sisk 2008, Collier 2009). One important reason has been the interna-
tional community’s faith in the peace building potential of liberal democracy. This belief
in the necessity of post-conflict democracy is reflected in the 1998 UN Secretary General
report to the Security Council stating that without democratization “lasting peace will
1
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not be possible” (Annan 2004: 32). In accordance with a broader liberal tradition it is
assumed that “[t]o the extent that democratic institutions and processes allow groups to
pursue their interests through peaceful means, governments have an electoral incentive
to refrain from repressing their opponents, and opposition movements have an incentive
to refrain from oppositional violence” (Joshi 2010: 6).
The expectation that democracy will make for more peaceful post-conflict development
should not be surprising given the broad range of studies in which democracy is found to
be important for the provision of public goods (Morrow, Smith, Bueno de Mesquita and
Siverson 2001), for economic development (Knutsen 2011: Chapter 6) and for a domestic
order in which leaders can be removed without the use of violence (Popper 1959: 12).
These are all factors that should be important for rebuilding countries after civil war and
thus provide ways of avoiding recurrent conflict (Walter 2004). Elections are also thought
to be critical for providing post-conflict governments legitimacy needed for sustainable
peace (Kumar 1998: 6).
Yet studies investigating the impact of post-conflict democracy have found only incon-
sistent evidence for any peace building potential of post-conflict democracy (Hegre and
Fjelde 2010). Figure 1.1 shows country level variation in whether elections have been held
within the first decade after the end of a conflict and whether the conflict recurred.1 The
map reveals that having democratic elections is not enough to avoid recurrent conflict.
This finding is in line with much of the literature which has argued that elections might
in fact be a cause of conflict recurrence (Collier, Hoeﬄer and So¨derbom 2008, Collier
2009, Flores and Nooruddin 2012, Brancati and Snyder 2012).
Even as these studies portray post-conflict elections as a source of instability, the map
in Figure 1.1 fails to convey any clear negative relationship between holding elections and
avoiding conflict recurrence. In many countries, exemplified by cases such as Nicaragua,
Mozambique and Papua New Guinea, democracy and peace seem to have gone hand in
hand (Jarstad 2009, Bjornlund, Cowan and Gallery 2007: 108). That elections may even
have had a positive impact in laying the ground for a civil peace is suggested by some
cases, such as Nicaragua following the 1990 end of conflict. Despite the fact that the
Sandinistas lost both the 1990 and the 1996 elections and the political system remained
polarized, they chose loyal opposition rather than recurrent conflict. Lo´pez-Pintor (1998)
1Important variation about individual peace spells is lost by aggregating the data to the country level.
Nevertheless, this map illustrates the general patterns in the data.




































































































4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
describes how the 1990 elections opened up for reconciliation and development, and that
in accordance with the constitution this was repeated with success six years later:
Although losing candidate Daniel Ortega denounced the elections as fraud-
ulent in the weeks following the vote, he would come to accept the results
after electoral observers concluded that the irregularities observed at the
polls, while numerous, did not imply ballot tampering or organized fraud.
Once again, with the international community’s assistance, the second gen-
eral elections helped drive autocracy and civil war further into Nicaragua’s
past. The elections should be considered a further step toward the consolida-
tion of democracy (Lo´pez-Pintor 1998: 49-50).
Democratic elections did not prove to be the same potent force for peace in Angola,
which held elections in 1992 following the 1991 negotiated termination of conflict. In
contrast to Nicaragua, democracy was never allowed to take root in Angola, as the losing
side of this first election, unita and the leader Jonas Savimba, decided to go back to
conflict rather than assuming the role of a loyal opposition and hope for stronger electoral
support the next time around (Ottaway 1998). As the rebel movement had retained its
military capabilities and had little to gain by submitting to the elected government it
chose to reinitiate the conflict (Lyons 2002: 20). Thus, according to Hartzell and Hoddie
(2007: 124) one of the main reasons for the collapse of the peace process was
the decision as part of the elections agreement, to hold winner-take-all elec-
tions. Not only did this particular institutional arrangement give those failing
to achieve a plurality in the electoral contest little incentive to comply with
the outcome, but it likely also proved threatening to those in minority, because
it gave the winner an important element of state control.
It thus appears that the impact of elections on the durability of post-conflict peace
varies according to case. The question why this is so is important given the destruction
and loss of life caused by recurrent conflict (Hegre, Nyg˚ard, Strand, Gates and Flaten
2011) and with the increased frequency elections are held in post-conflict settings (Collier
2009). As demonstrated by Elbadawi, Hegre and Milante (2008), conflict recurrence is by
now the main reason for the persistent threat internal conflicts pose to human security.
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Patterson (1997: 383) suggests one reason for why the Sandinistas of Nicaragua were
willing to accept electoral defeat, namely that strong institutions of checks and balances
meant that the legislature could be used to make sure that the consequences of not
controlling the executive would not be disastrous. Even if both the 1990 and the 1996
elections were lost, important reforms would not be reversed and the power of the state
could not easily be turned against them. The opposite was the case for Angola, where
little had been done to limit the power of those who would succeed in the first election after
the end of conflict (Strasheim and Fjelde 2012:12, Ottaway 1998:146). Hence whereas
the elections in Nicaragua were able to function as part of a transition towards a stable
democracy, the election in Angola was seen as a zero-sum game that the opposition could
not afford to lose.
Thus, part of the story behind the different effects of post-conflict elections may be
variation in the extent to which strong institutions of checks and balances that limit what
an elected government can do, are in place prior to holding elections. This agrees with
the scholarship that has described how emerging democracies have failed to developed
the institutional constraints which has guarded against abuse and built the foundations
for durable domestic peace in established democracies (Huntington 1968, Zakaria 1997).
Such institutional inconsistency has been shown to be related to the onset of civil war
(Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch 2001) and to short-lived regimes (Gates, Hegre,
Jones and Strand 2006).
1.1.1 Research Question
Existing research provides some indirect evidence for a possible interaction between in-
stitutions of checks and balances and post-conflict elections. Such an interaction could
explain why elections in the immediate aftermath of conflict when strong institutions
are not yet in place (Brancati and Snyder 2012: 8) and in countries without previous
democratic experience (Flores and Nooruddin 2012) are more likely to lead to recurrence.
What characterizes such settings is that institutions of checks and balances are less likely
to be in place. The greatest progress towards studying such an effect systematically is
perhaps made by Strand (2007: Chapter 8) who investigates the effect of the second
election after the establishment of a new regime. He finds that the impact of such second
elections on the risk of civil war onset is conditioned by the level of constraints placed
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
on executive power (Strand 2007: 332-333). The existing literature on post-conflict sta-
bility has, however, not tested this proposition directly by looking explicitly at whether
the level of institutional constraints prior to post-conflict election condition their impact
on the chances of conflict recurrence. Moreover, many contributions have doubted that
elections can ever be a force for peace in deeply divided post-conflict societies. Thus,
important contributions to the literature see the question of democracy and peace as a
difficult dilemma (Jarstad 2008). Even if previous scholarship has come up with some
suggestions, more research is needed before any firm conclusions can be reached. This
provides the motivation for the following research question:
Research Question Does the impact of democratic elections on the durability of
post-conflict peace depend on institutional constraints on elected
governments?
Referring back to Figure 1.1 it should be clear that this research question satisfies
both the demands King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 15) have of a good research question:
The prevalence of both conflict-recurrence and post-conflict elections makes this an issue
deserving of the attention of social science. Furthermore, the lack of a correlation between
having democratic elections and being able to preserve the civil peace presents a puzzle
for existing social science theory.
1.2 Findings
The main finding of this thesis is that the effect of competitive elections on the risk of
conflict recurrence is conditioned by the presence of horizontal constraints on elected
governments. Democratic elections make peace more durable when held in a context of
strong institutions of checks and balances in the executive-legislative relationship. When
such institutions are not in place, elections may be a source of recurrent conflict. This
finding holds whether looking at de jure provisions letting the legislative and executive
branch of government veto each other’s decisions or when looking at whether such con-
straints are operative in the political system in question. This increases the confidence in
the validity of the central proposition made in this thesis: Political institutions are im-
portant in determining the impact of competitive elections on post-conflict peace and the
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effect of these institutions depends on whether they are able to impose strong constraints
on the power of elected governments.
Even if support is found for the reported interaction, there are two important caveats
to be made. Firstly, there is considerable uncertainty attached to the effect of elections
at any given level of constraining institutions. This is to be expected given a relatively
limited sample size and given high correlation between the independent variables and some
of the control variables. It does, however, mean that caution should be advised when
making predictions about what impact elections will have in any specific post-conflict
setting. Secondly, a few observations may have considerable leverage over the reported
results. This is also to be expected given the limited sample. The observations with the
most leverage are the few which contradicts the main findings, thus the reported results
would be stronger if the most influential cases had been removed. This notwithstanding,
the sensitivity of the reported results to single observations is an additional reason to be
cautious when judging the strengths of the estimated effects.
Relatively strong support is, however, found in favor of the proposition that the effect
of elections on the durability of post-conflict peace depends on the level of institutional
constraints placed on elected governments. The above caveats aside, the interaction
between elections and constraints on the executive remains robust in a wide range of
model specifications. Moving beyond mere statistical significance, the interaction effect
is also shown to be strong enough to make it substantively interesting.
1.3 Organization
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 I develop the formal theoretical argument
and a testable hypothesis is derived. In Chapter 3 I proceed to develop a quantitative
research design tailored to test this hypothesis empirically. Results are reported in Chap-
ter 4, before I in Chapter 5 investigate the robustness of the reported results. A final
chapter concludes.
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Chapter 2
Theory
This chapter develops the theoretical argument on the relationship between elections and
institutions that constrain elected governments and post-conflict stability. It is argued
that the impact of different democratic institutions must be understood in light of how
they affect the post-conflict security dilemma. Democracy, if understood primarily as a
system letting a popular majority decide policies, does not necessarily build the founda-
tions for lasting peace. This is because elections by themselves do not solve commitment
problems. If election losers fear the consequences of submitting to peaceful opposition,
they can be expected to return to armed conflict. The potential for peace should, on the
other hand, increase with the introduction of institutions aimed at constraining what a
majority can do when it assumes power. This should help make the opposition confident
that its interests will be respected as the costs of majoritarian abuse are increased. Hence,
what effect holding elections will have on the risk of conflict recurrence is hypothesized
to depend on the strength of constraining institutions.
After briefly reviewing existing findings in the literature, this chapter proceeds by pre-
senting commitment problems as the main threat to durable peace after internal conflicts.
The third section points to mechanisms proposed in the literature through which demo-
cratic institutions may affect the severity of the commitment problem. It is argued that
dynamics that more generally make democracy self-enforcing are harder to achieve after
internal conflicts. However, new insights can be gained by disaggregating the concept
of “democratic institutions” into its sub-components. This is done in the fourth section.
Competitive elections may lead to either conflict recurrence or durable peace depending
on the whether effective institutional constraints are in place.
9
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2.1 What We Know about Post-Conflict Elections
Existing studies have generally found that elections increase the risk of conflict recurrence
(though see Jarstad 2009 and Cheibub, Hays and Savun 2012). Paris (2004), Flores and
Nooruddin (2012) and Brancati and Snyder (2012) find that elections are more likely
to produce recurrent conflict the sooner they are held after the end of hostilities, while
Collier (2009) posits that holding elections in conflict-ridden countries is an important
source of violence and renewed conflict. Collier, Hoeﬄer and So¨derbom (2008) find that
peace is more likely to collapse in the year following a competitive election. Also more
generally, transitionary elections have been found to be related to civil war (Cederman,
Gleditsch and Hug 2012, Strand 2007: Chapter 8). Even the prospect of elections is
found to be potentially destabilizing, as the chances of election victory are related to
rebel leaders’ willingness of accepting post-conflict democratization (Metternich 2011).
Moreover, Linebarger and Salehyan (2012) find that periods leading up to executive
elections in Africa are related to increased social conflict.
In short, systematic investigations of the impact of elections have found these to
be potentially destabilizing events. Elections may raise the level of polarization and
contestation and this may lead back to conflict. Election losers may be tempted to
contest results violently. What is found to be particularly dangerous in the post-conflict
setting is that
former enemies will find it difficult to commit to postconflict peace. Elections
exacerbate this dilemma, since election winners can break their commitment
to respect peace and democratic norms and instead use their newfound power
to punish their enemies (Flores and Nooruddin 2012: 558-559).
Even if elections in some cases are found to be related to conflict recurrence, they
may also be important milestones in transitions towards durable peace (Reilly 2002).
Stable democracy has been found to a be strong force for civil peace (Hegre et al. 2001).
However, transitions to democracy do of course require that elections are held at some
point and this may increase the risk of conflict (Cederman, Hug and Krebs 2010).
This makes it interesting to investigate the factors that mitigate the effect of elections.
While Strand (2007: Chapter 8) shows that executive constraints may be important in this
respect for the second election following a regime change, the existing literature on post-
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conflict recurrence has not provided any clear answer to how other political institutions
impact the relationship between elections and a civil peace.
Jarstad (2009) presents evidence that the introduction of power-sharing institutions
do not necessarily increase the chances of peace following post-conflict elections. Flores
and Nooruddin (2012), on the other hand find that the effect of early post-conflict elec-
tions depends on previous democratic experience and conclude that this has to do with
the maturity of other political institutions. This is in line with Huntington’s (1968) notion
of conflict being the results of opening up for political participation without strong insti-
tutions or a democratic tradition (see also Mansfield and Snyder 2007). To my awareness
this proposition has, however, not been subjected to much scrutiny neither theoretically
nor empirically within the literature on post-conflict elections. Whether other political
institutions may mitigate the impact of post-conflict elections is thus still an unanswered
question. An important motivation for this thesis is thus to fill this gap in the existing
literature.
2.2 Post-Conflict Commitment Problems
When investigating the impact of democratic institutions on the durability of post-conflict
peace a good first step may be to identify which mechanisms may explain the phenomenon
of recurring conflict. Understanding the challenges of the post-conflict setting is crucial
for understanding the effects of different aspects of post-conflict democracy. Previous
scholarship has pointed to the existence of a post-conflict commitment problem as an
important explanation both for why civil conflicts are difficult to end and why they so
often recur (Walter 2002, Joshi 2010, Metternich and Wucherpfennig 2011, Thyne 2012,
Powell 2012, Wig and Hegre 2013). The actors’ inability to trust each other makes it
more difficult to keep the political process going, as both actors will fear that compliance
will be taken advantage of. This can make the political process inherently unstable. This
has lead existing scholarship to conclude that power-sharing institutions may hold more
promise than democratic competition (Walter 2002, Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). Also
scholars who assume that some form of democracy will be necessary have put emphasis
of strengthening the elements of power-sharing within the political system (Lijphart 2004,
Binningsbø 2006). These institutions replace the ex ante uncertainty of democracy with
institutions that secure influence for all relevant groups.
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Establishing certainty and security is thus suggested to be crucial for stable peace
(Berdal 2009: 95-96). Even if both actors have an interest in long-term peace, it may
be hard to achieve if each actor fears that the other will take advantage of any acts
of goodwill. This aspect of post-conflict politics may be captured in a simple dynamic
game of incomplete information. The game takes place between two actors, the former
belligerents of a civil war. There are of course often more than two actors involved in
civil wars and post-war processes. Yet the important logic of post-conflict politics with
insecurity and commitment problems as important mechanisms can be illustrated in the
simplified two-actor setting. While recognizing that multiple actors may be important,
it is fruitful to simplify post-conflict politics as a two-actor game.
At the outset of this game the conflict is assumed to have ended, and I therefore
assume that some sort of agreement exists, either explicitly or as an informal agreement
reached on the battlefield. In the further political process both actors will have to make
choices as to whether to respect this outcome or to try to improve their position vis-a-vis
the other. Even if both sides have a vested interest in peace, insecurity over what will
happen after the weapons are layed down may make durable peace difficult to achieve
(Walter 2002).
I thus assume two actors, i ∈ {G,R}. One of these actors controls the government (G)
while the other actor is the former rebel actor (R) that would have to demobilize for there
to be lasting peace.1 To facilitate demobilization it seems reasonable that the government
would offer the former rebels concessions. The available strategies for the government are
thus to offer or not to offer a concession. The rebels may accept or contest any government
policy. A contestation is assumed to lead back to conflict. The rebels derive a utility of
pΠ−σR from conflict where Π denotes the contested political pie and p denotes the rebel
strength (e.g. Powell 2012). p may therefore be interpreted as the share of the contested
good the rebels would secure through armed conflict or alternatively the rebel probability
1Some research suggests that this situation may be somewhat different in the case of a decisive rebel
victory. Toft (2009) posits that recurrences are less likely following rebel victories. This is because
the former government apparatus easily can be identified and dealt with. If this proposition holds, the
peace following rebel victories could perhaps be expected to be less fragile. In those cases, the game
that is developed here may be a less accurate description of the post-conflict dynamics. However, rebel
victories are rare and, as Quinn and Joshi (2013) point out, rarely decisive. Even if being the “victorious”
side, rebels are typically less in control, and the former government may be able to relaunch military
resistance, as the Khmer Rouge did after being ousted from power in Cambodia (Kreutz 2012: 19).
Thus, the situation following most rebel victories should at least not be entirely different from the game
developed here. This is also indicated by a simple Cox regression reported in Appendix A. Whereas
government victories significantly lead to a smaller risk of recurrence, rebel victories do not.
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of victory. σi denotes actor i’s cost of conflict. Thus, the government’s utility of conflict
is (1− p)Π− σG. Because of the inefficiency of war, captured by σi, there should always
exist a division of the contested good Π, {Π,Π − x} that both sides prefer to conflict
(Fearon 1995: 383-384). The problem is that the rebels that have to demobilize cannot
be confident that the government will remain committed to such a distribution after they
have demobilized. This can be modeled by having two possible types of governments, one
committed (C) and one uncommitted (U), where the committed type is unable to renege
on its promise. The possible government types are thus denoted θ ∈ {C,U}. Where this
kind of commitment may come from will be investigated in later sections. For now what
is important is how this element of uncertainty affects the chances of durable peace. The
uncertainty is incorporated in the model by letting the fictitious player Nature draw the
type of government. Nature draws a committed government with a known probability q,
but the draw is not revealed to the rebels prior to demobilization. This game is illustrated
in extensive form in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Post-conflict politics, one-sided incomplete information
Nature
Government Government
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Consider first the situation where there is not offered any concession, x. In this case,
the former rebels will refuse to demobilize and go back to conflict as long as pΠ−σR ≥ 0,
which means that there will be renewed conflict as long as the rebels are not so weak as to
make the costs of conflict prohibitive. This fits well with the notion that conflicts that have
ended in an overwhelming victory are less likely to recur (Luttwak 1999, Quinn, Mason
and Gurses 2007, Toft 2009, Kreutz 2010a). A defeated side may find it impossible to
return to conflict regardless of how it is treated following the conflict. A recent example
is the strict military rule in Tamil provinces on Sri Lanka following the defeat of The
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In many cases, however, we should expect rebels to
prefer going back to conflict rather than surrendering to an abusive government. Provided
that there are not some external costs on making concessions, for instance related to the
signal this may send to other groups (Wucherpfennig 2011), both types of government
will always make an offer x, where x will never be so large as to make the government
better off in conflict.
Whether the rebels will accept an offer, x, and demobilize depends on their belief
about the government type, b(θ). As both types of Governments would make an offer
(at least under the conditions that make the game interesting), there exists no separating
equilibrium, and Bayesian learning based on observing an offer does not help the rebels in
making a decision. Stated formally, b(θ = C|x) = q. This makes it interesting to find the
critical q necessary for the rebels to accept an offer from the government and demobilize.
This is found by setting
q(pΠ− σR) + (1− q)(pΠ− σR) ≤ q(x) + (1− q)0. (2.1)
Simplifying and solving for q yields
q ≥ pΠ− σR
x
. (2.2)
Hence, the faith in the government’s commitment to its promises needed to facilitate
demobilization increases with the rebels expected utility of conflict and decreases with
what potentially could be gained from peace. This is perhaps unsurprising and fits well
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with the previous theoretical and empirical literature. It does, however, not answer the
question of whether democracy will help build the foundations for lasting peace. Whether
political institutions and institutional change can contribute to solving the post-conflict
commitment problems will be the topic of the rest of this chapter. What should already
be clear is two aspects of importance. Firstly, as the level of q is important for equilibrium
behavior, some sort of guarantees about future policy must be provided. Traditionally,
this is seen as one important function of political institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson
2006). Political institutions are the focus of the rest of this chapter. Secondly, such
possible guarantees must be tailored towards limiting the commitment problem. Hence,
there is already something to be said about what democratic institutions must be able
to do in order to facilitate durable peace.
2.3 Is Democracy the Solution?
A strong correlation between democracy and durable peace has generally not been identi-
fied. Research on the effect of the level of democracy or democratization on post-conflict
peace has typically not found any positive impact on the durability of post-conflict peace
(Walter 2002; 2004, Collier, Hoeﬄer and So¨derbom 2008, Hegre and Fjelde 2010). As
discussed in Section 2.1, studies looking at the effect of post-conflict elections have also
found these to be potentially dangerous (Reilly 2002, Flores and Nooruddin 2012), espe-
cially when they take place early in the post-conflict periods (Brancati and Snyder 2012).
This section expands on how different aspects of post-conflict democracy may be theo-
rized to have an effect on peace duration and shows that a disaggregation of the concept
of post-conflict democracy is necessary.
Recognizing the strategic concerns facing post-conflict political actors, parts of the
literature have come to optimistic conclusions concerning the potential of creating stable
post-conflict democracy. Such conclusions have been derived from two different lines of
thought on how democracy works, related in turn to two different theoretical frameworks
on the emergence of stable democratic rule. The first line of thought is related to Ace-
moglu and Robinson’s (2006) conception of democracy as a way for the elite to commit
to future redistribution in favor of the majority. Extending this logic to the post-conflict
setting, Metternich and Wucherpfennig (2011) argue that post-conflict democratization
makes political bargains between former belligerents credible, and thus removes the risk
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of conflict recurrence.
One problem with this perspective is that it remains unclear exactly how democratic
institutions can solve the commitment problems specific to the post-conflict setting.
Democratic elections may be enough to guarantee future redistributional policies and
thus quell the threat of revolution in the case of elite-majority bargaining (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2006). It is, however, not obvious how majority rule through elections will solve
commitment problems where the actor with de facto power to disrupt the peace is not
likely to win popular support in democratic elections. One plausible hypothesis is that
the type of democratization associated with credible commitments takes on a different
institutional character than the strict majoritarian conception of competitive elections
(Metternich 2011: 913). Some research suggests that political institutions of consocia-
tional democracy are effective in preventing conflict recurrences (Binningsbø 2006; 2011).
This may be because these institutions can more credibly signal a post-conflict order
where former belligerents get a share of their political power. Looking at changes in de
facto access to executive power for groups linked to the previous insurgency, Wucherpfen-
nig (2011) finds that such changes decrease the chances of recurrence once endogeneity
is accounted for.
The argument that elections alone do not work as a mechanism for credible commit-
ment after civil wars finds support in the outcome of the 1991 election process in post-
conflict Angola. When the unita leader Jonas Savimbi realized that elections would not
provide sufficient political influence, he rejected the transition process and went back to
war (Reilly 2002: 120). That elections not always secure a civil peace was also seen in
Algeria the same year. In December 1991, The National Liberation Front cancelled the
elections after the first round, as it became clear that the opposition party The Islamic
Salvation Front was about to win the election (Bouandel 1993). According to Blaydes
and Lo (2012: 129-130) this can be explained by the uncertainty regarding whether the
Islamists were committed to a continued democracy or would establish an Islamist dic-
tatorship. As Kalyvas (2000: 385) puts it, The Islamic Salvation Front failed to “signal
credibly that it would not subvert the institutions once it won.” Some further indication
of why majoritarian elections may fail to build a road towards lasting peace was provided
by the dominating Sinhalese parties in Sri Lanka, which used their democratic power to
secure Sinhalese interests on a wide range of issues in the 1972 constitution (Joshi 2012:
6).
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In a direct extension of Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) logic, as is attempted by
Metternich and Wucherpfennig (2011), the ability of democratic elections to solve com-
mitment problems should depend on the relationship between de facto power as observed
during the internal conflict and electoral strength. This means that democracy must
work to secure the long-term interests of those capable of disrupting it. Arguably, the
ability of electoral democracy to facilitate credible commitments does not to the same
extent apply to peripheral conflicts in which the former rebel movements have smaller
chances of winning support for their demand through participation in the national polit-
ical system. This may help explain the existence of peripheral insurgencies in India (see
Section 4.1), despite the relatively well-functioning democratic system. Indeed, one could
expect that when the rebel movement only represents marginal groups, elections in which
power is left to the majority make it harder to satisfy rebel demands (Metternich 2011).
In fact, the commitment problems may become more severe as elections may only serve
to provide the other side with legitimacy. Because opening up for majority influence on
politics does not necessarily solve post-conflict commitment problems, it remains unclear
how democratization could make post-conflict peace more durable.
There are, however, other aspects of democracy that more generally should help solve
commitment problems. These are institutions that regulate the political process and
provide opportunities for former rebels to react against reneged promises, without having
to go back to conflict. The expected utility of accepting peace under competetitive
democracy even without realistic chances of gaining power through the electoral channel
should be higher if there are institutions that protect the rule of law and constrain those
in power. One of the few scholars that have investigated the impact of these types of
institutions is Walter (2010). She finds that having a formal constitution decreases the
chances of conflict recurrence, while measures of repression increase these risks. What is
common for the type of institutions Walter (2010) finds to be important is that they put
limitations on what a legitimate government may do. Similarly, Flores and Nooruddin
(2012) find that early post-conflict elections are less risk-inducing for countries with a
previous democratic experience, and argue that this is because the constraints on the
executive are stronger in these countries. Lijphart (2004) posits that a stable post-conflict
democracy requires that all relevant groups are guaranteed influence and protection.
Another view of post-conflict democracy is related not to democracy as providing
solutions to the post-conflict commitment problem, but to Przeworski’s (1991) theory of
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the role of uncertainty in establishing self-enforcing democracy. According to Wantchekon
and Neeman (2002), former belligerents should be able to agree to let the people arbi-
trate the dispute if both sides face a decent chance at succeeding in the post-conflict
electoral competition. Previous research has found electoral strength to be important for
whether rebel leaders will accept democratization. Metternich (2011) does for instance
find that the success of democratizing interventions by international organizations in
ending African conflicts is related to the potential electoral strength of rebel movements.
If the latter view is correct then it might, however, also suggest a potential troublesome
impact of post-conflict democracy. If civil war actors are able to agree to democracy
because they think they face a decent chance of electoral success, one should perhaps
expect a sore loser effect when some groups lose the competition for ballots. Such electoral
losses may make it tempting to return to the guns. This effect is what leads Durant and
Weintraub (2010) to believe that majoritarian democracy cannot be self-enforcing after
civil war. Losing an election is expected to lead to the type of exclusion from state power
and competition over the spoils of government that is seen as one important source of
conflict (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009: 317). In other words, elections may yield
results that armed actors consider worse than renewed conflict and this may make conflicts
more likely to recur. In some cases, this danger can be recognized by the voters, as when
Charles Taylor was elected president of Liberia under the slogan “He killed my Ma, he
killed my Pa, but I will vote for him anyHa” (Outram 1999: 167).
In other cases, the prospect of loss in elections may lead to electoral fraud and attempts
by some parties to distort the election process, which might cause a spiral of violence and
renewed conflict. Hence, elections may be important trigger events for new violence (Sisk
2008, Brancati and Snyder 2012). Thus, whereas elections in stable democracies may
offer the citizens an opportunity to assess whether elites are respecting the rules of the
game and rebel if they are not (Fearon 2011), post-conflict elections may reveal to some
armed actors that their interests will be better served by conflict. Przeworski’s (1991)
framework does of course offer a possible solution to this problem. If the losing faction
views the chances of future electoral success as sufficiently good, the expected utility
of respecting election outcomes may be higher than that of renewed fighting (Strand
2007: 299). Such a mechanism probably exists, but there are aspects of the post-conflict
setting that makes it less plausible here than in other contexts. Firstly, emerging from
armed conflict the political actors already have the relevant experience and organizational
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capacity for conflict which is likely to increase the expected utility of conflict. Secondly,
this explanation rests on the assumption that the commitment problems highlighted in
the literature as obstacles for democratic settlements (Walter 2002) have already been
solved. Hence, this mechanism can only be part of a broader explanation of peace-
strengthening effect of democracy. This motivates the disaggregation of post-conflict
democracy embarked on in the next section.
Such a broad explanation may for example include the type of institutions Lijphart
(2004) proscribes for divided societies. Recognizing the dangerous aspects of post-conflict
majoritarian elections, post-conflict actors may introduce institutions to limit the zero-
sum aspects of competitive elections (Mukherjee 2006) and facilitate credible commit-
ments (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; 2007, Wig and Hegre 2013). Such institutions may
work in conjunction with democratic competition in producing a peaceful equilibrium.
That the quality of other democratic institutions are important for the effect of post-
conflict elections is also suggested by Flores and Nooruddin’s (2012) finding that the
effect of early post-conflict elections depends on whether the country has previous demo-
cratic experience.
In conclusion, previous research has not found any clear link between democracy or
democratization and durable peace. Furthermore, some authors argue that democracy
may help solve post-conflict commitment problems while other contributions point to
potential dangers of post-conflict democracy. One plausible explanation for this is that
different types of institutions associated with democracy may have different effects on
the chances of conflict recurrence. This motivates the disaggregation of post-conflict
democracy embarked on in the next section.
2.4 Disaggregating Post-Conflict Democracy
In this section I discuss ways of disaggregating post-conflict democracy. Formally, this is
done by letting elections be the mechanism that decides which actor will be allowed to
decide the distribution of the political pie, Π, as well as letting institutions that constrain
the majority be the mechanism that determines a majority’s ability to abuse its power.
As was discussed in the last section, opening up for majority access to power and imposing
constraints on the government may have very different effects in the post-conflict setting.
Variation in whether elections are combined with institutions that limit the power of the
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winner of the election has been suggested by previous research to be related both to onset
of civil war (Hegre et al. 2001, Hegre and Fjelde 2010) and more generally to the stability
of democratic regimes (Gates et al. 2006). Collier (2009: 15) argue that the introduction
of elections without institutions that punish abuse may not have any positive impact in
post-conflict settings. The model developed in section 2.4.1 incorporates this institutional
variation. The equilibrium outcome is to a great extent a reflection of the strength of
the constraining institutions. The exact nature of these are discussed in more detail in
section 2.4.2.
2.4.1 A Model of Post-Conflict Democracy
As before I assume two actors. For simplicity, these are still denoted i ∈ {G,R}. As
should be clear from Section 2.2, it should be possible to build mutually beneficial peace
by offering the rebels a sufficient piece, x of the political pie, Π. x still denotes the share
of Π allocated to R. However, instead of basing the peace on government concessions, a
democratic order is adopted where there exists a range of possible values of x, so that
x ∈ [xmin, xmax]. Moreover, both actors may now get control over the executive as this is
decided according to democratic rules. An election determines which actor is to set the
level of x, thus introducing ex ante uncertainty. This is modeled as Nature drawing the
rebels as the election winners with a probability, .  is thus the propability of the rebels
gaining power through the first election.
As in the model developed in Section 2.2, one source of concern is that the party in
power will eventually take advantage of its control of the state. As argued by Flores and
Nooruddin (2012: 558), the problem of elections is that election winners may use their
power to punish their enemies. Thus, the election victor may choose to allocate the entire
Π to itself. Annan (2004: 12) points out that this is often a concern after civil wars, and
particularly in Africa, where the state is more susceptible to the capture by for instance
ethnic groups. This may make post-conflict elections a zero-sum game with all the riches
of the state at stake.
To avoid this problem, institutions other than elections may be introduced. These
may include checks and balances, the rule of law and other institutions that introduce
limits on the feasibility of abusing power. This may be introduced in the model as a
parameter, η, that is subtracted from the Π that is realized from deviating from legitimate
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distributions of x. This may seem like an artificial modification of the model, but has
the straightforward interpretation that a move away from the political order involves a
non-zero cost. In more substantive terms, η can be seen as a parameter capturing the
extent to which other political institutions are able to make sure that democratic rules
are upheld following an election (Strand 2007: 293). The strength of these institutional
constraints is one important source of variation between self-proclaimed democracies that
may be important in explaining internal conflicts (Strand 2007: 312).
Prior to the election winner’s decision on x, the election loser decides whether to accept
the election result or to go back to conflict. If conflict is the outcome then the former
rebels are assumed to get a payoff of pΠ−σR, whereas the government gets (1−p)Π−σG.
As before, p denotes R’s probability of victory and σi denotes actor i’s cost of conflict.
This model of post-conflict democracy is shown in extensive form in Figure 2.2.
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Solving the model reveals an important aspect of the impact of post-conflict democ-
racy. Whether there is conflict in equilibrium is first and foremost a function of the
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strength of the constraining institutions, η. The ability to observe which institutions
are in place prior to making a decision to demobilize, makes this a complete informa-
tion game. Thus, whereas equilibria in the more general model of post-conflict politics
could be seen as a function of belief in how committed the other side is, equilibria in this
model depend on expectations about future outcomes as determined by political institu-
tions that may be observed directly. It is thus straightforward to solve the game using
backwards induction.
If the election results in a rebel victory, solving the game must begin by looking at the
decision node where the rebels implement their policies after having gained control over
the state. Whether they diverge from the legitimate divisions of Π will depend on whether
Π− η > xmax, in which case the domestic institutions are not strong enough to avoid the
election becoming an opportunity for seizing the state. Predicting this, the“Government”,
G, will choose to contest the election result as long as (1− p)Π− σG > 0. An empirical
example is the Algerian government’s decision to initiate an armed conflict in the prospect
of an opposition victory in the 1991 elections. As expressed by the US Assistant Secretary
of State, Edward Djerejian, the reason was the fear that the election would end up as“one
person, one vote, one time” (Djerejian 2008: 23). If on the other hand the institutions
are strong enough to constrain the rebels once in government, the former government, G,
would be able to give up its power as long as Π−xmax ≥ (1− p)Π−σG. The equilibrium
chance of conflict will thus depend both on whether the losing side prefers submitting to
democracy to recurrent conflict and whether election winners are constrained by other
political institutions so that they are not tempted to abuse the power gained through
the electoral channel. The condition under which there will be peace following a rebel
election victory is therefore
η ≥ Π− xmax ≥ pΠ + σG. (2.3)
By symmetry, the condition under which there will be peace following government
election victory is given by
η ≥ xmin ≥ pΠ− σR, (2.4)
The cost involved in defecting from legitimate distributions of Π once in power must
thus be greater or equal to the difference between the total Π and the electoral winner’s
2.4. DISAGGREGATING POST-CONFLICT DEMOCRACY 23
maximum share of the political pie. Furthermore, this difference between what is legit-
imately allocated to political winners and the total political pie cannot be so small as
to make conflict more beneficial than loyal opposition to the losers of the election. In
other words, the cost of peace has to be lower than the cost of conflict for those left in
opposition.
Substantially, this means that elections by themselves do not solve the commitment
problem facing the post-conflict political actors. What matters for the durability of
peace are the other institutions that makes it safe for the losing side to hand over power
to the electoral winners. In other words, there will be peace in equilibrium following an
election as long as the loser has more to gain from peaceful opposition than from returning
to conflict. The chances of this being the case depends largely on the ability of other
institutions to constrain the winners of the election following a demobilization of the
other side. “Indeed, institutional constraints on executive power such as a parliament or
independent courts reduce the ability for the potential winner of an election to forever
exclude political rivals, ethnic minorities, and leaders of insurgent groups from power”
(Mukherjee 2006: 409).
One implication of this is that parties committed to peace could be expected to try
to build this kind of constraining institutions. As Wucherpfennig (2011) points out, this
introduces an endogeneity problem, where the effects of such institutions are hard to
isolate from what lead to their adoption. As theorized by Elster (2000), adopting strong
institutions may be one way for an actor to make sure that they will be constrained
in the future and thus escape the commitment problem. The empirical difficulties this
introduces are discussed in Section 3.4.1. At this point it should, however, be noted that
the willingness to introduce constraining institutions may be related to the commitment
to peace. It may for instance be that conflicts ending in mutually hurting stalemates
both are less likely to recur and more likely to experience post-conflict democratization
than other conflicts (Joshi 2010: 23). On the other hand, Joshi (2010: 37) may be right
that the cases most likely to democratize are also those cases that previous research has
found to be most at risk, such as stalemates. As was suggested in Section 2.2, peace may
be stable regardless of political institutions when one side has a prohibitive high cost of
recurrent conflict. Joshi (2010) argues that there in these cases are only small incentives to
democratize. Thus on one hand, more committed actors may build stronger institutions,
on the other hand these more committed actors may face a less stable peace. The general
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point is, however, that institutions should not be seen as something completely exogenous
to the outcomes they produce. Recognizing the potential selection issues, it is still possible
to look further into what institutional makeups are more likely to facilitate durable peace.
The discussion thus far allows for a preliminary conclusion. Elections are by them-
selves not likely to provide the foundation for lasting peace. However, institutions de-
signed to constrain and regulate the post-demobilization political process should be im-
portant in making post-conflict elections be a force for peace. The next section will
elaborate on what these institutions are, and how this prediction can be tested.
2.4.2 The Conditional Effect of Post-Conflict Elections
This section investigates the prediction of the theoretical model further. A key implication
of the model is that the impact of post-conflict elections depends on the presence of
institutions that limit the authority of elected governments. Such institutions serve as
guarantees against majoritarian abuse in consolidated democracies, but are typically less
developed in new democracies (Kapstein and Converse 2008b: 26-27). The reason why
they are important is that they provide a way of restraining governments from abusing
their power. As is seen in the model in section 2.4.1, this may shift the equilibrium
outcome from renewed conflict to stable peace.
Dahl (2006: 36) points out that even if some sort of constraints on majority power
will be needed, this does not necessarily imply a need for formal institutions. It is also
possible to argue that individual ethics and social norms can play restraining roles. This
may be part of the story in consolidated democracies. Yet, informal constraints cannot
be expected to solve the post-conflict commitment problem, as informal constraints ul-
timately rest on trust (Lijphart 2008: 113-114). Precicely because of the commitment
problem discussed in Section 2.2, such trust is likely to be in limited supply in post-conflict
politics. This means that the institutionalization of constraints should be critical.
It may, however, not be clear whether such institutions can ever be expected to be
strong enough to make respecting democratic rules more beneficial than abuse for a post-
conflict majority. In other words, the condition that Π − η provides less utility than
the election winner’s preferred level of x, may seem depressingly limiting. As noted by
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000: 1122-1123), committing to policies after elections
is difficult: “Elected political offices, whether executive or legislative, carry important
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powers that are always partially – sometimes even greatly – unchecked”.
For institutions to have a strong enough impact they must be based on something
other than providing a disarmed opposition an arena for protest. Persson, Roland and
Tabellini (1997) show formally how the introduction of checks and balances hinder elected
governments from abusing their power by removing the option of enacting policies uni-
laterally. Institutions are only as strong as the effort needed to undermine them. A
powerful way of avoiding such abuse is to make different political offices check the power
of each other. Importantly, attempts to circumvent institutions of popular control may
also alienate members of the majority side in a way abuse of the opposition would not.
Abuse of power may thus require subverting a larger institutional structure which is likely
to involve substantial costs (Wig and Hegre 2013).
Thus, such institutions may involve substantial extra costs on abuse. Besley and
Persson (2011: 1430) argue that the institutional constraints on the executive are the best
measure of the degree to which there is an institutionalized ability to make commitments
not to expropriate the opposition. For the formal model in the Section 2.4.1, whether
there is peace in equilibrium was shown to depend in part on the inability of electoral
winners of expropriating all political power. The executive is likely to be the institution
under which such power is expropriated. Constraints on the executive should be seen as
an important determinant of the ability of expropriating the entire political pie.
Previous scholarship on the effect of executive constraints on civil war termination
has argued that constrained executives may be less successful in negotiating an end to
civil war because an empowered opposition puts limits on what kind of policies they can
pursue (Thyne 2012). On the face of it, this may seem to be a powerful counterargument
against the role of executive constraints hypothesized here. On closer examination the
two claims are, however, not orthogonal. The same mechanisms that should limit the
bargaining space of the executive during a negotiation, should limit the range of policies
feasible to the executive after negotiations have ended. Although this might make it
more difficult to reach agreements or grant what is perceived as unjust amnesties to small
insurgent groups, it also makes it less likely that a government will be able to renege on a
settlement already in place. What drives the argument is that executive constraints make
it more difficult for a government to renege on decided policies. Within the context of
negotiating an end to ongoing conflicts, this may be a problem as a government typically
will have committed to defeating insurgents. However, once a settlement is in place, not
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being able to renege on commitments should be a force of peace. Thus, where peace is
already established, constraints should make peace more durable as the chances of abuse
are smaller.
Examples on constraints on majority power playing such a role include the parlia-
mentarian provisions in the interim constitution of post-conflict Nepal (Joshi 2012: 21).
By providing the other political factions with the ability to constrain the Maoists, these
provisions facilitated a process where election results have been respected and violence
has been limited. Strasheim and Fjelde (2012: 12) link the aforementioned conflict re-
currence in Angola following the 1992 elections to the absence of constraints placed on
the executive branch under the 1991 Bicesse Agreement.
More broadly, it has been found that democratic stability in developing countries to a
significant extent depends on the degree of executive constraints (Kapstein and Converse
2008b: 63-65). Here too, the hypothesized mechanism is the ability to avoid abuse of
power secured through the electoral channel. Cross tabulations also suggest a relation-
ship between constraints on the executive and a sustained post-conflict democratization
(Strasheim and Fjelde 2012: 14). In accordance with the theoretical model of post-conflict
politics developed here, constraints on the executive seem to be of great importance for
the peace building potential of post-conflict democracy. Such institutions allow letting
an elected government assume power, without raising concerns that the settlement of the
conflict will not be respected.
To summarize, the model developed in section 2.4.1 incorporates two types of demo-
cratic institutions: elections and limitations on majority power. What the model shows
is that the potential for elections to increase the risk of recurrence is highly dependent
on how well regulated the post-conflict political system is. This suggests an interaction
effect between elections and constraining institutions.
Hypothesis 1. The effect of elections on the durability of post-conflict peace depends
on the level of executive constraints. Holding elections will only make peace less durable
where strong constraining institutions are not in place.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have developed a theoretical framework for understanding the rela-
tionship between democracy and post-conflict peace. The key proposition is that the
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threat the commitment problems pose makes regulation and effective constraints impor-
tant for the peace building impact of post-conflict elections. A general conclusion is that
competitive elections by themselves cannot be expected to make peace more enduring.
This follows from the importance of the post-conflict commitment problems in laying the
ground for durable peace. From this I derive the hypothesis that post-conflict elections
are more likely to contribute to durable peace the stronger the constraints put on majority
power are.
The next chapter proceeds to develop a research design for testing the proposition
that constraints that solves the commitment problem makes post-conflict democracy more
likely to contribute to durable peace. This allows evaluating whether the equilibria of the
theoretical model are reflected in the empirical data.
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Chapter 3
Research Design
In this chapter I develop a quantitative research design aimed at testing the proposition
that the strength of the constraints put on post-conflict majorities determine the peace
building potential of post-conflict elections. This chapter thus bridges the gap between
the theoretical model which is developed in Chapter 2 and the empirical data which
are analyzed in Chapter 4. Firstly, I outline how the dataset covering the 1972-2005
period is assembled. Secondly, I proceed to discuss the operationalization of key variables.
Thirdly, I present survival analysis, and more specifically the Cox model, as the statistical
approach to test the hypothesis. Fourthly, I outline important sources of bias and what is
done to limit the bias that endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and missingness might
introduce.
3.1 Dataset and Unit of Analysis
I use the information in the UCDP Termination Dataset (Kreutz 2010a) to construct
a dataset of post-conflict peace spells. This is done by measuring the time between
a termination date of a conflict episode and the start date of onset of a new conflict
episode between the belligerents of the same conflict. Thus, this is the source of both the
dependent variable, which is the durability of post-conflict peace and the unit of analysis
which is the post-conflict peace spell.
In the UCDP Termination Dataset conflicts are coded as having ended if the total
number of casualties in a year drops below the thresholds of 25 battle deaths. A low
theshold limits the problem of conflicts being coded as terminated due to fluctations on
the number of battle deaths (see e.g. Collier, Hoeﬄer and So¨derbom 2008:466). Yet there
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are some cases of low-intensity conflicts being coded as having ended because the number
of battle deaths have dropped below 25. This may be problematic if these conflicts have
never really ended (Rustad and Binningsbø 2012: 536). To avoid this problem I follow the
approach in the existing literature in only considering as peace spells those cases where
the peace lasted for at least two years (Gates and Strand 2004). Appendix B contains a
list of all included peace spells.
As important determinants of conflict recurrence vary with time, I split each peace
spell into “peace spell-years” to allow for time varying covariates. The reason for splitting
the data in years even if the dependent variable is measured in number of days, is that
the independent variables and most controls are only observed yearly. Thus, even if the
duration of peace can be measured more precisely, the same is not the case for all the
variables affecting the duration of the peace. I do, however, not expect this to affect
results. As theory does not allow predictions about the exact dates of recurrences, little
is lost from only observing yearly changes in important covariates.
The UCDP termination data set is dyadic in that conflict episodes are coded as being
part of the same conflict only if both sides of the conflict remain the same. If a new conflict
breaks out within the same country, this is not coded as a recurrence if the opposition side
is different. How peace spells are defined is not trivial. Dahl and Høyland (2012) show
how different definitions of what a peace spell is may lead to different results. The reason
for looking at new conflict-episodes rather than new conflicts is that the data-generating
process causing some countries to be more war-prone may be different from the processes
that make some dyads return to conflict after some years of peace (Walter 2004). As the
first type of process is of less interest to the research question of this thesis, I use a dyadic
criterion to identify peace spells. Employing a dyadic dataset thus facilitates a closer link
between the theoretical and empirical model.
3.2 Operationalizations
Testing the predictions made by the theoretical model empirically requires operationaliza-
tion of the theoretical concepts. Constructing indicators that make it possible to capture
the theoretical constructs empirically is hence an important part of the research process
(Adcock and Collier 2001). Conclusions may plausibly be driven by the choices made
when going from theoretical constructs to empirical indicators. This is especially a risk
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when working with complex and elusive theoretical constructs such as “constraining insti-
tutions”. Thus, in this section great care is taken to identify operationalizations of these
concepts that fit well with the theoretical constructs of Chapter 2. In addition to the
key independent variables of interests, a set of control variables are also identified. These
include operationalization of the other parameters crucial for equilibria in the formal
models and potential confounders, and alternative explanations provided by the existing
literature.
3.2.1 Independent Variables
The research question and the hypothesis derived from the theoretical model are con-
cerned with two independent variables. These are elections held in post-conflict settings
and the level and quality of institutional constraints placed on majorities in the settings
where such elections are held.
3.2.1.1 Post-Conflict Elections
The first independent variable that has to be operationalized is elections. It is only where
elections are held that the formal model in Section 2.4.1 is valid and where the level of
institutional constraints on majority power is hypothesized to be crucial for facilitating
a durable peace.
When investigating the conditional effect of elections on the durability of post-conflict
peace a difficult question is for how long elections can be expected to have an impact.
It seems unrealistic to expect elections only to have an impact in the month or year in
which they are held, as both the period leading up to and the aftermath of the election
may be affected by expectations for and reactions to the election. At the same time it
would be problematic to blame a recurrence that happened several years after the election
on a post-conflict election.1 To make sure that inferences do not rest on any arbitrary
demarcation on when elections can be expected to have an effect, I employ two different
measures to tease out the effect of post-conflict elections. The first is a binary indicator
for whether there was an election in the year of observation. This allows investigating
1There are, however, studies indicating that the long-term impact of early post-conflict elections.
Such early elections have for instance been found to lead to polarized party systems which again could
lead to conflict recurrence (Jarstad 2008: 31-32). Such effects are, however, beyond the scope of this
thesis.
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whether the risk associated with being in a post-conflict election year is mediated by the
level of constraining institutions.
Recognizing that this dummy is a rather crude indicator for the effect of elections,
which probably does not only exist in the election year, I also use a variable that is a
count of the years to the nearest post-conflict election in both directions of time. For
peace spells where post-conflict elections were never held, I set the time distance to the
maximum of 28. This may be problematic, but is in line with the existing literature.
Strand (2007: 316) similarly employs a decay function measuring the proximity in time
to the second election after a regime change, and assumes that if no second election is
observed, time can be set to infinity.2
Because the effect of elections is expected to diminish over time, I take the natural
logarithm of the distance (+0.1, to avoid taking the natural logarithm of 0). One al-
ternative operationalization would be a decay function where the effect of elections are
assumed to decline exponentially over time (Hegre et al. 2001, Strand 2007: 316). To
make sure that assumptions regarding the functional form of this variable are not biasing
the results I replicate one of the main models with Strand’s (2007) decay function as a
robustness test. This is reported in Appendix D. The results are robust to the choice of
operationalization.
A more problematic assumption is perhaps the assumption of symmetry in the effect
of election proximity. On the one hand one could assume, as do Collier, Hoeﬄer and
So¨derbom (2008: 470), that it is first and foremost the aftermath of an election that will
be important. On the other hand many countries have rather long campaign periods prior
to elections, while the dust settles quickly after the votes are counted. This would suggest
the effect to stretch further into the time prior to the election. Linebarger and Salehyan
(2012) find that the level of social conflict in African countries increases in periods leading
up to elections but declines after the election has been held. The assumption of symmetry
is tested in Appendix D. Although the results are slightly stronger for the aftermath of
elections, they are not radically different. It can thus be concluded that the results are
2I have also experimented with setting the value for the cases which never had elections to the mean
value of 18.6. This model is reported in Table D.1 in Appendix D. Setting these values to mean makes all
the constituent terms of the hypothesized interaction stronger and more significant. The explanation for
this is that some of the cases which never had elections also experienced recurrences. Thus, letting these
cases have a higher value on the variable measuring the distance to the nearest election may introduce
a downward bias for the effect of election proximity. Setting the time until election to the maximum for
cases may be problematic but is not driving the results in favor of the hypothesized interaction.
3.2. OPERATIONALIZATIONS 33
not driven by the assumption of symmetry.
A second issue is which elections should be included. Here two questions are impor-
tant. The first question is which type of elections should be included. What is of interest
within the framework of this thesis are the elections that can allocate control over the
political pie to one of the former belligerents. Depending on the political system of the
country in question, this may be both legislative and presidential elections. Both of these
election types are thus included. Some research has argued that presidential elections
are more likely to take the form of zero-sum games (Linz 1990:55-58, Lijphart 2004:111).
Whether the results are driven primarily presidential elections is a question that is inves-
tigated as a robustness test in Section 5.2. The effect is stronger for executive elections
but more significant for elections to legislatures. Importantly, the same pattern is present
regardless of the type of election. Grouping these elections together should thus not be
seen as an important source of bias.
A second question is how democratic an election should have to be in order to be
included. It may be problematic to employ a very restrictive coding rule. First of all this
may lead to the selection of elections only in countries with other democratic institutions.
More importantly, having a high threshold for competitiveness may lead to the exclusion
of elections that were boycotted by an opposition that instead returned to conflict. How-
ever, some restriction seems appropriate to avoid the inclusion of mock elections in very
authoritarian states, which may have stable peace spells for completely unrelated reasons.
I thus only include elections where the winning side received less than 90 % of the total
votes. This is not a very restrictive inclusion criterion, but it does exclude the most ob-
vious mock elections. I use election data from the iaep-dataset (Regan, Frank and Clark
2009) which includes all elections to executives and legislatures for the 1972-2005 period.
3.2.1.2 Institutional Constraints on Majority Power
The other independent variable that must be operationalized is institutional constraints
on majority power. Here two issues are important: first the indicator should capture
the type of constraining institutions argued to be important in Chapter 2 rather than
adjacent concepts such as the level of inclusiveness. In existing empirical applications
such subtleties are often lost (e.g. Joshi 2012). As discussed in sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2,
it is the horizontal constraints placed on the executive power that are likely to be most
important within the framework developed in Chapter 2. If election-induced recurrences
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are driven by the fear that election winner will seize control over the entire political state,
it should be the institutions of checks and balances that are explicitly designed to avoid
such abuses that will have the clearest effect.
Moreover, one is faced with a dilemma of capturing the de facto level of constraints
that is imposed by political institutions or focusing on formal institutions that are thought
to lead to high levels of constraints. What is important for the equilibria of the formal
model in Section 2.4.1 are the costs involved in deviating form legitimate distributions
of the political pie, Π. These costs were captured by the level of the parameter η. This
suggests that it is the de facto levels of institutional constraints that matter. For these
institutions to have an effect it must be well-known that they will produce costs for an
election winner trying to back away from the legitimate post-conflict order. Yet a strong
focus on realized levels of constraints may miss how specific formal institutions are the
source of these constraints. “Indeed, transitionary ‘constraints’ would not necessarily
bind, and may be changed by those who do not like them” (Glaeser, La Porta, de Silanes
and Shleifer 2004: 275). There is thus a case to be made also for concentrating on specific
formal institutions that should be expected to produce certain outcomes. The problem
with this is of course that it may lead to the inclusion of sham institutions existing only
as scraps of paper.
It should be noted that these two strategies in many ways could compliment each
other. One reason is that their biases are of opposite directions. Indicators of institutions
based on de facto performance will tend to fluctuate more than the durable institutional
characteristics they are supposed to measure (Glaeser et al. 2004: 277). De jure institu-
tions, on the other hand, are coded irrespective of whether they have any influence on
day-to-day politics. If the same results are found regardless of which measurement strat-
egy is employed, it should provide increased confidence in the validity of Hypothesis 1.
Another reason why these strategies may compliment each other is that they are not only
different empirical strategies, but can also be seen as ways of testing different empirical
evidence of the same theory, as is recommended by King, Keohane and Verba (1994). If
Hypothesis 1 is right then both higher levels of observed de facto constraints and for-
mal institutions aimed at checking and constraining the power of elected governments
should increase the peace building potential of post-conflict elections. A third reason
is that developing both empirical strategies opens up for convergent validation of each
strategy (Adcock and Collier 2001: 540). Assuming that both measures capture the same
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underlying concept of institutional constraints, they should be correlated.
As a measure of constraining institutions that is informed by institutions’ de facto
performance, I use the measure of the Polity-index measuring executive constrains, la-
beled xconst (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2004). This variable measures “the extent of
institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives, whether
individuals or collectives” (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2004: 24) on a seven-category
scale ranging from unlimited authority to executive parity or subordination. As argued
by Besley and Persson (2011: 1431) this measure is the empirical indicator most ap-
propriate for capturing the stiffness of constraints placed on majority power.3 A first
sub-hypothesis derived from Hypothesis 1 is thus
Hypothesis 1.1. The effect of elections on the durability of post-conflict peace depends
on the level of executive constraints as captured by xconst.
One problem with using components of the Polity-index such as xconst to study
the composition of political institutions after conflict is that data on such institutions is
missing in what the Polity-project defines as interruption, interregnum and transitional
periods (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2004: 19-20). The reason for this is that periods of
political transition are thought to be orthogonal to the institutional makeups that may
emerge from such transitions. As demonstrated by Plu¨mper and Neumayer (2010), mak-
ing assumptions about what goes on in these periods is a problematic exercise. Assuming
a particular score for xconst in all such cases could be an important threat to the valid-
ity of this variable and potentially bias regression results (Plu¨mper and Neumayer 2010:
210). Instead of assuming some general level for these cases I thus treat them as missing
and impute values through a multiple imputation model, as is discussed in Section 3.4.3.
The observations affected and the imputed executive constraint scores are reported in
Appendix C.
Another question concerning the xconst-variable relates to the level of measurement.
Technically the xconst-variable may be regarded as ordinal as it is not clear that the
differences between the levels reflect equal differences in the actual level of constraints
imposed on an executive (Strand 2007: 318). Most contributions to the literature have,
however, been willing to treat the executive constraints measure as continuous (Glaeser
et al. 2004, Acemoglu and Johnson 2005, Thyne 2012). To the extent that this is vi-
3For an additional application within the study of conflict recurrence see Wucherpfennig (2011: 22).
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able, treating the measure as continuous allows making use of more variation in the data
and is thus the strategy that is pursued here. The seven category scale seems to cap-
ture relatively small and equivalent differences in the degree of constraints. Moreover,
dichotomizing the executive constraints measure yields substantially very similar results.
Hence, I do not consider the assumption of continuity to be an important source of bias.
As a measure of institutional constraints based only on which formal institutions
are in place, I use a binary variable capturing whether the executive and the legislative
power have the power to veto each other’s decisions. This captures precisely the type
of formal institutions that Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997: 1166) consider to be
most important for constraining elected governments, as it means that “no policy can
be implemented unilaterally”. Wig and Hegre (2013: 11-12) argue that the existence
of a formal institution of mutual vetoes is highly indicative of the type of institutional
balance of power which should make expropriation of the opposition more costly. Data
on whether the formal institution of mutual veto power is present in a country is available
from the Institutions and Elections Project (iaep) (Regan, Frank and Clark 2009).
The dummy takes on the value of 1 if “the legislature have the constitutional power
to stop executive action” and “the executive have constitutional veto power over laws
passed by the legislature” (Regan and Clark 2010: 6). The coding is based on de jure
characteristics rather than subjective assessments of how these institutions perform. The
more precise criteria for exactly how the constitutions are imposing these constraints
may lead to the exclusion of similar institutions filling much of the same purpose. This
notwithstanding, in combination with testing sub-hypothesis 1.1, interaction the election
measures with a dummy allows further testing of Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1.2. The effect of elections on the durability of post-conflict peace depends
on whether the legislative and executive branch of government have the formal power to
veto each other’s decisions.
Having two different indicators of the same underlying concept makes it interesting to
investigate how well these two indicators converge empirically (Adcock and Collier 2001:
540-542). The correlation between these two variables is not particularly high even if they
are positively correlated. The point-biseral correlation is only 0.255 for the sample of
post-conflict peace spells.4 One plausible explanation for the relatively low correlation is
4The point-biseral is the correlation coefficient that is used when correlating a dichotomous variable
with a continuous variable.
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perhaps that there may be considerable variation in the performance of de jure institutions
in the post-conflict setting. This would be in line with what has already been discussed.
This interpretation is supported by the comparison of the percentage of observations
with mutual veto at high and low levels of executive vetoes. Among the observations
with xconst-scores of 6 or 7, 82.3% have de jure institutions providing a mutual veto
power. Thus most of the observations where the de facto executive constraints are high
have some de jure institution providing for mutual vetoes in the decision making process.
The percentage among the observations at the opposite end of the xconst-scale (scores
of 1 or 2) is 52.1%. Thus, the de jure institutions providing for a mutual veto is common
also in the post-conflict countries where de facto constraints are non-existent. This can be
seen from the map in Figure 3.1, which shows the mean xconst-score for the countries
with peace spells in my sample as well as the presence of de jure provisions for mutual
vetoes as coded by iaep. Although there is a tendency for mutual vetoes to go together
with higher de facto executive constraints, they are found also in countries with low mean
xconst-scores.
An empirical example that will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5 is Haiti in the early
1990s. After the recurrence of conflict following the 1991 presidential election, Haiti’s
executive constraint score dropped from 6 to 1. This reflected how the elected president
Aristede had been ousted and a military junta taken the de facto power (Nelson 1998:
72-736). Because the constitution was left unaltered, Haiti is, however, coded as having
mutual vetoes for the entire period.
There are also examples of the opposite case where there are no formal institutions
of mutual vetoes, but executive constraints are coded as high. Examples in this category
include peace spells in some former British colonies such as Sri Lanka and Trinidad and
Tobago, but also countries like Romania and Croatia. The general picture seems to be
that constraints on majority power are in place in these settings, but that there are no
constitutional arrangements for mutual vetoes. The only case in this category which
experienced a recurrence was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which may be considered
atypical as the two sides do not compete within the same domestic political system.
In general the two operationalizations of constraining institutions seem to capture the
same underlying concepts of institutions limiting what an elected majority may do with
its power. However – and as expected – there is an important difference in that de jure















































































































institutions exist in a broader range of settings. That very few cases are coded as de
facto constrained, even when this de jure indicator has a zero-score does, however, lend
support to the notion that these indicators capture the same type of institutions.
To avoid problems of reverse causality related to how institutions may change as a
result of recurrences, I lag both xconst and the mutual veto dummy with one year. In
other words, for each peace spell-year, t, I use the score in year t− 1. Changes in scores
on the institutional variables due to the recurrence of conflict should thus not bias results.
An opposite bias may, however, be introduced. For example Argentina had a competitive
election in 1983, six years after the end of conflict, and the executive constraints score
was upgraded from a minimum to a maximum score. According to Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (2013a) peace became “further stabilized” as a result of this democratization.
Because of the lag in xconst-variable, this election does, however, count as having
occurred within an unconstrained political system. Thus, even if the Argentinian conflict
never recur after this, this is not allowed to count in favor of sub-hypothesis 1.1. Thus,
there may be a downward bias in the reported results. As it is generally considered better
to fail to reject a false null hypothesis than to make the opposite mistake, I choose to lag
the institutional constraints while knowing that this can make it harder to find support
for the hypothesized relationships.
3.2.2 Control Variables
In addition to these explanatory variables, a set of central variables are included in the
baseline statistical model. This is necessary to avoid omitted variable bias. Omitted
variable bias occurs when a variable that is correlated with both the dependent and the
independent variable(s) is excluded from the analysis. The estimated coefficient for the
affected independent variable is then neither consistent nor unbiased (Stock and Watson
2007).
To avoid the problem of omitted variable bias I thus employ a set of control variables
found to be important predictors of internal conflicts (Hegre and Sambanis 2006) as well
as predictors of conflict recurrence more specifically (Kreutz 2010a). Important controls
thus include the natural logarithms of population, GDP per capita and battle deaths in
the previous conflict, as well as if the previous conflict ended in a one-sided victory.
Whether there was a one-sided victory is a particularly important control variable.
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One-sided victories are consistently found to be related to more durable peace (Wagner
1993, Licklider 1995, Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007, Kreutz 2010a, Mason, Gurses,
Brandt and Quinn 2011), moreover the outcome of the conflict is also been found to
be related to the institutional makeup after conflicts (Gurses and Mason 2008, Wig and
Hegre 2013). This variable should also pick up other important variation related to how
settled the previous conflict is, which should be expected to impact the effect post-conflict
elections will have. In cases where the conflict has made it utterly clear which side is
the stronger, elections may not have a particularly disruptive impact. Thus, including a
dummy for one-sided victories is important to avoid omitted variable bias.
Including the logarithm of the number of battle deaths in the previous conflict should
similarly pick up important variation related to the severity of conflict. Quinn, Mason
and Gurses (2007: 177) argue in favor of using this as an indicator of the cost of conflict.
Higher battle deaths of the previous conflict mean that also new conflicts are likely to be
costly affairs. Another rational choice expectation may be that more severe conflicts, as
reflected in the number of battle deaths, have revealed more private information and thus
are associated with a lower risk of recurrence (Fearon 1995: 393). Alternatively, one may
expect the bitterness created by more brutal conflicts to make a peaceful post-conflict
order harder to achieve (Lacina 2006). In any event, this is an important control variable.
I also include a dummy indicating the presence of a peace keeping operation. Following
much of the existing literature (Kreutz 2010a), I look at whether a peace keeping operation
was present in the country of the peace spell. This may be somewhat problematic as the
peace keepers’ mandate may not in all cases be linked to that particular conflict episode.
Empirically, this problem is, however, limited. I have excluded PKOs following inter-state
conflicts as these missions will not have mandates linked to the internal conflicts.
Another important set of control variables are aspects of democracy other than elec-
tions and executive constraints. The much used Polity-index is for instance made up of
three components, which in addition to the level of executive constraints include how
the executive is recruited and the extent of political participation and opposition (Mar-
shall, Jaggers and Gurr 2004). These aspects of democracy may also be related to a more
durable peace after civil wars. Joshi and Mason (2011) do for instance find that increased
openness and competetiveness of political participation is related to durable peace. There
is a danger that the executive constraints variable is picking up some of the variation in
these other components and that this could be driving results. The correlation between
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executive constraints and executive recruitment in the sample of post-conflict peace spells
is 0.844. The Polity-project’s component measuring political participation and opposi-
tion may be endogenous to internal armed conflict as one of the indicators contributing
to this components is whether political competition is “intense, hostile, and frequently
violent. Extreme factionalism may be manifested in the establishment of rival govern-
ments and in civil war (Vreeland 2008: 401). Thus, Gates et al. (2006: 897) propose to
replace this component with a measure based on Vanhanen’s (2000) democracy index.
What contributes to this variable is the extent the population participates in elections
and whether these elections are competitive. The correlation with this measure and the
executive constraints-component is 0.728, while the correlation with having elections is
0.226.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean SD Min Max Missing
Executive constraints 3.841 2.043 1.000 7.000 301
log (election proximity) 1.617 2.214 -2.303 3.336 0
log (population) 16.627 1.531 12.922 20.813 191
log (battle deaths) 7.023 2.294 3.219 13.286 118
log (GDP per capita) 7.658 0.964 5.624 10.304 191
Executive recruitment 5.193 2.300 1.000 8.000 301
Political participation 1.977 1.650 0.000 4.174 190
Victory 0.344 0 1 0
Territorial conflict 0.443 0 1 0
PKO 0.068 0 1 0
Election year 0.162 0 1 0
Mutual veto 0.575 0 1 155
Including these variables in the models may increase problems of multicollinearity,
which may lead to less efficient estimates (Greene 2002: 56-57). Estimating the model
without these variables do indeed lead to more efficient estimates without there being any
major changes in the reported coefficients. To make sure that no conclusions are driven
by correlation between the independent variables and these other aspects of democracy,
I leave the other components in the reported models as controls. Beyond making the
reported results somewhat less significant, this should not have any devastating impacts.
It is indeed possible to think of other variables that may plausibly predict the recur-
rence of civil war. However, listing all possible variables on the right side of the equation
may open up for specification errors and essentially meaningless results (Achen 2005). I
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thus pursue a more minimalist approach in the main models, but include other variables
in a range of robustness tests to guard against possible bias. The reported results are
robust to a wide range of specifications, some of which are reported in Section 5.2.
Descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables are reported in Table
3.1.
3.3 Statistical Model
The dependent variable is the duration of post-conflict peace. There are generally two
approaches to modelling this statistically. The first is to model the chances of a conflict
episode recurring at any point in time as a function of known covariates (Walter 2004). In
this approach, variation in how long it takes the peace to collapse is discarded. One only
compares cases where the peace eventually collapsed with cases where it did not. This
is problematic both for substantial and statistical reasons. Because the binary approach
does not take time until the recurrence into account it is unable to deal with the right-
censoring that occurs because peace spells are not observed after 2005. Survival analysis





where f(ti) is the density of failure times, S(ti) is the survival function and δi is the
censoring indicator. Thus, both censored and uncensored peace spells are included in the
model without biasing results (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 18-19).
Survival analysis also has a more substantive advantage, as it is of inherent interest
to study the time until recurrence rather than only whether recurrence happens. If one
peace spell lasts twice as long as another, this provides clues to what makes peace more
stable, even if they both eventually fail. Thus in the applied literature it is recognized
that survival analysis is the statistical approach best suited to investigate “the distinctive
structure of post-conflict risks”and how these“evolve as a result of policy choices”(Collier,
Hoeﬄer and So¨derbom 2008: 465).
The type of statistical model to be used here is thus that of event history analysis.
This does, however, open a range of issues related to the type of event history model
that is to be employed. One of the most important issues is how the baseline hazard
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is to be treated (Golub 2008: 531). Related to this issue is the question of whether a
parametric model should be estimated. Employing a parametric model requires making
an assumption about the shape of the baseline hazard, which is the underlying effect
the passage of time has on the chance of recurrence. Stated differently, it is the hazard
function for those cases where all independent variables are set to zero (Golub 2008: 531).
Theory does not suggest any clear expectation about the shape of the baseline hazard
in the post-conflict scenario. Thus, I opt for a Cox proportional hazard model where no
assumption has to be made about the underlying duration dependency (Box-Steffensmeier
and Jones 2004: 48).
In the Cox model the hazard rate for the ith case is given by
hi(t) = h0(t) exp β
′x (3.2)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard and β
′x is the covariates and their coefficients (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 48). When the model is estimated the baseline hazard is
left unspecified. This requires the model to be estimated through partial likelihood.
The estimation requires assuming that the time intervals between failure times does not
offer any information (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 51). It is thus the ordering of
recurrences rather than the time between recurrences that is important.
Beyond the flexibility that stems from not having to make any assumption about the
shape of the baseline hazard, the Cox model also provides other advantages over its para-
metric counterparts. One such advantage is the Cox model’s ability to deal with tied data.
Ties occur where some spells are of equal length, and they a problem for all continuous
duration models (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 53). When survival times are tied
it is not possible to determine precicely the risk set at each survival time, and as a conse-
quence the partial likelihood must be approximated (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:
54). There are various ways of dealing with ties within the framework of a Cox model.
A method considered relatively accurate and which is also computationally efficient is
the Efron approximation (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 54). This approximation
accounts for how there are different possible sequences of the tied events and gives each
possible sequence an equal weighting when calculating the partial likelihood. The Efron
approximation thus produces results that are very similar to those obtained from using
an exact method (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 55-56). The Efron approximation
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is thus the method that is used in this thesis.
Another advantage of the Cox model is its superior handling of the proportional
hazards assumption (Golub 2008: 536-539). The proportional hazard assumption is the
assumption that the hazard ratio between two observations is constant over time (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 132). This assumption is shared by both the Cox model
and several of the parametric models. Violations of this assumption can produce biased
estimates but are hard to detect for the parametric models. By comparison the validity
can easily be tested for through the Grambsch and Therneau (1994) test for the Cox
model (Golub 2008: 537).
The Cox model is only semi-parametric, making it less efficient (Golub 2008: 540)
and thus, the choice of a Cox model implies somewhat larger standard errors. Given
the discussion above, this concern does, however, not seem strong enough to justify a
parametric model. After all, the more precise parametric estimates might end up being
seriously biased. Although a trade off between unbiasedness and efficiency exists, there
is a strong case to be made in that the Cox model is the most appropriate model for this
thesis.
Another important issue when specifying a survival model is the nature of the covari-
ates (Golub 2008: 532). This is a question of whether covariates are fixed or time-varying
and whether their effect is assumed to be the same at all survival times. Ignoring either
time-varying or time-dependent covariates should be seen as a serious specification error
(Golub 2008: 533). As should already be clear from sections 3.1 and 3.2, I allow covari-
ates to vary with time. This should be fairly uncontroversial. Both the key independent
variables undergo changes during peace spells. After all, every year is not an election
year. The same holds for important controls such as GDP per capita. The Cox model
is well suited for incorporating time-varying covariates as the partial likelihood function
is determined only by the ordered failure times. Hence, the coefficient of a time-varying
covariate has the straightforward interpretation of being the change in the log-hazard
ratio related to a one-unit change in the covariate at time t (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
2004: 103-104).
The question of time-dependent variables is a more difficult one. Not taking the
time-dependence of covariates into account leads to violations of the proportional hazard
assumption of the Cox model (Golub 2008: 537). Fortunately, such violations can be
tested for through the Grambsch Therneau test. Individual violations of the assumptions
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can be discovered by calculating Harrell’s Rho (1986) , which is the correlation between
the rank ordered Schoenfeld residuals and the rank ordered survival times. The global
test uses the maximum of the cumulative sum of these residuals. The null hypothesis of
the test is that the proportional hazard assumption holds (Grambsch and Therneau 1994:
522-523). Thus, following Mills (2011: 143) my approach is to first estimate the models
without any interaction with time, and then test for the presence of such interactions. The
models can then be modified as appropriate either through the introduction of interactions
with time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 136) or through stratification for control
variables of less interest to the analysis (Mills 2011: 157).
To evaluate the proportional hazard assumption I rely on the Grambsch and Therneau
test. Testing of the models revealed that the proportional hazard assumption is violated
both for PKOs and for the logarithm of battle deaths. This means that the effects of
these variables are time dependent. I thus introduce an interaction between each of them
and the natural logarithm of time (Mills 2011: 154).
The Grambsch and Therneau test for the model where PKOs and the logarithm of
battle deaths are interacted with the logarithm of time is reported in Table 3.2. Here,
the proportional hazard assumption is not violated for any of the covariates. The global
test is far from being statistically significant, indicating that the proportional hazard
assumption is not violated for the model at large. This holds also for the rest of the
models reported in this thesis, although individual tests are not reported.
Table 3.2: Grambsch and Therneau test of proportional hazards
Rho Chi-square p-value
log (election proximity) 0.04 0.46 0.50
Executive constraints 0.07 1.06 0.30
log (election proximity) * executive constraints -0.05 0.70 0.40
Victory -0.04 0.25 0.62
log (Population) -0.01 0.00 0.94
log (GDP per capita) 0.01 0.02 0.88
log (Battle deaths) -0.07 0.63 0.43
PKO -0.08 1.65 0.20
Territorial conflict -0.07 0.55 0.46
Executive recruitment -0.07 1.02 0.31
Political participation 0.04 0.30 0.59
log (battledeaths)*log (time) 0.02 0.06 0.80
PKO*log (time) 0.08 1.65 0.20
Global test 6.32 0.93
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3.4 Important Sources of Bias
The research design developed so far is well suited for testing the hypothesis that hori-
zontal constraints on majority power mitigate the impact elections have on post-conflict
peace. The choice of a Cox model and the set of control variables should serve to limit
possible bias. So should the strategy of investigating both formal institutions and de facto
performance of constraining institutions. There are, however, some important remaining
sources of bias, the most important of which are discussed in this section. These are the
endogeneity of constraining institutions, the multi-level structure of the data and missing
observations.
3.4.1 Endogeneity
Arguably, the variation in institutional design cannot be considered completely exogenous
to the duration of post-conflict peace. As was suggested in Section 2.4.1, endogeneity
arises because the prospects of peace may also determine what sorts of institutions are
put in place to avoid a recurrence. If the endogeneity is very strong, institutions may have
no independent effect (Przeworski 2004: 527). More plausibly, the endogeneity distorts
the causal effect of institutions. If the best institutions are introduced only in the cases
where peace is most likely to fail, then this will bias the estimates of the effect of these
institutions. This could lead to biased estimates as “selection induces unrepresentative
values of the dependent variable, even after controlling for values of the independent
variables” (Boehmke, Morey and Shannon 2006: 193).
There are cases where it seems plausible that the conflict may have given rise to insti-
tutions which have helped avoid a conflict recurrence. One example may be post-conflict
Nicaragua. Prior to conflict, Nicaragua had the lowest possible score on the xconst-
variable. After the end of the conflict there were considerable reforms which introduced
institutions of checks and balances (McCoy 1998: 57-58). As a result, Nicaragua’s
xconst-score increased to 5 in 1990 and to 7 in 1995, one year prior to the second
peace-time election. As the conflict never recurred, it appears that the introduction of
such institutions has been successful in making democracy a force for peace. As dis-
cussed, this is the interpretation offered in the case literature (McCoy 1998). Another
interpretation is, however, that the introduction of these institutions were a results of a
commitment to peace, and that it was this commitment rather than the institutions per
3.4. IMPORTANT SOURCES OF BIAS 47
Figure 3.2: Changes in executive constraints after conflict









se that paved the way for a durable peace.
More generally it is the case that institutions change slowly, but that when there are
reforms after internal conflicts they do tend to go in the direction of stronger institutional
constraints. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2, which shows the distribution of changes in
executive constraints-scores within the first decade after conflict compared to the average
score in the decade prior to conflict. As can be seen from the Figure, most cases do
not have any change in executive constraints after conflict. It is, however, more common
with positive than negative changes, which lends some support to the notion that conflict
may lead to the adoption of institutions which facilitate credible commitments (Wig and
Hegre 2013).
There are different attempts at dealing with this problem in the existing literature.
Wucherpfennig (2011) fits a strategic logistic model that takes the strategic nature of
concessions into account. He thus avoids endogeneity issues when evaluating the effect of
these concessions. This approach also has the benefit of allowing a close fit between the
theoretical and the empirical model (Signorino and Yilmaz 2003). However, the range of
strategic statistical models implemented in standard statistical packages is still limited
(Kenkel and Signorino 2011). This makes the strategic approach less feasible in this
setting.
The other alternative is using an instrumental variable estimator to isolate the exoge-
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nous variation in the constraining institutions (Sovey and Green 2011). The logic behind
employing instruments is to exploit variables that are related to the endogenous indepen-
dent variable but not to the dependent variable to isolate the exogenous variation in the
independent variable. The most common approach is that of a two-stage least squares
regression in which the instrument is first used to estimate predicted values for the inde-
pendent variable of interest. The dependent variable is then regressed on these predicted
values in a second-stage regression (Greene 2002). This is the strategy of Gammet and
Malesky (2012: 995-997) who exploit regional diffusion of political institutions and use
proportion of states within a region with closed-list PR as an instrument for closed-list
PR systems which is their independent variable of interest.
There are some possible instruments for executive constraints available. Within the
field of political economy, an important literature has used differences in colonial ex-
periences as instruments for executive constraints. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001) have for instance exploited how the settlement of Europeans in some colonies led
to stronger institutions, and used settler mortality rates during the colonial era as an
instrument for executive constraints. A problem with this instrument in the context of
this thesis is, however, the limited data coverage of this variable. Another set of possible
instruments are also related to the history of colonialism. La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1999) and North, Summerhill and Weingast (2000) argue that dif-
ferences between a British and a Continental legal tradition may explain variation in
contemporary constraints placed on executives. The experience of colonialism has spread
these different legal traditions to other countries. At the same time, legal origin is not
likely to have any independent effect on the propensity for recurrent conflict today.5
This makes the origin of a country’s legal system a possible instrument for executive
constraints.
A major problem when employing an instrument variable within the context of a
survival model is, however, that these methods are still not well developed for survival
models (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 112-114). This introduces two problems:
Even if it might be possible to extend the logic of two-step least square to the context of
a survival model, the methodological literature does not offer any guidance regarding the
statistical properties of this estimator. Moreover, it is not implemented within standard
5Although one possible exception may be effects of being covered by the French security umbrella.
See Collier, Hoeﬄer and Rohner (2009: 10).
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statistical software. Estimating it “by hand” means that the standard errors cannot
easily be corrected to account for the two-step estimation and are thus very likely to be
biased. To avoid basing inferences on models with unknown properties, I thus choose
not to pursue this strategy for the main models reported in Chapter 4. Even if it is not
a perfect solution, the strategy of correcting for endogeneity in a two-step estimation
should offer some indication of whether results are driven by endogeneity. It is thus
pursued further in Section 5.3. In this section it is found that the presence of endogeneity
does not appear to be driving the results in favor of the hypothesis.
3.4.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity
If there are unobserved variables that make some observations more prone to failure this
may bias estimates of the coefficients and lead to violations of the proportional hazard
assumption (Jenkins 2004: 81). One problem is the existence of several peace spells
within the same country. This exacerbates the problems related to temporal dependence
introduced by incorporating time-varying covariates (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:
146). These are hardly independent observations, and the problem may potentially be-
come more severe as several peace spells take place within the same country-years. That
some countries are more at risk of conflict may be considered a source of unobserved het-
erogeneity when modeling the durability of dyadic peace spells. In addition to controlling
for various variables found to be related to the risk of civil war, I employ shared frailty
models to account for unobserved country specific factors. The idea here is to introduce
an additional parameter that picks up that some countries have a higher propensity for
experiencing recurrences (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 142). More specifically, each
country is allowed its own random intercept (Therneau 2012: 1-2). Thus country-specific
propensities for recurrence should not be driving the results.
A related problem is that some conflicts recur multiple times. As is pointed out
by Mills (2011: 167), it might be that experiencing one event impacts the chances of
experiences further events. For instance, having had a recurrence once may make credible
commitments even harder to achieve in the future. As is discussed by Hartzell and Hoddie
(2007: 110-111), it seems beyond doubt that the history of repeated conflict is part of
the reason for the many failures in settling the conflicts of Angola. There are several
models for dealing with recurrent events proposed in the methodological literature. The
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simplest approach is to cluster the standard errors, assuming conditional independence
of events (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002: 1073-1074). This model is developed by
Andersen and Gill (1982). As, the dependence within countries are taken into account
either by clustering standard errors on country or by the inclusion of a frailty term, this
dependence is already to a large extent taken into account. Clustering standard errors
instead on conflicts have only very slight effects on the variance estimates. A greater
problem is, however, that the assumption that events are conditionally independent may
easily be violated (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002: 1075).
That events are not likely to be conditionally independent can be taken into account by
stratifying the data according to which event rank each observation is at risk of (Prentice,
Williams and Peterson 1981). This is arguably the most appropriate way of correcting
for repeated recurrences of conflict. It is, however, not an entirely unproblematic solu-
tion. One problem is that very few observations have ever been at risk of a 4th or a 5th
recurrence. This can be seen from Figure 3.3 which shows the distribution of event ranks.
As is shown, there are relatively few peace spells that succeed multiple rounds of conflict,
which is a problem as the risk set becomes very small for these observations with higher
ranked events (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002: 1079). To not overwhelm the reader
with different models, I do not estimate models with this specification in Chapter 4. To
make sure that this is not driving the results, conditional models of the type proposed
by Prentice, Williams and Peterson (1981) are, however, estimated as a robustness test
in Section 5.4. In short, it does not appear that what assumptions are made concerning
the multi-level structure of the data have any important impact on the results.
3.4.3 Missing Data
Missing data both on the independent variable and on some of the important control
variables is a potential source of bias that has to be dealt with. As is shown in Table 3.1
there is some missing data on both the indicator of executive constraints and important
controls such as population size and GDP per capita. This is regarded as a general
problem for conflict research (Høyland and Nyg˚ard 2011). As data cannot be assumed
to be missing completely at random, multiple imputation may be the best way of dealing
with it (Honaker and King 2010: 564). For this I use the R-package Amelia II written
by Honaker, King and Blackwell (2012).
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The method of multiple imputation uses the available information in the data to make
a predictive model for imputing empty cells. This is done repeatedly, producing a set of
datasets where the observed values are the same, but the imputed values are different
(Honaker and King 2010: 536). This allows using the mean of the imputed values as
a “best guess” for the cell, and the variation across imputations as a measure of the
uncertainty attached to this “best guess”.
The imputation model in Amelia II assumes the complete data to be multivariate
normal (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2012: 4). For some variables this assumption
is problematic. As is well known the assumption of multivariate normality is typically
not appropriate for demographic and economic variables where marginal relationships be-
tween two variables may decrease as these variables increase (Honaker, King and Blackwell
2012: 18-19). As for the survival models, this is solved by taking the natural logarithm
of these variables. This is done for population, GDP per capita and battle deaths (see
Section 3.2).
Additional information can be learned from observing time trends (Honaker and King
2010: 565-566). Examples are level of development and population, both variables that
are highly autocorrelated. Even if linear interpolation is inappropriate, it is possible to
make use of these trends to impute values more accurately on these variables. One way
of doing this is to include leading and lagged values of these variable in the imputation
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model. Because the imputation model is predictive and not causal, the introduction
of leading values does not produce any bias (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2012: 22). I
include“leads”and“lags”of both population and GDP per capita. Because these variables
are measured at the country-level, I use country rather than conflict episode as the cross-
sectional unit in the imputation model. Trends in time within countries are also likely to
be important more generally. To exploit this, I include a third-level polynomial of time in
the imputation model (Honaker and King 2010: 567-569). Hence, the imputation model
is specified so as to make the best use of all available information to predict the values
of the missing cells.
The imputation model rests on the assumption that data is missing at random, but not
necessarily completely at random (Honaker and King 2010: 563-564). What this means
is that even if there is a systematic component to the missingness such as governments
in very poor or unstable countries failing to report certain data, there is no systematic
component to the missingness after controlling for the observed elements of the data.
This assumption cannot be tested but is obviously more credible if more variables are
included in the imputation model (Honaker and King 2010: 563-564). Rubin (1996: 479)
thus recommends including as many relevant variables as possible. On the other hand,
imputing values for a very large dataset introduced computational difficulties. In the
imputation model I have included all the variables used in the robustness tests of Chapter
5, in additional to other institutional variables from iaep as well as other variables related
to conflict, such as the logarithm of conflict duration. This should limit bias related to
violations of the missing at random assumption.
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics, after imputations
Mean SD Min Max Missing
Executive Constraints 3.746 1.953 1.000 7.000 0
Log (election proximity) 1.586 2.215 -2.303 3.336 0
log (population) 16.658 1.478 12.922 20.813 0
log (battle deaths) 7.076 2.264 3.219 12.429 0
Log (GDP per capita) 7.614 0.973 5.624 10.022 0
Executive recruitment 5.042 2.219 1.000 8.000 0
Political participation 1.911 1.612 -0.083 4.174 0
Victory 0.353 0 1 0
Territorial conflict 0.439 0 1 0
PKO 0.068 0 1 0
Post-conflict election year 0.188 0 1 0
Mutual veto 0.580 0 1 0
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High missingness and correlations between the variables with missing values may cause
convergence problems for the imputation model (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2012: 22).
I follow the recommendation of Honaker, King and Blackwell (2012: 23) of including a
ridge prior that shrinks the covariance among the variables towards zero without changing
means or variances. This produces a more stable imputation model, but can potentially
introduce some bias. Following Høyland and Nyg˚ard (2011: 11), I set the ridge prior to
1 permille of the rows in the data. This is well below what is recommended by Honaker,
King and Blackwell (2012: 23), and there is thus little reason to expect that any significant
bias is introduced. Descriptive statistics for the imputed data are shown in Table 3.3.
In general, the distributions on the variables before and after the imputations are very
similar.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has developed a statistical research design tailored to test the hypothesis
of Chapter 2. The key explanatory variables have been operationalized and important
control variables have been identified. The Cox model is argued to be the most appropri-
ate statistical approach for the questions posed in this thesis. Although able of handling
several potential problems, the Cox model on its own does not steer clear of all possible
sources of bias. It is argued that problems of endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and
missingness remains. Endogeneity problems are argued to be an important source of bias
for which there is no easy fix. A possible way of controlling for some of this endogeneity
has however been suggested and is pursued further in Section 5.3.
Other issues are more easily dealt with. Unobserved heterogeneity is taken into ac-
count by letting observations within the same country have a shared frailty. Problems
of missingness is dealt with through multiple imputation. That some countries for un-
observed reasons have a higher propensity for recurrent conflict and that data are not
missing at random should thus not be important sources of bias for the results presented
in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Results
In this chapter I present the results from the quantitative analysis. I begin with a simple
descriptive analysis of the data before the rest of the chapter proceeds to cover the re-
gression results and what these can tell about the effect of post-conflict democracy on the
durability of peace. All results are reported as survival ratios, which are the proportion-
ate changes in the survival rate given one-unit changes in the covariates, holding other
covariates fixed (Jenkins 2004: 30). As the Cox model is a proportional hazard model,
these ratios are independent of survival time. To further facilitate interpretation both
of the estimated effects and the uncertainty attached to these, I simulate expected sur-
vival times for peace spells with post-conflict elections at different levels of institutional
constraints. This allows comparing the chances of avoiding recurrence in substantively
interesting scenarios based on the regression results.
I find support for the proposition that the effect of post-conflict elections depends on
the strength of the institutions put in place to constrain post-election majorities. This
holds both when investigating the post-conflict election years, and when broadening the
scope to also investigate distance in time to the nearest post-conflict election. The results
remain largely the same when looking at general de facto levels of executive constraints
and when using a de jure indicator for whether the constitution gives the legislative and
executive branch the power to veto each other’s decisions. This increases confidence in
the finding that the presence of institutions designed to constrain majority power are
important for what effect holding elections will have in post-conflict settings. Simulating
expected survival times for scenarios where elections are held based on the estimated mod-
els shows that having constraining institutions leads to substantially interesting changes
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in the expected durability of post-conflict peace.
4.1 Descriptive Analysis
The formal model in Section 2.4.1 makes the prediction that the effect of elections for
the risk of conflict recurrence will depend on whether strong institutions placing con-
straints on majority power are in place. The stronger the constraining institutions of the
post-conflict democracy are, the less likely it is that elections will undermine the peace.
This interaction was presented as Hypothesis 1. In Chapter 3 the measurement of the
concept of constraining institutions was discussed. Both a de facto-informed and a more
strictly de jure indicator was proposed, and these form the basis of sub-hypotheses 1.1
and 1.2, respectively. While sub-hypothesis 1.1 posits that higher levels of executive con-
straints as captured by the xconst-component of the Polity-index make elections have
a more positive impact on the durability of peace, sub-hypothesis 1.2 suggests the same
interaction between formal institutions allowing the legislative and executive branch to
veto each other’s decisions. The question is now whether such an interaction is observed
empirically.
Before proceeding to the more advanced statistical analysis, a basic descriptive analy-
sis of the data can be useful. Even if more rigorous statistical analysis is needed for robust
inferences, making simple plots and cross-tabulations is also necessary to get a good sense
of the data and to avoid making inferential mistakes (Achen 2005: 338). Figure 4.1 shows
variation across time for the most important variables in the analysis. These graphs are
based on the first decade of each peace spell in order to better facilitate comparison across
the time periods. This should be unproblematic as most recurrences happen during this
first critical decade of peace (Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004: 1136). The upper panels show
the mean level of executive constraints and proportion of observations with mutual veto
post-conflict election years over time. For the executive constraints index that is more in-
formed by de facto developments, the mean level of executive constraints in post-conflict
election years has increased slightly since the early 1980s.
In the 1970s there was only one competitive election occurring in a post-conflict set-
ting. This was the election in Malaysia that took place in 1978, three years after the end
of conflict between the government and the Communist guerrilla. From the early 1980
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Figure 4.1: Development over time for main variables in the first decade of post-conflict
peace spells
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when post-conflict elections became more common, the development in the proportion
of post-conflict election years with formal institutions allowing for mutual vetoes follows
much of the same trend as the xconst-variable. It is, however, worth noting that the
proportion of post-conflict election years in which there are formal institutions providing
mutual vetoes stays well above 50% for the entire period, indicating again that even if
the de jure indicator is able to pick up much of the same, de jure institutions are much
more common than effective constraints in post-conflict settings. This may also reflect
how these formal institutions may exist only as scraps of paper, which may make it more
difficult to find a general effect of them (see also Section 3.2.1.2).
The bottom panels show how the proportion of post-conflict years with elections and
recurrences, respectively, has developed over time. As can be seen in the bottom left
panel, there has been a marked increase in the proportion of post-conflict years in which
elections are held. In the 1970s only 1.8% of the post-conflict years had an election. In the
late 1990s this percentage was 22.7%. Elections had become as common in post-conflict
settings as in stable democracies (see also Collier 2009). This may in part reflect how
the international community to a greater extent has pushed for elections after conflicts
(Collier, Hoeﬄer and So¨derbom 2008), but also that democratic elections to a greater
extent have been seen as the default way of organizing the political system by post-conflict
actors after the end of the cold war (Jarstad 2009: 50). As pointed out by Cheibub, Hays
and Savun (2012: 18), holding elections was associated with an alignment with the West
during the Cold War, but has gained more wide-spread acceptance in the post-Cold War
period.
It is, however, harder to judge whether this had any impact on the proportion of peace
spells that failed. As can be seen from inspecting the lower right panel, there is less of
a clear trend in the number of recurrences. There were relatively few recurrences in the
1980s, when the number of post-conflict elections started to rise, but the late 1990s’ peak
in post-conflict elections overlaps with a peak in the number of recurrences. It is, however,
difficult to see any clear relationship here, and for recurrences it is hard to see any clear
trend at all. In sum, it is hard to say just from looking at these trends whether elections
have any impact on the recurrence rate. Thus, as in the map presented in Chapter 1, any
clear correlation between elections and recurrences seems absent. This is in line with the
main proposition of this thesis: post-conflict elections are expected to have conditional
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Figure 4.2: Correlation between elections and recurrence in the first decade of peace at
different levels of constraining institutions












































































rather than general effects on peace durability.
Hypothesis 1 proposes an interaction between elections and the level of constraining
institutions. If the effect of elections vary with the level of constraining institutions, it
should be possible to see this in a simple cross tabulation. In other words, the difference
between the proportion of recurrences happening in election versus non-election years
should depend on the level of constraints placed on majority power. This is illustrated in
Figure 4.2, which shows the proportion of post-conflict election and non-election years in
which there were recurrences at high and low levels of each of the indicators of constraining
institutions. As can be seen from Figure 4.2, having elections seems to be associated with
a lower risk of recurrence where the constraining institutions are well-developed. This
provides some preliminary support for the hypothesized interaction between elections and
the level of executive constraints.
This interaction seems particularly strong for the xconst-indicator. At high levels
of executive constraints only a very small proportion of post-conflict election years ex-
perience a conflict recurrence. In fact, there was only one recurrence in an election-year
in this category. This was the recurrence of the 1989 conflict in Haiti in 1991 between
factions within the military and the civil government (Uppsala Conflict Data Program
2013d). Most recurrences in which there are high levels of executive constraints do,
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however, not happen in election years. Peripheral conflicts in India account for a large
proportion (42.1%) of these recurrences. These are perhaps not easily explained within
the framework developed in Chapter 2.
At lower levels of executive constraints election years experience more recurrences
than non-election years. Thus, the relationship is the complete opposite of the one at
higher levels of executive constraints, lending support to sub-hypothesis 1.1. An example
of a conflict recurrence in this category is the 2002 renewal of hostilities in The Repub-
lic of Congo. UCDP reports the cause of the recurrence to be that the winner of the
2002 presidential election, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, had decided to renege on some of the
concessions granted to the rebels in the 1999 peace accord (Uppsala Conflict Data Pro-
gram 2013b). It is worth noting that the 1999 agreement that had ended the previous
conflict-episode held provisions for democratic elections, but that there was no agreement
on other rules that would govern the post-conflict democratic system. After a land slide
victory for Sassou-Nguesso, fighting broke out between the government and the insur-
gents of the Pool region (Arriola and Johnson 2012: 19). What is interesting given the
theoretical framework of this thesis is how democratic elections do not appear to have
facilitated peaceful bargains in this case. Elections in the absence of effective controls
on the executive appear to have given way to a zero-sum game between armed groups.
According to Raleigh (2007: 178), opening up for democratic competition in the 1990s
had not changed the neo-patrimonial character of the state and competition over the
spoils of the state continued among different ethnic groups. What would have happened
if strong constraints on majority power were in place is of course a contrafactual question
that is hard to answer. The absence of security related to what a majority government
could do seems, however, to have been a primary cause of the recurrence.
The relationship is very similar also when looking at formal institutions providing for
mutual vetoes. Where de jure institutions provide for mutual vetoes, most recurrences
happen in non-election years. The opposite relationship exists for cases without such
mutual vetoes. As an example one may consider the 1997 recurrence of conflict in Chad
where the election of a Muslim president led the Christian rebel groups of the South to
reinitiate conflict. What appear to be important for the case of Chad is that both armed
and electoral competition took the form of a zero-sum game over the control over the
executive. Similar to what was experienced in The Republic of Congo, the competition
for ballots did not allow for any peaceful bargain in what continued to be a zero-sum
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game. In line with the theoretical expectations from Chapter 2, May and Massey (2000:
123-125) point to how it was clear that the faction of president Idriss Deby would not
tolerate any challenges to its own rule from within the political system. Although, it
cannot be said with certainty what effect formal institutions providing for mutual vetoes
would have had, it seems clear that the incomplete nature of the Chadian democratization
was an important source of renewed conflict (May and Massey 2000).
The descriptive analysis in this section has indicated that the effect of elections on the
risk of conflict recurrence may be conditioned by whether strong constraining institutions
are in place. Both when employing an indicator informed by de facto performance and
when employing a strictly de jure indicator, the same pattern is found: Having institutions
that constrain majority power appears to condition the relationship between post-conflict
elections and recurrences. Next, I turn to the survival analysis to investigate whether this
apparent relationship holds when controlling for possible confounding variables.
4.2 Cox Regression Results
Although suggestive, the correlation apparent in the descriptive analysis is not sufficient
to reach any firm conclusion on whether the relationship between post-conflict elections
and the durability of post-conflict peace is conditioned by the presence of institutions that
put constraints on majority power. To see whether the proposed interaction holds when
controlling for possible confounding variables and taking into account other problematic
aspects of the data, I now turn to the research design developed in Chapter 3.
4.2.1 The Conditional Effect of Being in a Post-Conflict Elec-
tion Year
I begin by testing sub-hypothesis 1.1, using only post-conflict election years as the indi-
cator of elections. Thus, a binary variable indicating whether there was an election in a
given post-conflict year is included in the models. As the effects of having elections are
likely to be strong both in the run-up to the election and in the aftermath – effects that
are not picked up when looking only at election years – this is arguably a tough test for
the hypothesis. Some cases where having elections contributed to a recurrence of conflict
will not be counted as such. For instance, this means ignoring the proximity between
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for instance the 1991 election in Angola and the 1992 conflict recurrence, even as the
election results are cited as an important source of the recurrence in the case literature
(Reilly 2002, Ottaway 1998). Investigating further what happens in post-conflict election
years is, however, a useful next step in extending the analysis of the correlation suggested
by the descriptive analysis of Section 4.1. It allows investigating whether the apparent
relationship between the level of executive constraints and the effect elections have on the
chance of recurrence holds when controlling for possible confounding variables and when
the duration and multi-level structure of the data is taken into account.
The stepwise development of the model with post-conflict election year and xconst
as the measure of constraining institutions is shown in Table 4.1. The first two models
are based only on observed data and the multi-level structure of the data is not taken into
account apart from correction of the standard errors. In Model 1 the interaction term is
omitted, reflecting how elections are treated in the existing literature (though see Flores
and Nooruddin (2012) for a partial exception). In this model, there is no significant
relationship between post-conflict election years and conflict recurrence. Constraints on
executive power have a positive impact, but this is not significant. All in all democratic
institutions appear to be of limited importance when there is assumed not to be any
interaction effects, thus reflecting previous findings in the literature. It should, however,
be noted that when controlling for executive constraints there is no negative impact of
elections on the durability of peace. Thus, the suggested lack of a correlation between
election years and recurrences is confirmed also when controlling for possible confounding
variables. This is in line with Jarstad (2009: 51) who in her sample of post-agreement
periods finds a surprisingly limited impact of elections on the chance of recurrence, and
Cheibub, Hays and Savun (2012) who find that elections in Africa do not raise the chances
of internal conflict. According to Cheibub, Hays and Savun (2012: 15) their non-finding
can be explained by how they to some extent manage to “hold institutional capacity
constant” by limiting the analysis to Africa.
The interesting question is what happens when the interaction between post-conflict
elections is introduced in Model 2. One interesting change is in the Akaike information
criterion (AIC), which is a measure of the model’s goodness of fit but which penalizes for
additional parameters (Akaike 1974). That Model 2 has a lower AIC indicates that the
model in which an interaction between competitive elections and executive constraints is
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Table 4.1: Cox regressions 1972-2005. Interaction between post-conflict election year and
levels of executive constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cox Cox Cox, Imp. Frailty
Post-conflict election year 1.094 0.178** 0.193** 0.223**
(0.439,2.729) (0.036,0.871) (0.043,0.874) (0.064,0.774)
Executive constraints 1.244 1.112 1.167 1.235
(0.953,1.622) (0.805,1.535) (0.862,1.58) (0.947,1.61)
Post-conflict election year 1.677** 1.639** 1.589**
*executive constraints (1.075,2.617) (1.074,2.501) (1.103,2.289)
Victory 2.882*** 2.735*** 3.096*** 3.048***
(1.353,6.139) (1.297,5.765) (1.576,6.083) (1.445,6.426)
log (population) 0.729*** 0.717*** 0.742*** 0.751***
(0.579,0.919) (0.568,0.904) (0.607,0.909) (0.61,0.925)
log (GDP per capita) 1.201 1.213 1.177 1.225
(0.847,1.703) (0.86,1.712) (0.871,1.59) (0.866,1.733)
log (battle deaths) 0.808 0.803 0.895 0.89
(0.6,1.088) (0.592,1.089) (0.683,1.175) (0.665,1.193)
PKO 45.895 43.376 13.913 15.965
(0.198,10640.017) (0.174,10812.912) (0.058,3360.151) (0.478,533.229)
Territorial Conflict 1.391 1.354 1.428 1.412
(0.833,2.322) (0.815,2.252) (0.857,2.379) (0.779,2.56)
Executive recruitment 0.975 0.972 0.907 0.982
(0.74,1.284) (0.744,1.271) (0.697,1.179) (0.745,1.293)
Political participation 0.898 0.935 0.995 0.884
(0.672,1.199) (0.707,1.237) (0.75,1.319) (0.689,1.135)
log (battle deaths) 1.172 1.182 1.089 1.087
*log(time) (0.969,1.418) (0.96,1.456) (0.915,1.296) (0.9,1.313)
PKO 0.109* 0.107 0.18 0.169*
*log (time) (0.008,1.533) (0.007,1.594) (0.012,2.627) (0.026,1.103)
log-likelihood null -306.71 -306.71 -376.93 -376.93
log-likelihood -289.95 -285.48 -354.78 -342.02
AIC 603.91 596.96 735.57 729.54
N 1454 1454 1854 1854
Number of events 67 67 79 79
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Estimates in survival ratioes.
95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered on country
introduced fit the data better beyond what can be ascribed to an additional irrelevant
parameter. This is one indication that the proposed interaction is important.
Moreover, the interaction term is significant at the 95%-level and higher than 1.
The interpretation of this is that post-conflict election years become less associated with
conflict recurrences at higher levels of executive constrains. What is also interesting is
that the constituent term of election years is less than 1 and significant at the 95%-level.
This term has no substantial interpretation as the executive-constraints index never takes
on the value of 0. Yet, it is one indication that election years are associated with conflict
recurrence where executive constraints are weak. In fact the estimated survival ratio
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remains significantly less than 1 also when executive constraints take on the value of 1.1
There is, however, considerable uncertainty in this model, so that even if the interaction
is statistically significant there may be more uncertainty attached to the effect of post-
conflict elections at any given level of executive constraints.
In Model 3 the imputed data is also included, but this has only a slight impact on the
results. This is perhaps not surprising. As discussed in Section 3.4.3, the imputations
did not produce any major changes in the distribution of values for any of the variables.2
That the results do not appear to be driven by missingness in the data should increase
our confidence in the reported relationship. In addition to being based in part on imputed
data, Model 4 is a shared frailty model with country as the second level unit and thus also
accommodates the multi-level structure of the data. Comparing models 3 and 4 reveales
only slight differences in the estimated survival ratios. There is a marginal decline in
AIC when estimating a frailty model, indicating that this model may fit the data slightly
better. The differences are not huge, but Model 4 seems to be the better model and thus
provides the basis for the inferences in this section.
The survival ratios reported in Table 4.1 indicate that when executive constraints
are low, being in an election year increases the chance of experiencing a recurrence, but
that this effect changes with higher levels of executive constraints. This is in line with
sub-hypothesis 1.1. Exactly what this effect looks like is, however, hard to see just
from inspecting the regression table. As is demonstrated by Brambor, Clark and Golder
(2006) interactions in generalized linear models can only be meaningfully interpreted
by considering the joint effects of the interacted variables. What is needed to evaluate
the interaction is a comparison of the marginal effect of election years across the different
levels of executive constraints, and the uncertainty attached to these estimates (Brambor,
Clark and Golder 2006: 73-74). These magnitudes are presented graphically in Figure
4.3.
Based on Model 4 in Table 4.1, Figure 4.3 shows how the estimated survival ratio
associated with being in a post-conflict election year changes with the level of executive
constraints. As is seen from the figure, being in an election year decreases the risk of
1For Model 4, this is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
2The extent of missingness for different variables is reported in Table 3.1 along with descriptive
statistics prior to the imputations. For the data that includes imputed values, descriptive statistics are
reported in Table 3.3.
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Figure 4.3: Interaction between post-conflict election years and executive constraints
Estimated survival ratios for post-conflict election years at different levels of executive constraints. Sur-
vival ratios are based on Model 4 in Table 4.1. The rug shows the distribution of levels of executive
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recurrence when executive constraints are high, although this effect is only statistically
significant for the highest level of executive constraints. The 95%-confidence interval
barely overlaps with 1 when the executive constraint-score is 6, but the effect remains
significant at the 90%-level. At the opposite extreme, post-conflict elections are signif-
icantly more likely to lead to recurrences when executive constraints are at the lowest
level. The results are, however, not stronger than that there is considerable uncertainty
attached to what effect an election will have at most levels of executive constraints.
It may be interesting to note how this relates to the finding that so-called inconsistent
regimes are more likely to experience internal conflicts and more generally are less stable
(Hegre et al. 2001, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Gates et al. 2006). In light of the findings
of this literature, it may be somewhat surprising that there is no significant effect at
mid-levels of executive constraints as these levels indicate inconsistent institutions, while
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there is a significant negative impact of elections when constraints are at the lowest. As
is argued by Strand (2007: 318), the theory of regime consistency predicts that “regimes
with either full parity between the executive branch and other branches of government or
no limitations on the executive should not experience a change of risk in conflict due to
elections”. In addition to showing that elections may in fact decrease the risk of conflict
recurrence, Figure 4.3 shows that elections are most dangerous where constraints are
lowest. That this is the case in the context of post-conflict settings may be explained
by how the opposition is more likely to have capacity to violently contest the election
results. This may make post-conflict settings different from elections in authoritarian
regimes more generally.3 On the other hand, the findings of this thesis confirms the
more general proposition that elections will only have a positive impact where strong
institutions are in place (Huntington 1968, Zakaria 1997). That opening up for elections
is likely to cause conflict recurrence when executive constraints are weak is hence in line
with some of the broader suggestions in the literature on inconsistent regimes (Hegre and
Fjelde 2010).
There is considerable uncertainty attached to the effect of being in an election year at
any given level of executive constraints. Only for the highest and lowest level of executive
constraints is the estimated effect of being in an election year significantly different from 1.
In part this may be explained by multicolinearity in the model, introduced by controlling
for the other sub-components of the Polity/sip indeces. Reestimating the model without
these controls (not reported) yields very similar survival ratios, but with smaller standard
errors, thus suggesting that while this would not introduce any omitted variable bias, it
would yield somewhat more efficient estimates. The differences are, however, not huge,
and these controls are thus left in the model so that readers can be confident that the
results are not driven by other aspects of democracy than the ones suggested by the
theory developed in Chapter 2.
Another reason for the uncertainty is, however, that there as already noted is less of a
clear relationship for the mid-levels of executive constraints. In these cases there are some
limitations on what the executive can do, but these limitations are “[s]light to [m]oderate”
(Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2004: 24). An example is post-conflict Mozambique, which
only had an executive constraints score of 3 in 1994, when the first competitive election
was held two years after the end of the country’s civil war. Yet the election did not
3For a review on the literature on elections in authoritation states, see Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009).
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produce a recurrence and Mozambique is held up in the qualitative literature as a prime
example of a successful peace-to-democracy transition (Manning 2002). That the demo-
cratic system would help pave the way for durable peace was, however, far from given
and Manning (2002: 5) describes post-conflict Mozambique as an important “least likely
case” where democracy was conducive to lasting peace even in “the absence of any formal
power-sharing agreements at the cabinet level, and with only limited concessions to pro-
portionality in the allocation of political power.” Cases such as Mozambique’s transition
serve as important reminders of the need for humility when making inferences concern-
ing what can be achieved in specific post-conflict settings, as post-conflict politics are
complicated processes in which the outcome may be difficult to predict. For the case
of Mozambique it does also seem that the role of the international community has been
important in facilitating a form of repeated elite-bargaining between Renamo and Fre-
limo which has helped overcoming the post-conflict commitment problem (Manning 2002:
8-9).
The same step-wise model development using the binary indicator for mutual vetoes is
shown in Table 4.2. In substantive terms the results are very similar to the ones reported
in Table 4.1. In Model 5 election years and formal institutions of mutual vetoes are in-
cluded in the model but without any interaction term. Neither of these have significant
effects on their own, indicating that neither being in an election year nor having formal
institutions providing for mutual vetoes has any general effect on the risk of recurrence
independent of each other. As for the executive constraints, this changes when an in-
teraction term is introduced. In models 6-8 being in an election year in a setting where
there are no formal institutions allowing the legislative and executive branch to veto each
other’s decisions is shown to significantly increase the risk of conflict recurrence. As for
executive constraints, this interaction holds when data is imputed for models 7 and 8
and when the multi-level structure is taken into account in Model 8. For the models
where election years are interacted with mutual vetoes, taking the possible unobserved
heterogeneity at the country-level into account has a very slight impact on the estimated
results.
That the reported survival ratios for the interaction terms are higher for the models
in Table 4.2 than in Table 4.1 is because the mutual veto variable is binary while the
xconst-variable can take on seven different values. What this means is that a change
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Table 4.2: Cox regressions 1972-2005. Interaction between post-conflict election year and
institutions providing a mutual veto
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Cox Cox Cox, Imp. Frailty
Post-conflict election year 1.085 0.333** 0.37** 0.401**
(0.422,2.793) (0.134,0.832) (0.154,0.892) (0.167,0.961)
Mutual veto 0.973 0.684 0.709 0.719
(0.591,1.602) (0.361,1.296) (0.406,1.239) (0.377,1.369)
Post-conflict election year 7.304** 6.062** 5.674***
*mutual veto (1.59,33.541) (1.476,24.903) (1.568,20.534)
Victory 2.549** 2.353** 2.784*** 2.774***
(1.229,5.286) (1.16,4.773) (1.459,5.315) (1.346,5.717)
log (population) 0.744*** 0.726*** 0.754*** 0.764***
(0.61,0.909) (0.597,0.883) (0.633,0.898) (0.628,0.929)
log (GDP per capita) 1.24 1.277 1.231 1.285
(0.883,1.741) (0.929,1.756) (0.914,1.658) (0.926,1.784)
log (battle deaths) 0.806 0.827 0.899 0.9
(0.595,1.094) (0.604,1.132) (0.679,1.191) (0.672,1.204)
PKO 48.109 41.987 16.93 18.153*
(0.212,10894.532) (0.191,9224.599) (0.081,3530.91) (0.575,572.765)
Territorial conflict 1.443 1.36 1.518* 1.515
(0.875,2.379) (0.848,2.18) (0.935,2.463) (0.841,2.727)
Executive recruitment 1.136 1.09 1.037 1.042
(0.917,1.407) (0.888,1.339) (0.844,1.276) (0.855,1.27)
Political participation 0.905 0.959 1.034 1.032
(0.674,1.216) (0.713,1.29) (0.765,1.397) (0.778,1.369)
log (battle deaths) 1.166 1.158 1.085 1.082
*log (time) (0.963,1.413) (0.936,1.432) (0.908,1.297) (0.897,1.304)
PKO 0.113 0.122 0.176 0.17*
*log (time) (0.008,1.61) (0.008,1.818) (0.013,2.474) (0.027,1.082)
log-likelihood null -306.68 -306.68 -376.93 -376.93
log-likelihood -291.59 -286.94 -357.37 -349.4
AIC 607.17 599.89 740.74 737.56
N 1453 1453 1854 1854
Number of events 67 67 79 79
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Estimates in survival ratioes.
95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered on country
of one scale-unit on the mutual veto variable implies a move from no constraints to a
fully constrained system, while a one unit change on xconst-variable is a more limited
difference. What is clear is however that when there is no formal institutions of mutual
veto in place, election years are associated with a higher risk of conflict recurrence. The
interaction is shown graphically in Figure 4.4. The survival ratio of being in an election
year is significantly less than 1 in cases where no formal institution providing for a mutual
veto was in place. An example of such a case is the 1999 recurrence of the conflict
between the government of Djibouti and a splinter group of the former rebel movement
frud (Ishiyama and Batta 2011: 437). In the absence of constraining institutions, having
token representation of members of the rebel group in government does not seem to have
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Figure 4.4: Interaction between post-conflict election years and formal institutions pro-
viding a mutual veto Estimated survival ratios for post-conflict election years with and without formal
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convinced the broader rebel movement that their interests would be protected in the
post-conflict democracy. As has been discussed was the case for the processes leading
up to the 2002 recurrence in The Republic of Congo and the 1997 recurrence in Chad,
elections without strong constraints seem to have given way to a zero-sum game where
conflict was preferable to peaceful opposition rather than facilitating peaceful bargains.
Where such institutions at least formally existed, the survival ratio of being in an
election year was higher than 1, indicating a positive impact on the durability of peace.
The 95%-confidence interval for this effect does, however, overlap with 1. The effect re-
mains significant at the 90%-level. One example of this is the period surrounding the 1996
election in Nicaragua. This election was lost by the Sandinistas, but this formerly armed
faction decided to respect this outcome rather than return to conflict. The qualitative lit-
erature has viewed the 1996 election as an important milestone in Nicaragua’s transition
towards a peaceful democracy, and McCoy (1998: 57-58) points to the introduction of a
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system of checks and balances as one of the important developments between the 1990
end of conflict and the 1996 elections. This represented something new in the political
history of Nicaragua, and seems to have been important to a democratic post-conflict
political process (McCoy 1998: 57). Thus, a closer look at this specific case seems to
confirm the importance of constraining institutions for democratic elections to have a
positive impact on the durability of peace. It is worth noting that Nicaragua in 1996 also
had a maximum score on the executive constraints-measure indicating that the formal
institutions also had a real impact on the political system. The peaceful development
under the Nicaraguan post-conflict democracy does at least in part appear to have been
facilitated by institutional configurations reassuring all groups that the other side would
not turn the power of the state against them.
Included in all models is also a set of control variables. The justifications for these
were discussed in Section 3.2.2. The direction and significance of the estimated survival
ratios for these controls are of less interest. Moreover, as they only serve as controls, the
model has not been specified in order to isolate their effects. Therefore, I do not offer
substantive interpretation of these survival ratios. Their direction are, however, largely
in accordance with what has more generally been found in studies of conflict recurrence
(see Kreutz 2010a).
The results reported so far do perhaps show a surprisingly positive impact of elections.
Being in a post-conflict election year only has a significantly negative impact on the dura-
bility of peace when the constraints on the executive are very low. One possible reason
for this is that recurrences do not necessarily happen in the year of the election, even if
the election contributed to the recurrence. The period running up to an election may
be just as important and so may the aftermath. Thus, the next section digs deeper into
the conditional effect of post-conflict elections by broadening the scope to investigating
distance in time to the nearest post-conflict election rather than just the impact of being
in an election year.
4.2.2 The Conditional Effect of Election Proximity
It is also interesting to take into account what happens in the periods building up to and
in the aftermath of elections. The model presented in this section do this by investigating
the impact of election proximity. Instead of including a dummy for being in an election
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year, a variable measuring the proximity in time to the nearest post-conflict election is
included in the models.4 This variable thus takes on the value of 0 in election years and
the distance to the nearest election after the end of conflict for other observations. Thus,
in these models Angola, which as discussed had an election in 1991 is assigned a value
of 1 on this variable in 1992 which is the year of recurrence. Hence, this variable is able
to capture this proximity in time to the election in the year prior to Angola’s recurrence.
To avoid losing the peace spells where an election never took place, I set the value of this
variable to the maximum observed time until an election, which is 28 years. This may
be problematic, but it allows including all peace spells in the model.That results in these
models are similar to the ones with dummies for election years should increase confidence
in that how spells without an election are dealt with is not driving the results. Because
the effect of elections is likely to decline with time, the variable has been log-transformed.
Hence, as the proximity to the election diminishes, the effect of an additional year without
elections is also allowed to decline. This is important as there is no reason to expect that
going an extra year without an election will have the same effect in countries, such as
Saudi-Arabia, which has not held a single competitive election since the end of conflict in
1979, as in El Salvador which has had very frequent elections throughout its post-conflict
period.
Table 4.3 presents the models where the distance in time to the nearest election is
interacted with either xconst (models 9 and 10) or the mutual veto dummy (models 11
and 12). Models 9 and 11 are simple Cox models based only on observed data and with
standard errors clustered on country. Models 10 and 12 are based also on imputed data,
and the multi-level structure of the data has been taken into account by the inclusion of
a frailty term.
Model 10 shows that for low executive constraints the effect of being further in time
4In the models reported in this chapter, the effect of proximity is assumed to be symmetric. What
this means is that the effect of being one year prior to an election is assumed to be the same as being
one year into the aftermath of one. As discussed in Section 3.2.1.1, there may be reasons to expect
this assumption to be too heroic. On one hand, many countries have long and bitter campaigns prior to
elections, while the dust settles rather quickly after the votes have been counted (Linebarger and Salehyan
2012). This would suggest the time prior to the election to be risk-prone. On the other hand, it may be
that organizations focus on mustering electoral support prior to the elections and then may choose to go
back to conflict if they do not get sufficient influence after the elections (Collier, Hoeﬄer and So¨derbom
2008: 470). This would perhaps suggest that the risk associated with elections lasts longer after elections.
The symmetry of election proximity is tested in the models reported in the table in Appendix D. As it
turns out, the effects are somewhat stronger for time after elections, but the differences are not huge. It
does not appear that the assumption of symmetry is an important source of bias.
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Table 4.3: Cox regressions 1972-2005. Interaction between election proximity and execu-
tive constraints/mutual veto
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Cox Frailty Cox Frailty
log (election proximity) 1.277 1.221 1.11 1.086
(0.901,1.811) (0.945,1.577) (0.886,1.391) (0.914,1.292)
Executive constraints 1.664*** 1.748***
(1.172,2.361) (1.265,2.416)
log (election proximity) 0.885** 0.897***
*executive constraints (0.802,0.976) (0.829,0.97)
Mutual veto 2.644** 2.573**
(1.09,6.417) (1.076,6.148)
log (election proximity) 0.623*** 0.643***
* Mutual veto (0.443,0.877) (0.492,0.841)
Victory 2.677** 2.903*** 2.251** 2.634***
(1.223,5.859) (1.373,6.142) (1.105,4.589) (1.269,5.465)
log (population) 0.757** 0.783** 0.741*** 0.779**
(0.607,0.943) (0.634,0.968) (0.621,0.885) (0.637,0.953)
log (GDP per capita) 1.105 1.144 1.149 1.19
(0.763,1.6) (0.804,1.626) (0.815,1.619) (0.843,1.678)
log (battle deaths) 0.78 0.875 0.818 0.909
(0.571,1.065) (0.653,1.174) (0.592,1.129) (0.675,1.223)
PKO 80.659 25.31* 59.49 20.957*
(0.194,33593.812) (0.674,951.048) (0.214,16573.62) (0.631,696.399)
Territorial Conflict 1.38 1.427 1.399 1.526
(0.815,2.335) (0.786,2.589) (0.868,2.256) (0.843,2.762)
Executive recruitment 0.968 0.875 1.109 1.033
(0.727,1.289) (0.679,1.129) (0.91,1.352) (0.844,1.263)
Political participation 0.854 0.915 0.906 1
(0.643,1.133) (0.691,1.21) (0.674,1.218) (0.747,1.341)
log (battle deaths) 1.189 1.089 1.148 1.063
*log(time) (0.964,1.467) (0.901,1.316) (0.923,1.429) (0.877,1.287)
PKO 0.084* 0.139** 0.11 0.16*
*log (time) (0.005,1.563) (0.02,0.963) (0.007,1.825) (0.024,1.045)
log-likelihood null -306.71 -376.93 -306.68 -376.93
log-likelihood -280.82 -338.26 -281.92 -342.32
AIC 587.63 721.32 589.85 726.22
N 1454 1854 1453 1854
Number of events 67 79 67 79
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Estimates in survival ratioes.
95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on country
from an election year is to increase the survival ratios. In an election year, having insti-
tutions producing a one point higher executive constraints-score has a survival ratio of
1.75. Thus having stronger executive constraints has a strong effect on the chances of
preserving the peace when elections are held. The interpretation of the interaction term
of 0.9 is that the effect of having higher executive constraints declines as one moves away
from the election year in time. In other words, the peace-inducing effect of executive
constraints declines as the proximity to an election increases. It is the configurations of
political institutions that are important. This effect is shown graphically in Figure 4.5,
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Figure 4.5: Effect of proximity to the nearest election at the highest and lowest level of
executive constraints















which shows the estimated survival ratio of being at different proximities to an election.
Being close in time to an election increases the chances of avoiding a recurrence when
executive constraints are high. As post-conflict societies with high executive constraints
move further away from an election there is, however, an increased chance of experiencing
a recurrence. For post-conflict political systems with unconstrained executives, the trend
is the opposite. These systems are most at risk close to elections and become slightly less
risk prone as the proximity to an election diminishes.
At no substantially interesting distance in time to an election does however the survival
ratio for the least constrained systems become significantly greater than 1. In other words
there is never a clear positive impact of not having elections, even when the level of the
institutional constraints is very low. This could be seen as having an important policy-
implication as it means that one cannot, based on these results be certain that postponing
elections will make peace more durable, even when no executive constraints are in place.
How postponing elections affect the durability of peace is a separate question that lies
beyond the scope of this thesis. Flores and Nooruddin (2012) find that delaying elections
with two years in post-conflict settings where the democratic experience is limited, may
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make recurrence less likely. As pointed out by the authors, this could be because some
time is needed to establish institutions that constrain the winners of elections in these
cases (Flores and Nooruddin 2012: 559). Two years is, however, a relatively limited delay,
indicating that what is needed is time to establish constraining institutions rather than to
avoid the election altogether. This agrees with the results presented in this thesis, as there
is never a significantly positive impact of being further away from an election even when
the executive constraints are very low. Thus, trying to avoid the dangers of post-conflict
elections by postponing or eliminating them does not seem to be a strategy destined for
success (for opposing arguments on whether transitional elections should be delayed to
allow for the development of other institutions, see Carothers 2007 and Mansfield and
Snyder 2007).
What does have a strong effect is the level of constraining institutions where elections
are held. A better strategy than postponing elections may therefore be to make sure
that strong constraints on majority power are introduced. Elections are significantly less
dangerous when such constraints are in place. This provides strong support for Hypothesis
1.1. De facto levels of executive constraints have a strong impact on how holding elections
affects the durability of post-conflict peace.
The results are similar for models 11 and 12, which evaluate sub-hypothesis 1.2. Hence
these results hold also when focusing on a more specific and de jure institution. In model
12 the conditional effect of being further from an election year when there is no mutual
veto is 1.09, which is a relatively limited and also statistically insignificant effect. The
effect of having mutual vetoes when being in an election year is, however, the stronger
and highly significant survival ratio of 2.57. This means that having mutual vetoes raises
the expected chance of not experiencing a recurrence with 157% when being in an election
year. The interaction term is also significant and less than 1, which means that the effect
of this constraining institution declines with greater distance in time to the election.
This effect is summarized in Figure 4.6. This figure shows the estimated survival ratio
for proximity to an election in cases with and without mutual vetoes. As can be seen
from the figure, for the cases with formal institutions providing for mutual vetoes being
close in time to an election is significantly related to an increased durability of the peace,
while this changes as one moves away from the election in time. For the cases where no
institutions of mutual veto exist, the effect of election proximity is the opposite, but the
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Figure 4.6: Effect of proximity to the nearest election with and without institutions
providing mutual veto















survival ratio is never significantly different from 1. This is in line with what was found
when looking at levels of executive constraints: there is more uncertainty attached to
what the effect of having an election is when constraining institutions are not in place,
although elections do seem to be related to recurrences in these cases. For the cases
where constraining are in place, it seems clear that having elections do have a positive
impact on the durability of peace. Thus, there is a case to be made for a peace building
potential of post-conflict democracy, but only when checks and balances are part of the
institutional makeup of the democratic system.
4.3 What do These Results Mean?
So far what has been demonstrated is a statistically significant relationship between the
effect that elections have on the durability of post-conflict peace and whether there are
institutions placing constraints on majority power. Another question is whether this
interaction produces substantially interesting differences in the chances of conflict recur-
rence. An appropriate question to ask of anyone claiming to know something about how
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different political institutions can affect the durability of post-conflict peace is therefore
whether this is an effect that is so strong that we should care about it. A second question
is how much uncertainty is attached to the estimated effects. In other words, how sure
can we be that holding elections really will lead to more stable post-conflict peace at
higher levels of constraining institutions? These are the questions this section will deal
with when analyzing what these results mean.
To clarify what the reported results actually mean, I follow King, Tomz and Wit-
tenberg (2000) in simulating quantities of interests. The quantity of greatest interest
given the research question of this thesis is arguably the number of years the peace can
be expected to last if there is a post-conflict election at different levels of institutional
constraints.
One difficulty in simulating the expected survival times from Cox regression models
is that the baseline hazard – the underlying duration dependency – is not estimated in
this model. As the unestimated baseline hazard is part of the survival function, expected
survival times cannot be calculated directly. To circumvent this difficulty, I estimate
a parametric model for the purpose of simulating quantities of interests. As discussed
in Chapter 3, the main difficulty when estimating a parametric model is getting the
underlying duration dependency right. Making the wrong assumption about the baseline
hazard leads to biased results. Having estimated a semi-parametric model as the main
model, it is, however, possible to estimate a series of parametric models and choose the
one that yields results similar to the Cox model. Both the Weibull and the log-logistic
models have results that are slightly weaker but otherwise similar to those in the Cox
models. These two models are non-nested and one can thus not choose one over the other
by comparing log-likelihoods. Following Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004: 44-45), I
compare the models based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). As the AIC for
the log-logistic model is lower, this model is used in the simulations in this section. The
model is reported in Appendix E.
To illustrate how much we can expect constraining institutions to impact the effect
of having elections one may consider a hypothetical but typical case where elections are
held every four years after the end of conflict and other variables are kept constant at
their mean or median value. The question is then how long we can expect the peace to
last in this scenario. This is illustrated in Figure 4.7. The black lines show the estimated
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Figure 4.7: The chances of staying at peace with elections every four years. Other
variables are kept at their mean or median value.



































chance of still being at peace at each year for the highest and the lowest level of executive
constraints. The blue and the pink areas show the 95%-confidence interval for each of
these estimates.
The estimated chance of avoiding a conflict recurrence is rather different in the two
scenarios. For the case where elections are held every 4 years but executive constraints
are not present the chances of still being at peace after 15 years is only 80.6%, while
the corresponding chance is 98.5% if strong executive constraints are in place. This is an
important difference both from a theoretical and policy making perspective. It shows that
having strong executive constraints makes a marked difference for the effect on expected
durability of post-conflict peace spells in which elections are held regularly.
It is important to point out that there is considerably uncertainty attached to the
estimated survival times. This uncertainty reflects both the estimation uncertainty always
related to the analysis of what is a finite number of observations, and the fundamental
uncertainty attached to the stochastic component of the data-generating process (King,
Tomz and Wittenberg 2000: 348-349). The latter component is perhaps, intuitively
important here. The recurrence of internal conflict may in part be a function of large
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sum of unobserved events. These settings are inherently unstable and it is thus difficult
to predict the chance of staying at peace for any specific observation. What can be said
with some degree of confidence is, however, that the chance of preserving the peace will be
different for cases with low and high executive constraints if elections are held regularly
during the post-conflict period.
4.4 Conclusion
To summarize, the results of the survival analysis provide support for the hypothesized
interaction between post-conflict elections and the level of institutional constraints placed
on majority power. What this means is that the peace building potential of democracy
after internal conflicts should not be judged primarily on the basis of the correlation
between having elections and experiencing recurrence. Whether elections can contribute
to a durable peace seems largely to be a function of how strong the constraints placed on
the post-election majorities are.
This is in line with the prediction of the theoretical model developed in Section 2.4.1.
In this model, holding competitive elections may support both conflict recurrence and
durable peace in equilibrium, depending on the strength of institutions constraining ma-
jority power. What is observed empirically is that elections are related to more durable
peace where such constraining institutions are in place, while there is a correlation be-
tween elections and conflict recurrence where such institutions are absent. The empirical
findings are thus in line with the expectation based on the theoretical model.
As has been shown in this chapter, this finding is robust to looking both at formal
institutions and to also use an indicator taking de facto performance of these institutions
into account. Moreover, the finding is robust both to comparing election to non-election
years and to looking at time proximity to elections. This increases confidence in the
hypothesized interaction. The next chapter will evaluate the robustness further as well
as analyze how well the models fit the data.
Chapter 5
Robustness and Model Diagnostics
The previous chapter presented the results of the empirical analysis. This chapter inves-
tigates the robustness of these results. This is an important additional step in testing the
hypothesis that the effect of elections on the durability of post-conflict peace is mitigated
by institutions that constrain the power of elected governments.
I begin this chapter by investigating how well the models presented in Section 4.2.2
fit the data. This is both a question of whether the estimated survival times correspond
to observed survival times and of whether the models are driven by a few influential ob-
servations or reflect broader relationships. Both these questions are investigated through
analysis of the models’ residuals. Having confirmed that there is a reasonable fit between
the models and the data, the chapter continues to investigate the robustness to slightly
different model specifications. This interaction effect is shown to hold across different
specifications of the independent variables and of what constitutes a post-conflict peace
spell. It is also robust to the inclusion of additional control variables.
This chapter also offers an opportunity to address the issues of endogeneity and re-
peated events which were discussed in Chapter 3, but only to a limited extent taken into
account in Chapter 4. To better account for how levels of constraints on majority power
may be endogenous to conflict (Wig and Hegre 2013, Wucherpfennig 2011), I attempt
to instrument for executive constraints using British legal origin as an instrument. The
interaction effect holds when I in this way attempt to isolate the variation in executive
constraints that is exogenous to conflict. The reported results are also robust to account-
ing for the multi-level structure of the data within a repeated events rather than a shared
frailty framework.
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5.1 Measures of Fit
One question that may be asked of the models that are presented is how well they fit
the data. In the analysis in Chapter 4 this was less of a concern. What is of primary
interest to this thesis is the effect of post-conflict democracy and more specifically whether
the presence of constraining institutions mediate the impact of holding elections in post-
conflict societies. Hence magnitudes, direction and precision of the covariates of interests
are of greater interest than building a statistical model that accounts for all aspects
of conflict recurrence. Whether the models estimated do at all fit the data is still an
interesting question. After all, it is not clear what inferences could be made from a model
that is not able to predict the patterns in the data. This section thus investigates both
whether there is a correspondence between the predicted survival times and the survival
times that are observed, and the extent to which the results are driven by a few influential
observations. These are both questions that may be investigated by analyzing the models’
residuals (Cox and Snell 1968: 248-249).
5.1.1 Adequacy of the Model
The first question regarding the fit of the models is thus whether the models are adequate
in describing the data. This is a question of the correspondence between predicted and
observed survival times, and can be evaluated by plotting the Cox-Snell residuals against
the estimated integrated hazard function based on these same residuals (Mills 2011: 149-
151). If the model is adequate in predicting the variation in the data, this plot should
follow an exponential distribution with a hazard ratio of 1. This is the case if the plot
follows a straight line through the origin (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 120).1
The overall fit of models 7 and 9 can thus be assessed by examining Figure 5.1. Neither
of these models fit the data perfectly. At the upper end of cumulative hazard rate, there
are clear deviations from the 45◦ line, and these are particularly clear for Model 9. As
noted by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004: 124-125), this is typical as this is the tail
where the estimation uncertainty will be greatest. This problem may be amplified by
how the models are estimated on a relatively small sample. It may, however, be that the
relative lack of fit suggests the omission of important covariates. To what extent this is
1As the imputation based models are less flexible, I have used the models based only on observed
data to construct the Cox-Snell residuals. As the models are very similar, I do not expect this to affect
the results.
5.1. MEASURES OF FIT 81












lll l ll l l l l



































l ll l l l l l l























biasing results will be investigated further in Section 5.2. For now, it may be concluded
that both models appear to fit the data quite well at the lower end of the cumulative
hazard rate but get progressively worse at higher levels. At least for the lower end of
the cumulative hazard rate there is, however, a reasonable correspondence between the
predicted survival times and the survival times as observed in the data.
5.1.2 Influential Observations
Another interesting question is whether the results are driven by some influential obser-
vations or if the model is successful in capturing what is a more general relationship. In
other words; how much would the estimated coefficients change if one observation was
removed from the data? This can be investigated by plotting the score residual for each
observation (Therneau and Grambsch 2000: 154-156). For Model 10, which is the shared
frailty model where executive constraints are interacted with the natural logarithm of
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election proximity, this is shown in Figure 5.2. As this thesis is primarily concerned
with the interaction between elections and constraining institutions, I only report score
residual plots for the constituent terms of this interaction.
Although some observations have more leverage than others, it does not seem to be the
case that the reported results are vulnerable to the removal of any single case. There are,
however, some observations with moderate leverage particularly when it comes to pulling
the coefficients in the opposite direction of what is hypothesized. Specifically the 1991
recurrence on Haiti, but also the 2004 recurrence of the conflict between the government
of Georgia and South Ossetian separatists moderates the hypothesized interaction effect
for Model 10. A larger group of observations provides support for Hypothesis 1.1 and the
pull of each of these is more limited. For Model 12 which evaluates Hypothesis 1.2, there
are more observations that exert a greater influence. Observations do, however, pull in
opposite directions, and the reported results are not sensitive to any single observation.
As for model 10, it is the few observations that do not fit with the theoretical expectations
of this thesis that have the strongest leverage. This should be seen as an indication that
some of the uncertainty in the models are caused by a limited set of observations that
are not well accounted for.
As can be seen in Figure 5.2 the 1991 recurrence in Haiti is an observation that
has some leverage on the results. Removing this observation would change all of the
constituent terms of the interaction. The conditional effect of executive constraints given a
one year distance in time to the nearest election2 would change with 0.06 if this observation
was removed, which is at least a moderate impact. As discussed in Section 4.1, this is one
of few observations where executive constraints are high (6), but an election still produced
a conflict recurrence. The case is thus not only influential but may also be considered as
deviant. Estimating the model (not reported) after dropping the peace spell ending in this
recurrence makes the results stronger and considerably more significant. Dropping the
observation would however only be appropriate if the deviance was the result of a coding
error. Before drawing inferences based on the model this should thus be investigated
further (Seawright 2011: 63-65). What is clear is that Haiti’s executive constraint score
dropped to 1 in the year of the recurrence, but this appears to have been the result of the
conflict rather than the other way around. It is, however, not obvious that the constraints
2This is when the logarithm of election proximity takes on the value of 0.
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Figure 5.2: Influential observations? Changes in interaction between proximity to election
and executive constraints with the removal of each observation
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on majority power in Haiti prior to the 1991 recurrence were as strong as a executive-
constraints score of 6 would suggest. President Aristede is reported to have shown little
constraint when going after his political enemies both within the court system and when
having his supporters harass members of parliament (Dupuy 2009: 166-168). Thus, even
if the 1991 conflict recurrence in Haiti constitutes a deviant case in my analysis, it is not
clear that it could be the foundation of an argument against Hypothesis 1. In any event,
I do not exclude the peace spell from the analysis.
The other observation pulling the results in the opposite direction of what is hypothe-
sized is the recurrence of the conflict over the independence of South Ossetia in 2004. The
case is interesting as the recurrence followed the Rose Revolution in which the central
government of Georgia was democratized. The new and elected leadership launched a
campaign to “restore the country’s territorial integrity” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program
2013c). This particular recurrence may thus offer some support for the notion that democ-
ratization may be a source of nationalist conflict (Zakaria 1997, Snyder 2000). Thus, even
in the presence of relatively strong executive constraints, election winners may choose to
resort to conflict. This is also in line with Kreutz (2010b: 2) who finds that government
initiated recurrences sometimes are driven by factors other than those hypothesized to be
important in Chapter 2. On such factor is the use of conflict to rally supporters for the
government. It is, however, important that there was no process of demobilization and
dismantling of the condition of dual sovereignty prior to the recurrence. The assumptions
of the formal model in Section 2.4.1 upon which Hypothesis 1 is based are thus violated.
It is thus not clear whether the case should have any bearing on how the predictions of
this model is evaluated (Morton 1999). In any event, this case demonstrates that other
dynamics may be valid for some cases of conflict recurrence.
There are also cases with some leverage in the opposite direction, the one with the
greatest being The Republic of Congo in 2002. Reestimating the model without the peace
spell ending in this recurrence (not reported) leads to minor changes in the magnitude of
the coefficients of interests but does not affect which inferences can be made based on the
model. The 2002 recurrence of the conflict between the government and Ntsiloulous forces
(Raleigh 2007: 77) happened in the year of a competitive election but in the absence of
effective constraints on the executive. The reason for why this case is influential does not
appear to be a coding error. As was discussed in Section 4.1, this seems instead to be
a clear example of democratic competition in the absence of effective constraints on the
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executive being unable to facilitate a peaceful development. There are also other cases
in this category. As these are all clear cases of recurrences happening in settings with
elections in the absence of strong executive constraints, it is unsurprising that they have
some leverage over the results.
For Model 12 in which the logarithm of election proximity is interacted with the mutual
veto dummy, the score residuals of the substantively most interesting coefficients are
reported in Figure 5.3. Compared to Model 10, the score residuals are somewhat higher
for all the constituent terms of the interaction for this model. This is explained by how
thes coefficients have greater magnitudes in this model. As for Model 10, the recurrence in
Haiti in 1991 is important for moderating the results of this model. In this model there are
also some other observations with more leverage over the results. At most the coefficient
for mutual vetoes at one year from an election would change by 0.15 by removing a single
observation. This would mean a clear change in the magnitude of the reported survival
ratios, but the inferences of the model would remain similar. Combined, the results are
vulnerable to what happens within these more influential clusters of observations. As
indicated by the cases that have been used as examples, these observations are cases
where elections have lead to recurrences. Depending on the level of the constraining
institutions, these observation will thus pull the results in one direction or the other.
One of the data points with the most leverage is the 1997 recurrence of the conflict
between the government of Chad and the rebel groups. The recurrence happened one
year after the election of Idriss De´by as president and in the year of the legislative elec-
tions (African Elections Database 2013). Chad did at the time only have one institution
contributing to the mutual veto. It should also be noted that the country-year has a
lagged executive constraints score of 2, establishing some equivalence in coding across
these indicators, and indicating that a coding error does not explain the leverage of this
observation. Rather it appears to be a case that fits the theoretical framework developed
in Chapter 2, as election victory guaranteed president De´by full control of the riches of the
state and the opportunity to use the apparatus of the state against his opponents (Gould
and Winters 2012: 321-322). Even if it was not the results of a coding error, it would be
problematic if this single observation to a large extent was driving the results. This is
hardly the case. The term that would change the most if this observation was removed
is the effect of changes in election proximity in the absence of constraining institutions,
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Figure 5.3: Influential observations? Changes in interaction between proximity to election
and mutual vetoes with the removal of each observation
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which would only change by 0.06.
In conclusion the influential observations for models 10 and 12 do not appear to
be coding errors, although Haiti perhaps had constraining institutions with a poorer
de facto performance than the high executive constraints score would suggest. Neither
would the inferences that are made based on these models have to be changed if any
single observation was removed from these models.
The results, are however, driven by a cluster of observations in which there is a
clear correlation between elections and conflict recurrence. It should not be considered
problematic that these observations are influential, but it should be pointed out that there
are relatively few of them. As the number of recurrences are also limited, they do make
up a very low proportion of the events in the data. It would, however, be interesting to
see whether the results hold if the time series was extended to include more recurrences
and post-conflict elections. This may be a promising avenue for future research.
5.2 Robustness to Different Model Specifications
So far the analysis, has provided support for the interaction between constraining institu-
tions and election proximity. One question one may still want to pose is how robust these
results are to different specifications of both the independent variables and of what con-
stitutes a post-conflict period. Moreover, there are some other variables that it might be
interesting to control for. If the theory developed in Chapter 2 holds, the reported results
should be robust also to other reasonable specifications of the main model. This section
thus investigates whether there are specifications of the model in which Hypothesis 1 does
not hold.
The analysis has so far not distinguished between presidential and legislative elections.
This is because what is hypothesized to be important are the elections that determine
which actors will receive control over political power. Whether elections to the legislative
or to the executive are most important in this respect will depend on the rest of a coun-
try’s political system. There may, however, be a case to be made that direct elections to
the executive are more likely to have the winner-takes-all character assumed in Chapter
2 (Linz 1990, Lijphart 1999; 2008: Chapter 9). It is also not clear whether legislative
elections in presidential systems with very low executive constraints would have an im-
portant effect, as it can be argued that less is at stake in such an election. To make sure
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that grouping these two types of elections together is not biasing the results, model 10*
in Table 5.1 disaggregates election proximity to proximity to a legislative election and
proximity to an executive election.
As can be seen from inspecting Table 5.1, the proposed interaction does at least have
the same direction for elections both to legislatures and to executives. Disaggregating
elections does, however, increase the standard errors and thus leads to the loss of statisti-
cal significance. The interaction term for proximity to legislative elections and executive
constraints remains weakly significant. The main reason for the loss of significance ap-
pears to be that effect of distance to either executive and legislative elections gets weaker
when controlling for distance to the other type of elections. The somewhat more efficient
estimates for legislative elections may be explained by the fact that not all democratic
countries hold executive elections. Estimating the model separately for executive and
legislative elections (not reported) leads to similar estimates but with smaller standard
errors. The effect of proximity to executive elections remain stronger but somewhat less
significant. In sum, there may be a difference between the election types, but this does
not seem to be driving the results. A comparison of the AIC of models 10 and 10*
indicates that disaggregating elections does not improve the fit of the model. Rather
than suggesting a marked difference between different types of elections, this model may
underline that the reported results are based on a relatively limited sample, which makes
further disaggregation difficult.
Another possible problem is that results may be driven by how post-conflict peace is
operationalized. Dahl and Høyland (2012) show that previous findings in the literature
may not be consistent across different specifications of what constitutes a post-conflict
peace spell. One such difference concerns how severe the conflict must have been for
the period following it to be counted as a post-conflict peace spell. Collier, Hoeﬄer and
So¨derbom (2008: 466) do for instance employ a more restrictive criterion of a total of
1000 battle related deaths for the conflict to be included in their data. They furthermore
censor the peace spells after the first decade of peace (Collier, Hoeﬄer and So¨derbom
2008: 465). Model 10** investigates the effect of using this more restrictive criterion
for the identification of peace spells. This increases both the magnitude and significance
of the interaction between executive constraints and the effect of election proximity. It
should, however, be noted that this model is based on a quite limited number of obser-
vations. That the proposed interaction becomes stronger and more significant even as
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other important predictors such as victories and the logarithm of population are no longer
significant should lend additional confidence to Hypothesis 1.
Table 5.1: Cox regressions 1972-2005. Robustness of the interaction between election
proximity and level of executive constraints
(10) (10*) (10**) (10***) (10****)
log (election proximity) 1.22 1.47* 1.25* 1.21
(0.945,1.577) (0.946,2.27) (0.959,1.633) (0.94,1.564)
Executive constraints 1.75*** 2.38*** 3.23*** 1.94*** 1.78***
(1.265,2.416) (1.377,4.099) (1.565,6.665) (1.368,2.745) (1.298,2.444)
log (election proximity) 0.9*** 0.79** 0.89*** 0.9***
*executive constraints (0.829,0.97) (0.662,0.946) (0.81,0.97) (0.829,0.969)
log( executive election proximity) 1.3
(0.857,1.977)
log(executive election proximity) 0.88
*executive constraints (0.754,1.035)
log (legislative election proximity) 1.07
(0.788,1.465)
log (legislative election proximity) 0.92*
*executive constraints (0.848,1.005)
Victory 2.9*** 2.9*** 1.63 3.06*** 3.31***
(1.373,6.142) (1.374,6.103) (0.449,5.886) (1.421,6.587) (1.552,7.055)
log (population) 0.78** 0.78** 0.84 0.78** 0.81**
(0.634,0.968) (0.636,0.969) (0.571,1.227) (0.638,0.963) (0.669,0.983)
log (GDP per capita) 1.14 1.15 1.03 1.07 1.13
(0.804,1.626) (0.812,1.636) (0.56,1.876) (0.758,1.522) (0.806,1.582)
log (battle deaths) 0.88 0.88 0.76 0.91 0.94
(0.653,1.174) (0.678,1.148) (0.407,1.421) (0.701,1.187) (0.723,1.23)
PKO 25.31* 26.57* 0.04 0.11** 0.13**
(0.674,951.048) (0.699,1009.776) (0,22144.94) (0.015,0.813) (0.018,0.902)
Territorial conflict 1.43 1.45 0.87 1.29 1.36
(0.786,2.589) (0.803,2.618) (0.294,2.592) (0.716,2.317) (0.768,2.419)
Executive recruitment 0.88 0.87 0.6** 0.87 0.88
(0.679,1.129) (0.674,1.118) (0.388,0.935) (0.675,1.127) (0.69,1.124)
Political participation 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.89
(0.691,1.21) (0.689,1.201) (0.574,1.457) (0.651,1.144) (0.68,1.154)
log(battle deaths) 1.09 1.08 1.16 1.06 1.05
*log (time) (0.901,1.316) (0.914,1.273) (0.741,1.823) (0.898,1.256) (0.891,1.244)
PKO 0.14** 0.14** 49.42 1.22 1.28




*log (election proximity) (0.641,2.043)
Election during conflict 0.64
(0.346,1.187)
log-likelihood null -376.93 -376.93 -149.49 -369.63 -369.63
log-likelihood -338.26 -338.13 -116 -332.19 -337.06
AIC 721.32 723.77 276.8 708.57 708.62
N 1854 1854 586 1854 1854
Number of events 79 79 36 79 79
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Estimates in survival ratioes.
95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
Flores and Nooruddin (2012) find previous democratic experience to be important
for what effect post-conflict elections will have on the durability of post-conflict peace,
and in line with this thesis argue that this may be explained by the institutional con-
text under which elections take place. As such, interacting elections with a measure
of executive constraints could be seen as a more precise test of the theoretical mecha-
nism suggested by Flores and Nooruddin. It may, however, be interesting to see whether
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sub-hypothesis 1.1 holds also when controlling for the interaction between elections and
whether a post-conflict democracy has previous democratic experience. If the measure of
executive constraints captures the relevant constraining institutions, it should be robust
to controlling for the effect of being a new democracy and the interaction between this
lack of democratic maturity and elections. This is investigated in Model 10***, which
includes a dummy for whether the country of the peace spell was a new democracy and
the interaction term for this dummy with the election proximity. Following Flores and
Nooruddin (2012: 564), a country is coded as a new democracy if it had a polity score
below 7 prior to the outbreak of the initial conflict and polity score higher than 7 in
the post-conflict period. Controlling for the interaction between being a new democracy
and elections does not affect the estimated interaction between proximity to elections
and executive constraints. That Flores and Nooruddin’s (2012) interaction is weak and
insignificant in Model 10*** also suggests that the executive constraints-measure does a
better job in picking up the institutional maturity central to their argument. This pro-
vides additional support for the key proposition of this thesis: it is the constraints placed
on majority power rather than other aspects of institutional maturity that determine
what impact elections will have in the post-conflict setting. That the interaction between
election proximity and executive constraints are stronger in this model suggests that this
effect may be somewhat stronger for settings with some prior democratic experience.
While Flores and Nooruddin (2012), as well as this thesis, focus on the quality of
constraining institutions that mediate the impact of having elections, a competing expla-
nation could be that it is not the level of such constraints that matter but the experience
with elections. This may be some of the effect captured in Flores and Nooruddin’s (2012)
”new democracy”-dummy and what leads Bratton (1998), Strand (2007) and Cederman,
Gleditsch and Hug (2012: 14-17) to find first and second elections to be particularly
conflict inducing. One measure that may capture the extent to which the parties to the
conflict have previous experience with democracy is whether elections were held during
the armed conflict. This means moving beyond whether elections have previously been
held in the country of interest, and instead investigating directly whether both antago-
nists have observed how elections previously have been organized and what the outcome
has been. If elections during conflict were held, then both the population and the armed
factions should be expected to have both some information about each other’s electoral
strength and trust in the mechanisms of elections. A dummy indicating whether there
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was an election in the country during the previous conflict episode is included in Model
10****. Introducing this variable has no clear effect on the interaction between election
proximity and executive constraints. The effect of having held elections during the con-
flict is not statistically significant and the direction of the effect is the opposite of what
would have been expected.
In conclusion, the interaction between proximity to an election and the level of execu-
tive constraints holds across various specification of the model. This provides additional
support for Hypothesis 1.1. One may also want to consider to what extent the support for
Hypothesis 1.2 is driven by the choice of mutual vetoes as the formal institutions captur-
ing the extent of constraints put on majority power. As this may not be the only plausible
indicator of formal institutions aimed at providing such constraints, it is interesting to
investigate how robust the reported results are to alternative indicators.
Regan, Frank and Clark (2009: 296-297) propose an index of executive power made
up of the difference between formal institutions providing assets to the executive such
as power to dismiss the legislature and formal institution imposing constraints on the
executive. Not all of these indicators are suited for capturing constraints placed on
majority power. Dictatorial rule, which counts as an asset for the executive in this index
(Regan, Frank and Clark 2009: 296), would for instance be an awkward component.
Some of the specific variables proposed by Regan, Frank and Clark (2009) could perhaps
serve as alternatives to the mutual veto dummy. One such indicator could be whether the
legislature has to approve budgets. The problem with this and other of the suggestions
offered by Regan, Frank and Clark (2009) is that there is very limited variation within
systems that hold competitive elections. Thus even if a model where mutual vetoes
are replaced with legislative power to approve budgets produce coefficients and standard
errors that appear to provide strong support for the hypothesized interaction, caution is
appropriate as there are strong reasons to suspect that the models have not converged
properly. I thus choose not to report these models.
Another index of formal political institutions imposing constraints on majority power
and thus allowing for credible commitments is developed by Wig and Hegre (2013). This
index is an attempt of capturing different political institutions of the type Lijphart (1977;
1999; 2004) argues that facilitate elite-level bargaining in divided societies. As such,
this index does not only capture constraints placed directly on majority power such as
mutual vetoes but also proportional election systems, federalism, judicial review, legisla-
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tive quotas, balanced bicameralism and an independent central bank (Wig and Hegre
2013: 10-12). The relationship between having an independent central bank and credibly
promising not to abuse power following elections is perhaps not obvious. Nor is the ap-
propriateness of an additive index here. The assumption that having both judicial review
and an independent central bank makes credible commitments twice as likely as only
having mutual vetoes seems to be rather heroic. Still, these are all institutions captur-
Table 5.2: Robustness of interaction between de jure constraining institutions and election
proximity
(12) (12*) (12**) (12***) (12****)
log (election proximity) 1.09 1.12 1.09 1.07 1.09
(0.914,1.292) (0.841,1.486) (0.921,1.299) (0.903,1.278) (0.913,1.292)
Mutual veto 2.57** 2.71** 2.57** 2.46**
(1.076,6.148) (1.143,6.411) (1.067,6.169) (1.002,6.035)
log (election proximity) 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.64***
*mutual veto (0.492,0.841) (0.493,0.838) (0.498,0.853) (0.491,0.842)
Consociationalism index 1.2
(0.886,1.625)
log (election proximity) 0.92*
*Consociationalism index (0.844,1.002)
Victory 2.63*** 2.84*** 2.67*** 2.63** 2.41**
(1.269,5.465) (1.353,5.949) (1.304,5.461) (1.258,5.481) (1.132,5.139)
log (population 0.78** 0.79** 0.76*** 0.78** 0.79**
(0.637,0.953) (0.637,0.986) (0.631,0.925) (0.632,0.952) (0.636,0.969)
log (GDP per capita 1.19 1.21 1.13 1.17 1.17
(0.843,1.678) (0.849,1.719) (0.814,1.573) (0.823,1.653) (0.821,1.673)
log (battle deaths) 0.91 0.88 0.95 0.9 0.91
(0.675,1.223) (0.656,1.184) (0.705,1.272) (0.665,1.205) (0.677,1.223)
PKO 20.96* 18.8* 0.16** 19.77* 22.7*
(0.631,696.399) (0.582,607.123) (0.026,0.969) (0.611,640.386) (0.672,766.476)
Territorial conflict 1.53 1.6 1.56 1.5 1.49
(0.843,2.762) (0.887,2.901) (0.877,2.791) (0.821,2.729) (0.823,2.713)
Executive recruitment 1.03 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.03
(0.844,1.263) (0.869,1.285) (0.859,1.27) (0.842,1.268) (0.841,1.272)
Political participation 1 0.98 0.96 0.99 1.02
(0.747,1.341) (0.733,1.32) (0.716,1.277) (0.735,1.332) (0.752,1.374)
log (battle deaths) 1.06 1.08 1.03 1.07 1.06
*log (time) (0.877,1.287) (0.895,1.308) (0.852,1.243) (0.881,1.293) (0.874,1.28)
PKO 0.16* 0.17* 1.07 0.16* 0.16*
*log (time) (0.024,1.045) (0.026,1.088) (0.494,2.309) (0.025,1.059) (0.024,1.068)










log-likelihood null -376.93 -376.93 -376.93 -376.93 -376.93
log-likelihood -342.32 -343.59 -346 -340.45 -339.44
AIC 726.22 733.17 728.49 725.97 728.66
N 1854 1854 1854 1854 1854
Number of events 79 79 79 79 79
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Estimates in survival ratioes.
95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
ing how political power is divided in ways to limit majoritarian power (Lijphart 1999).
Even if there is a less clear theoretical fit between some of the sub-components of this
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index and the theoretical mechanism suggested in Section 2.4.1, the interaction between
election proximity and de jure constraining institutions should perhaps be expected to
hold also when employing this index as an indicator of formal constraining institutions.
As can be seen from inspecting Model 12*, this expectation is only partially confirmed.
The standard errors are somewhat larger, but the same interaction is found also when
employing the index proposed by Wig and Hegre (2013). One important caveat is that
the effects for the consociational index are much less signficant. Having an additional
consociational observation does not have a significant effect on the recurrence risk when
being one year from the closest election. As this operationalization does not capture the
theoretical concept as clearly as the mutual veto dummy, I do however not consider this
to be devastating.
An alternative way of looking at some of the other consociational institutions that
make up Wig and Hegre’s (2013) index is not as alternative operationalizations but as
possible omitted variables. Even if it fails to facilitate credible commitments, a variable
such as proportional elections still may make a post-conflict democratic system more
likely to facilitate durable peace by increasing the inclusiveness of the system (Reynolds
2006, Joshi 2012). This may be seen as an alternative explanation for the finding of
this thesis. It may thus be interesting to see whether the reported interaction between
election proximity and executive constraints holds also when introducing proportional
electoral systems as an additional control. In Model 12**, I thus include a dummy
variable indicating proportional electoral systems taken from the iaep-dataset. As can
be seen from comparing models 12 and 12**, controlling for proportional electoral system
has no important impact on the results.
There are also other possible candidates for omitted variable bias that have not been
considered. One such variable is that of economic growth. Some studies show that
economic growth may be important for avoiding conflict recurrence (Collier, Hoeﬄer and
So¨derbom 2008). This finding may, however, not be very robust (Dahl and Høyland
2012). Omitted variable bias may be introduced as executive constraints may also be an
important predictor of economic growth, although the long term effects may be what is
most important (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005). In Model 12*** economic growth is thus
introduced as an additional control variable. This does not affect the estimated survival
ratios for any of the constituent terms of the interaction, and this holds both for the
mutual veto indicator as in Model 12*** and for the xconst-variable (not reported).
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The impact of ethnicity and changes related to the end of the Cold War are also factors
that have not been included in the models reported so far. If ethnicity or changes in the
international system are somehow related both to post-conflict institutions and to risk of
conflict, then this would be problematic. Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug (2012: 12) find
that ethnic differences may make elections more likely to lead to conflict, while Cheibub,
Hays and Savun (2012) find the relationship between African elections and conflict to
have changed after the end of the Cold War. More generally, both ethnicity and the end
of the cold war are variables sometimes invoked to explain patterns of conflict (Kaldor
1999). According to Baloyra (1998: 32), this distinction may also be important for the
impact of post-conflict elections: “elections following a civil war driven by ideological
consideration may have greater efficacy than in those driven by ethnic hatred”.
Kalyvas (2001) convincingly argues that the distinction between “new” and “old” civil
wars is not valid. However, as post-conflict democratization is a phenomenon that has
become more common after the end of the Cold War, differences between “new” and “old”
wars could bias the results if this distinction was picking up important differences. I con-
trol for these possible differences in Model 12****, which includes a variables measuring
the proportion of the population that is excluded from political power, taken from Ceder-
man, Min and Wimmer (2009). I also include a quadratic term of the ethnic population
variable to capture what could be expected to be a curvilinear relationship between the
size of the excluded population and conflict (Cunningham and Weidmann 2010: 1043)
and a dummy variable indicating whether the peace spell occurred after the end of the
Cold War. The inclusion of these variables do not affect the interaction between mutual
veto and election proximity. Hence, these are not sources of omitted variable bias.
An additional set of robustness tests evaluating different operationalizations of election
proximity are reported in Appendix D. These tests are discussed in Section 3.2.1.1 and
are thus not granted additional space in this chapter. It should however be noted that the
reported results are not sensitive to different operationalizations of election proximity.
In conclusion, the results reported here do not appear to be driven by specific choices
in the model specification or in operationalization of key variables. Also when using dif-
ferent operationalizations of elections and post-conflict peace spells and when introducing
additional control variables does the reported interaction hold. One possible threat to
the robustness is, however, that the results are weaker and less signficant when using Wig
and Hegre’s (2013) consociationalism index. It is not clear how this should be interpreted
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as there is less of a clear fit between the theoretical concept and this operationalization.
5.3 Endogeneity Revisited
As was pointed out in sections 2.4.1 and 3.4.1, the level of executive constraints may
not be completely exogenous to the severity of the post-conflict commitment problems.
On one hand such constraints may be introduced precisely because post-conflict actors
want to solve the commitment problem (Wucherpfennig 2011, Wig and Hegre 2013). On
the other hand, such constraints may be more likely to be introduced in cases where
the commitment problem is already solved (Gurses and Mason 2008). In any event, this
may produce bias in the reported estimates. As the risk of recurrence itself may be a
cause of institutional constraints, the effect of executive constraints cannot be estimated
consistently (Greene 2002: 959).
As discussed in section 3.4.1, it is not straight forward how this problem should be
dealt with. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004: 112-114) note that the development of
selection models within the context of survival analysis is still in its infancy. Even if some
progress is made my Boehmke, Morey and Shannon (2006), solutions to endogeneity
problems are still not implemented in standard software for survival analysis. Because
of these problems, the models reported so far do not attempt to correct for endogeneity
apart from the inclusion of control variables related to how the previous conflict ended.
As suggested in Section 3.4.1 it may, however, be possible to follow the logic of an
instrumental variable regression to attempt to correct for how endogeneity is biasing
the results. Important caveats include that the properties of the instrumental regression
within survival analysis is unsettled and that standard errors will be biased as the available
software does not allow any appropriate correction of the variance estimates. Still, using
instruments to generate predicted values for executive constraints and substitute these
into the survival model should at least give some indication of the presence and direction
of the possible endogeneity. Future methodological work may improve the estimation
procedure and thus the ability to isolate the exogenous effect of constraining institutions.
Thus, following the logic of a two-step ordinary least squares estimator (see Stock and
Watson 2007: Chapter 12; Greene 2002: 396-403; Wooldridge 2002: 83-101), I attempt to
isolate the exogenous variation in executive constraints by using an instrument to predict
executive constraints score that are uncorrelated with the error term of the duration
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model. This involves estimating an ordinary least squares regression with the endogenous
variable, executive constrains, as the dependent variable. In this model I include all the
other variables which appear in the survival model in addition to an instrument, which as
a variable that is correlated with the executive constraints but not with the durability of
post-conflict peace (Stock and Watson 2007: 474). The instrument thus allows isolating
the effect of executive constraints that is exogenous to recurrence risk.
This strategy obviously requires the identification of an appropriate instrument. La Porta
et al. (1999: 231-232) posit that the British legal tradition has been developed with the
purpose of limiting the power of the monarch, and that this stands in stark contrast to
other legal traditions which have been developed with the aim of expanding the power of
the state. The constraints placed on executive power may thus be expected to be higher
in countries with a British legal tradition. As this legal system was spread throughout
the British Empire, having a British colonial history may be a predictor of executive
constraints. It is for this reason that North, Summerhill and Weingast (2000) argue that
differences in the colonial experience may explain differences in the economic performance
of North and South America. To the extent that this correlation is strong enough, this
makes British legal origin a relevant instrument. The relevance of British legal origin as
an instrument for executive constraints can be tested by including it in the first-stage
linear model, and testing the null-hypothesis that the coefficient is zero, using a simple
F-test (Stock and Watson 2007: 481). The F-statistic of the coefficient for a British legal
origin is 16.4, which is above the minimum of 10 suggested as a criterion for instrument
relevance (Stock and Watson 2007: 506-507).
I have also considered other possible instruments, such as the age of a country’s con-
stitution and a French colonial heritage. Of these it is the age of a country’s constitution
that has the highest correlation with executive constraints, but the decline in the F-
statistic to only 9.18 when this variable is included suggests that it is a weak instrument.
Following the recommendation of Stock and Watson (2007: 480-481), I thus leave it out
of the model. Dummies for having belonged to other colonial empires than the British
do not predict executive constraint scores. This provides support for the notion that
the British legal tradition are unique with respect to providing constraints on executive
power (La Porta et al. 1999).
The other criterion for a variable to be used as an instrument is validity, which means
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Table 5.3: Controlling for endogeneity: Two-step IV estimation
Baseline Cox 1st stage OLS 2nd stage Cox
Intercept -1.342***
(-2.093,-0.591)
log (election proximity) 1.277 0.022* 1.379*
(0.901,1.811) (-0.004,0.048) (0.963,1.975)
Executive constraints 1.664*** 9.569*
(1.172,2.361) (0.936,97.809)
log (election proximity) 0.885** 0.871***
*Executive constraints (0.802,0.976) (0.791,0.958)
Victory 2.677** -0.423*** 5.559***
(1.223,5.859) (-0.564,-0.282) (1.8,17.167)
log (population) 0.757** -0.045** 0.789**
(0.607,0.943) (-0.087,-0.003) (0.645,0.966)
log (GDP per capita) 1.105 0.3*** 0.674
(0.763,1.6) (0.235,0.365) (0.343,1.326)
log (battle deaths) 0.78 -0.036** 0.841
(0.571,1.065) (-0.069,-0.004) (0.613,1.155)
PKO 80.659 0.237*** 0.898
(0.194,33593.812) (0.098,0.377) (0.446,1.81)
Territorial conflict 1.38 0.2 46.652
(0.815,2.335) (-0.264,0.665) (0.131,16643.059)
Executive recruitment 0.968 0.634*** 0.306
(0.727,1.289) (0.596,0.672) (0.065,1.443)
Political participation 0.854 0.162*** 0.725
(0.643,1.133) (0.104,0.22) (0.492,1.07)
log (battle deaths) 1.189 0.012*** 0.109
*log (time) (0.964,1.467) (0.003,0.021) (0.006,1.934)
PKO 0.084* -0.04 1.151
*log (time) (0.005,1.563) (-0.307,0.227) (0.935,1.417)
British legal origin 0.249***
(0.128,0.369)
log-likelihood null -306.71 -306.71
log-likelihood -280.82 -281.55
AIC 587.63 589.1
N 1454 1454 1454
Number of events 67 67
R^2 0.747
Adjusted R^2 0.745
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. OLS estimates in coeffcients. Cox estimates in survival ratioes.
95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on country.
that the instrument must not be a predictor of the dependent variable after controlling
for the other variables in the model. As I only have one instrument, the model is not over-
identified and it is thus not possible to test the validity of the instrument formally (Stock
and Watson 2007: 485). It does, however, not appear to be any clear reason to suspect
a British legal origin to be related to conflict recurrence. Moreover, the point-biseral
correlation between having a British legal origin and experiencing a conflict recurrence is
only 0.01.
The first step OLS is reported in the second column of Table 5.3. It is perhaps worth
noting that the sign of the victory coefficient is negative, which lends some weight to
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the notion that constraining institutions are less likely to be established in those cases
where the risk of recurrence is the lowest (Wucherpfennig 2011, Wig and Hegre 2013). A
British legal origin is a highly significant predictor of executive constraints. In the Cox
regression reported in the third column, the executive constraint scores are replaced by
predicted executive constraints scores from the first stage OLS.
By comparing the second-stage Cox model to the baseline model reported in the first
column, it is clear that the conditional survival ratios for election proximity and executive
constraints get higher when substituting executive constraints with predicted executive
constraints, while the survival ratio for the interaction term is somewhat lower. If these
results are accurate it implies that endogeneity introduces a downward bias in the results
reported in Chapter 4. Again, this is in line with the notion that political institutions that
constrain elected governments are more likely to be adopted where they are most needed
(Wucherpfennig 2011, Joshi 2010: 37). These cases will also tend to be the cases where
the peace is most likely to fail. One reason may be that negotiated settlements often
involve provisions for institutional reform (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). Another reason
may be that one actor decide to adopt constraining institutions in order to appease the
other actor (Wucherpfennig 2011) and facilitate credible commitments (Wig and Hegre
2013).
The standard errors also change in the two-stage estimation. It is, however, important
to point out that these variance estimates are very likely to be biased as I have not been
able to correct for how this Cox regression is the second stage of a two-stage estimation.
Again, it should be pointed out that the properties of instrumental variable regression
within the framework of a survival model has not been tested and the survival ratios may
thus also be biased. These results do, however, provide some evidence that the reported
results are not driven by endogeneity. While clearly not an optimal solution, the two-step
estimation attempted in this section is the best test for endogeneity that is possible within
the framework of this thesis. Future methodological development may provide methods
for coming closer to the “true” causal effect of executive constraints after conflict. How-
ever, the test undertaken in this section should provide some additional confidence that
the support found for Hypothesis 1 is not primarily driven by an endogenous relationship
between conflict and institutions.
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5.4 Recurrent Events
As discussed in Section 3.4.2, having multiple peace spells of the same conflict episode
is another possible source of bias. That repeated conflict recurrences within the same
conflict-dyad are conditionally independent of each other, is an assumption that is likely
to be violated. As pointed out by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004: 155) ignoring
correlation between events may produce biased variance estimates, and can also bias the
coefficients. In this section I investigate to what extent this is biasing the results reported
in Chapter 4. Because each event within one conflict cannot be assumed to be condi-
tionally independent of previous events and a conflict cannot be at risk of experiencing a
second recurrence before it has experienced a first, the Prentice, Williams and Peterson
(1981) model (PWP) is the most appropriate way of dealing with repeated events in the
context of this thesis (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002: 1075). This model stratifies
the data by event rank so that the baseline hazard for different events are allowed to
vary. What this means is that the baseline hazard of the peace spell following the 1995
termination of the conflict between the government of Ethiopia and the Oromiya rebel
movement, olp, is allowed to be affected by the fact that this was the 5th termination of
conflict between these two antagonists.
Table 5.4 compares models 10 and 12 to their PWP counterparts. As can be seen
from comparing the models, this increases the standard errors somewhat and also has
slight effects on the magnitudes of the survival ratios. That there are some differences in
the results when the model is estimated as a PWP-model indicate that the fact that some
conflicts recur repeatedly may have some important implications. The risk of recurrence
is affected by the previous conflict history.
What is important within the framework of this thesis is, however, that the proposed
interaction holds also when the model is modified to account for the repeated event
structure of the data. Both hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2 are confirmed also when letting the
baseline hazard vary according to event-rank. It is thus possible to conclude that the
reported results are not driven by what assumptions are made concerning how dependency
between some of the peace spells in the data is affecting the durability of post-conflict
peace.
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Table 5.4: Shared frailty models vs. PWP-models for repeated events
(10) (10b) (12) (12b)
Frailty PWP Frailty PWP
log(election proximity) 1.221 1.22 1.086 1.07
(0.945,1.577) (0.889,1.675) (0.914,1.292) (0.868,1.318)
Executive constraints 1.748*** 1.714***
(1.265,2.416) (1.237,2.375)
log(election proximity) 0.897*** 0.893**
* Executive constraints (0.829,0.97) (0.816,0.978)
Mutual veto 2.573** 2.582*
(1.076,6.148) (0.997,6.684)
Log(election proximity) 0.643*** 0.649***
* Mutual veto (0.492,0.841) (0.474,0.888)
Victory 2.903*** 3.245*** 2.634*** 2.783***
(1.373,6.142) (1.562,6.74) (1.269,5.465) (1.433,5.403)
log(population) 0.783** 0.803** 0.779** 0.79***
(0.634,0.968) (0.667,0.966) (0.637,0.953) (0.662,0.944)
log(GDP per capita) 1.144 1.034 1.19 1.084
(0.804,1.626) (0.752,1.423) (0.843,1.678) (0.79,1.487)
log(Battle deaths) 0.875 0.771 0.909 0.808
(0.653,1.174) (0.554,1.072) (0.675,1.223) (0.575,1.135)
PKO 25.31* 29.54 20.957* 21.422
(0.674,951.048) (0.405,2155.81) (0.631,696.399) (0.446,1027.77)
Territorial Conflict 1.427 1.219 1.526 1.296
(0.786,2.589) (0.669,2.22) (0.843,2.762) (0.739,2.273)
Executive recruitment 0.875 0.876 1.033 1.022
(0.679,1.129) (0.68,1.13) (0.844,1.263) (0.843,1.24)
Political Participation 0.915 0.93 1 1.01
(0.691,1.21) (0.707,1.225) (0.747,1.341) (0.766,1.333)
log(Battle deaths) 1.089 1.227** 1.063 1.178
*log(Time) (0.901,1.316) (1.004,1.499) (0.877,1.287) (0.956,1.451)
PKO 0.139** 0.119** 0.16* 0.151*
*log(Time) (0.02,0.963) (0.015,0.96) (0.024,1.045) (0.021,1.066)
log-likelihood null -376.93 -266.18 -376.93 -266.18
log-likelihood -338.26 -241.07 -342.32 -243.1
AIC 721.32 508.15 726.22 512.2
N 1854 1854 1854 1854
Number of events 79 79 79 79
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Estimates in survival ratioes.
95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has extended the analysis of Chapter 4 by investigating Cox-Snell and score
residuals to make sure that there is a correspondence between predicted and observed
survival times, and to investigate the extent to which the results are driven by single
influential observations. It has also been investigated how robust the reported models are
to various specifications and to the inclusion of additional control variables, as well as to
corrections for endogeneity and repeated events.
In general, the results of these diagnostics and robustness exercises should be seen
as bolstering confidence in the proposed interaction effect between post-conflict elections
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and institutions that impose constraints on majority power. Some caveats are, however,
warranted. The results that are reported in this thesis are based on a relatively small
number of events. Although support for the hypothesis is not driven by any single obser-
vation, this means that there is a relatively small number of cases that are crucial for the
support found for the hypothesized relationship. One possible avenue for future research
may thus be to extend the analysis to cover a longer time series and see if this has any im-
pact on the reported results. As post-conflict elections are relatively new phenomena, it
is not given that extending the time series backwards would be the most fruitful strategy,
but incorporating data on institutions, elections and conflict recurrence from the period
after 2005 may be important for assessing whether the interaction found in this thesis is
generalizable to a broader set of cases.
Within the sample of post-conflict peace spells that are investigated in this thesis, it is,
however, possible to conclude that the effect of elections on the risk of conflict recurrence
depends on what other institutions are in place. This interaction effect is robust to
different specifications both of the election variable and the indicators for constraining
institutions. It does furthermore hold when employing a narrower definition of what
constitutes a post-conflict peace spell, when controlling for the possible endogeneity of
executive constraints and when estimating a model where repeated events are taken into
account.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, I have investigated the question of why post-conflict elections in some set-
tings seem to have facilitated durable peace while in other settings have been related to
recurrent conflict. My main proposition has been that this may be explained by vari-
ation in the institutional constraints placed on elected governments. This follows from
a theoretical framework that – in line with much of the existing literature on conflict
recurrence – assumes the existence of post-conflict commitment problems to be the pri-
mary explanation for recurrent conflict. Because post-conflict governments are not able
to credibly guarantee not to renege on past promises, the former rebels will be reluctant
to demobilize. This may lead to recurrent conflict.
Within this framework, the effect of elections should depend on the extent to which
election winners can credible promise to show restraint after assuming office. Where
there are few constraints on what election winners can do once in power, the post-conflict
commitment problem will not be solved. In these cases elections can be expected to lead
to recurrence if the election losers do not face a prohibite cost of conflict.
Institutions of checks and balances may, however, keep election winners from reneging
on the peace settlement. Such institutions makes it more difficult to expropriate power
for the executive and provide ways of punishing attempts by a government to renege on
concessions that have been made. Elections are thus less likely to become zero-sum games
over control of the state, and consequently are less likely to lead to conflict recurrence.
In these cases, losing an election will be less of a threat and post-conflict democracy
may thus be related to durable peace. This reasoning is captured in the hypothesis that
“The effect of elections on the durability of post-conflict peace depends on the level of
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executive constraints. Holding elections will only make peace less durable where strong
constraining institutions are not in place.”
This hypothesis has been tested empirically for a dataset of all post-conflict peace
spells in the 1972-2005 period. The empirical testing has relied on two different indicators
for institutional constraints to capture both de facto performance and de jure provisions.
The former is captured by the executive constraints-component of the Polity index, while
the latter is captured by whether the executive and the legislature have de jure power to
veto each other’s decisions. The proposed interaction between constraining institutions
and post-conflict election holds for both these indicators, and also regardless of looking at
what happens in election years or investigating the effect of proximity in time to elections.
Holding competitive elections significantly increases the risk of conflict recurrence when
the constraining institutions are weak.
When institutional constraints on elected governments are strong, post-conflict elec-
tions are however related to durable peace. In these settings elections may even be a
positive force for peace. This may suggest that once the commitment problem is solved,
elections can have a stabilizing effect by providing legitimacy for elected governments and
allowing for political participation through non-violent means. These are expectations for
positive association between democracy and post-conflict peace proposed in the literature
that has previously not received clear support in the literature (e.g. Walter 2004). The
results thus provide strong support for the theoretical framework developed in this thesis
and show that the destabilizing effect of elections that has been identified in the existing
literature is indeed mitigated by the presence of institutions of executive constraints.
From a policy making perspective it is important that the main finding of this thesis
may call for a modification of some of the recommendations previously made in the
literature. For instance, Collier, Hoeﬄer and So¨derbom (2008: 470) conclude their study
of post-conflict risks with stating that “international pressure for democracy should be
justified by criteria other than peace-strengthening. Democracy does not appear to be an
instrument for enhancing the durability of post-conflict peace.”What I show in this thesis
is that policy makers may very well keep their faith in democracy as a tool for durable
peace as long as elections and institutions that constraint election winners are introduced
in conjunction. The best advice may thus not be to tone down the calls for elections
in conflict-ridden countries but rather to focus more on strengthening the institutional
checks on those that succeed in these elections. As argued by Carothers (2007), it is
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not clear how holding off elections should be seen as a good strategy for building the
institutions necessary for a functioning democracy. The main policy implication is that
the strong executive constraints is a goal that should be pursued in conjunction with the
goal of holding elections.
What may also be of interest to policymakers is that the type of institutional arrange-
ments that are found to mitigate the impact of elections in this thesis are institutions
that may be also have other positive effects. Kapstein and Converse (2008b;a) argue
that the level of executive constraints are important for stability in young democracies
more broadly and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) find a positive relationship between
executive constraints and economic growth. There appear to be few negative effects of
having higher levels of executive constraints. This stands in contrast to some of the
power-sharing mechanism that are recommended in the literature (Hartzell and Hoddie
2007), but that other contributions have found to have considerable negative influences
(Roeder and Rotchild 2005). This thesis do not take side in the debate on the relative
merits of power-sharing institutions, but it may still be interesting that institutions that
are more generally accepted as having inherently good properties may also help solve the
commitment problem related to post-conflict democracy.
The findings of this thesis are also important for the scholarly understanding of the re-
lationship between political institutions and armed conflict. While most previous studies
have found what is at best mixed evidence for the unconditional effects of different types
of institutions, this thesis demonstrates that political institutions work in conjunction.
The effect of democratic elections can thus not be assessed irrespective of the broader
institutional context. To the best of my knowledge this thesis is the first study to show
a positive conditional effect of post-conflict elections on the durability of post-conflict
peace. In the context of strong institutional constraints, elections are found to have the
opposite effect of what has previously been found in the literature.
This is important also for the vein of research that investigates the effects of democracy
and democratization using aggregate measures such as the Polity-index (e.g. Metternich
and Wucherpfennig 2011). As interactions between different democratic institutions are
important, differences or changes in aggregated measures of democracy may not be able to
capture important variation in post-conflict institutions. As is demonstrated in this thesis,
disaggregating these indeces may be a fruitful approach for enchancing the scholarly
understanding of how democracy and democratization relates to conflict and conflict
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recurrence.
One important contribution made in thesis has thus been measuring directly how
institutions condition the effect of elections. As noted by Cheibub, Hays and Savun
(2012: 13-14), the lack of direct measurement of constraining institutions has been one
important omission in existing studies. There are, however, still important ways to im-
prove measurement. It would for instance have been interesting to investigate data on
election participation for conflict antagonists, as well as the outcome of these elections.
This would allow even more precice testing of the implications from the theoretical model
developed in Chapter 2. Some initial steps in this direction are taken by for instance
Metternich (2011) who uses the size of rebel leaders’ ethnic group as a proxy for electoral
strength. Clearly, it would be useful to also link these actors more directly to parties in-
volved in post-conflict politics. This would allow more precise testing of the mechanisms
hypothesized to be important for the link between elections and conflict recurrence.
Two important caveats are warranted. Firstly, there is considerable uncertainty at-
tached to the effect of elections at most levels of institutional constraints. Thus, even if
the interaction between constraining institutions and elections is statistically significant,
the results do not allow for very strong predictions about what effect elections will have
for individual peace spells. To some extent, this may be an artifact of the relatively small
sample size. Future research may thus want to extend the time-series.
Secondly, the support found for the hypothesized relationship is driven by a relatively
limited number of observations. This is also not surprising given the relatively few ob-
servations in the dataset, but it remains one important caveat. The observation with the
most leverage is the recurrence of conflict on Haiti in 1991, which is one of the few cases
that count against the hypothesized interaction. A larger cluster of observations provides
support for the hypothesized relationship. The leverage of each of these observations is
more limited. Nevertheless, it remains one cause for concern that the reported results
are at least somewhat vulnerable to the removal of a few observations. These caveats
notwithstanding, the available data provides relatively strong support for the proposition
that the effect of post-conflict elections depends on the level of constraints placed on
elected governments.
In conclusion, this thesis has shown that the effect of post-conflict elections on the
durability of peace is mitigated by the strength of institutions constraining elected govern-
ments. Where such institutions are weak, the conditional effect of elections is to increase
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the chances of conflict recurrence. In a context of strong institutional constraints, elec-
tions are related to durable peace.
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Appendix A
Rebel vs. Government Victories








log (GDP per capita) 1.101
(0.779,1.557)












Number of events 67
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Estimates in survival ratioes.
Standard errors clustered on country.
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Appendix B
Post-conflict Peace Spells Included
in the Analysis
Table B.1: List of post-conflict peace spells
Conflict ID Country Side A Side B End of conflict Recurrence year Years of peace
6 Iran KDPI KDPI 1988 1990 2
6 Iran KDPI KDPI 1990 1993 3
6 Iran KDPI KDPI 1993 1996 3
6 Iran KDPI KDPI 1996 9
10 Philippines CPP, Militar CPP, Militar 1995 1997 2
10 Philippines CPP CPP 1997 1999 2
22 Paraguay Military Fac Military Fac 1989 16
23 Myanmar KNUP, KNU KNUP, KNU 1992 1995 3
23 Myanmar KNU KNU 1995 1997 2
23 Myanmar KNU KNU 1998 2000 2
23 Myanmar God’s Army, God’s Army, 2003 2005 2
24 Myanmar CPB-RF, CPB, CPB-RF, CPB, 1988 1990 2
24 Myanmar ABSDF ABSDF 1992 1994 2
24 Myanmar ABSDF ABSDF 1994 11
25 Myanmar ANLP, CPA, R ANLP, CPA, R 1978 1991 13
25 Myanmar ARIF, RSO ARIF, RSO 1992 1994 2
25 Myanmar RSO RSO 1994 11
26 Myanmar NMSP NMSP 1990 1996 6
26 Myanmar BMA BMA 1996 9
29 India PWG, MCC PWG, MCC 1994 1996 2
33 Yemen Arab Republic National Dem National Dem 1982 23
34 Myanmar KIO KIO 1992 13
36 Guatemala FAR I, FAR I FAR I, FAR I 1995 10
37 Israel Palestinian Palestinian 1996 2000 4
43 Thailand CPT CPT 1982 23
50 Argentina ERP, Montene ERP, Montene 1977 28
54 India NSCN - IM NSCN - IM 1997 2000 3
54 India NSCN - IM NSCN - IM 2000 2005 5
56 Myanmar KNPP KNPP 1987 1992 5
56 Myanmar KNPP KNPP 1992 1996 4
56 Myanmar KNPP KNPP 1996 2005 9
62 Iraq SCIRI SCIRI 1984 1987 3
62 Iraq SCIRI SCIRI 1987 1991 4
62 Iraq SCIRI SCIRI 1996 2004 8
63 Lebanon LNM, LAA LNM, LAA 1976 1982 6
63 Lebanon LNM, Amal, N LNM, Amal, N 1986 1989 3
63 Lebanon Lebanese Arm Lebanese Arm 1990 15
64 Malaysia CPM CPM 1975 1981 6
64 Malaysia CPM CPM 1981 24
65 Laos Pathet Lao Pathet Lao 1973 1989 16
65 Laos LRM LRM 1990 15
67 Myanmar SSA SSA 1973 1976 3
67 Myanmar SURA, SSRA, SURA, SSRA, 1988 1993 5
67 Myanmar MTA, SSA-S MTA, SSA-S 2002 2005 3
70 Ethiopia TPLF, EPRP, TPLF, EPRP, 1991 14
74 Iraq KDP, PUK, KD KDP, PUK, KD 1992 1995 3
74 Iraq PUK PUK 1996 9
78 Ethiopia ELF, EPLF, E ELF, EPLF, E 1991 14
80 Venezuela Bandera Roja Bandera Roja 1982 1992 10
80 Venezuela Military fac Military fac 1992 13
85 Sudan Anya Nya/SSL Anya Nya/SSL 1972 33
86 DRC FLNC FLNC 1978 1996 18
86 DRC AFDL, RCD, R AFDL, RCD, R 2001 4
90 Burundi Palipehutu Palipehutu 1992 1994 2
91 Chad Frolinat, Fi Frolinat, Fi 1972 1976 4
91 Chad FAN, FAP, FA FAN, FAP, FA 1984 1986 2
91 Chad GUNT, CDR GUNT, CDR 1987 1989 2
91 Chad MOSANAT, Rev MOSANAT, Rev 1994 1997 3
91 Chad FARF, MDD, M FARF, MDD, M 2002 2005 3
94 Indonesia OPM OPM 1978 1981 3
94 Indonesia OPM OPM 1981 24
95 Peru Sendero Lumi Sendero Lumi 1999 6
98 Ghana Military fac Military fac 1981 1983 2
98 Ghana Military fac Military fac 1983 22
101 South Africa SWAPO SWAPO 1988 17
102 Syria Muslim Broth Muslim Broth 1982 23
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103 Cambodia Khmer Rouge/ Khmer Rouge/ 1975 1978 3
103 Cambodia KNUFNS, Khme KNUFNS, Khme 1998 7
111 Guinea RFDG RFDG 2001 4
112 Philippines MIM, MNLF, M MIM, MNLF, M 1990 1993 3
113 Sudan Islamic Char Islamic Char 1976 1983 7
117 Sri Lanka JVP JVP 1990 15
118 Uganda Military fac Military fac 1972 1974 2
118 Uganda Military fac Military fac 1974 1979 5
118 Uganda Kikosi Maalu Kikosi Maalu 1992 1994 2
119 United Kingdom PIRA PIRA 1991 1998 7
119 United Kingdom RIRA RIRA 1998 7
120 El Salvador ERP, FPL, FM ERP, FPL, FM 1991 14
121 Oman PFLO PFLO 1975 30
122 Zimbabwe ZANU, ZAPU, ZANU, ZAPU, 1979 26
123 Uruguay MLN/Tupamaro MLN/Tupamaro 1972 33
125 Chile Military fac Military fac 1973 32
126 Bangladesh JSS/SB JSS/SB 1992 13
129 Pakistan Baluchi sepa Baluchi sepa 1977 2004 27
130 Eritrea EIJM - AS EIJM - AS 1997 1999 2
130 Eritrea EIJM - AS EIJM - AS 1999 2003 4
130 Eritrea EIJM - AS EIJM - AS 2003 2
131 Angola FNLA, UNITA FNLA, UNITA 1995 1998 3
131 Angola UNITA UNITA 2002 3
133 Ethiopia WSLF WSLF 1983 1994 11
133 Ethiopia ONLF ONLF 1994 1996 2
133 Ethiopia ONLF ONLF 1996 1999 3
133 Ethiopia ONLF ONLF 2002 2004 2
134 Indonesia Fretilin Fretilin 1989 1992 3
134 Indonesia Fretilin Fretilin 1992 1997 5
134 Indonesia Fretilin Fretilin 1998 7
135 Morocco POLISARIO POLISARIO 1989 16
136 Mozambique Renamo Renamo 1992 13
137 Afghanistan Taleban Taleban 2001 2003 2
139 India TNV TNV 1988 1992 4
139 India ATTF ATTF 1993 1995 2
139 India NLFT NLFT 1995 1997 2
139 India NLFT, ATTF NLFT, ATTF 2004 1
140 Nicaragua FSLN FSLN 1979 1982 3
140 Nicaragua Contras/FDN Contras/FDN 1990 15
141 Somalia SSDF, SNM SSDF, SNM 1984 1986 2
141 Somalia SNM, SPM, US SNM, SPM, US 1996 2001 5
141 Somalia SRRC SRRC 2002 3
143 Iran MEK MEK 1982 1986 4
143 Iran MEK MEK 1988 1991 3
143 Iran MEK MEK 1993 1997 4
143 Iran MEK MEK 1997 1999 2
143 Iran MEK MEK 2001 2005 4
144 Iran APCO APCO 1980 25
145 Saudi Arabia JSM JSM 1979 26
146 Liberia Military fac Military fac 1980 1989 9
146 Liberia NPFL, INPFL NPFL, INPFL 1990 2000 10
146 Liberia LURD, MODEL LURD, MODEL 2003 2
147 Spain ETA ETA 1982 1985 3
147 Spain ETA ETA 1987 1991 4
147 Spain ETA ETA 1992 13
148 Tunisia Rstance A Rstance A 1980 25
149 Gambia NRC NRC 1981 24
150 South Africa ANC ANC 1983 1985 2
150 South Africa ANC ANC 1988 17
152 India PLA PLA 1988 1992 4
152 India PLA, UNLF PLA, UNLF 2000 2003 3
153 Kenya Military fac Military fac 1982 23
156 India Sikh insurge Sikh insurge 1993 12
157 Sri Lanka LTTE, TELO, LTTE, TELO, 2001 2003 2
157 Sri Lanka LTTE LTTE 2003 2005 2
158 Cameroon Military fac Military fac 1984 21
162 Suriname SLA SLA 1987 18
163 Togo MTD MTD 1986 19
164 Yemen People’s Republic Yemenite Soc Yemenite Soc 1986 19
165 Burkina Faso Popular Fron Popular Fron 1987 18
167 Comoros Presidential Presidential 1989 16
168 Ethiopia ALF ALF 1976 1996 20
168 Ethiopia ARDUF ARDUF 1996 9
170 India ULFA ULFA 1991 1994 3
171 Indonesia GAM GAM 1991 1999 8
172 Panama Military fac Military fac 1989 16
174 Papua New Guinea BRA BRA 1990 15
174 Papua New Guinea BRA BRA 1996 9
175 Romania NSF NSF 1989 16
177 Mali MPA MPA 1990 1994 4
177 Mali FIAA FIAA 1994 11
178 Niger CRA CRA 1994 11
179 Rwanda FPR FPR 1994 1997 3
179 Rwanda FDLR FDLR 2002 3
180 Senegal MFDC MFDC 1990 1992 2
180 Senegal MFDC MFDC 1993 1995 2
180 Senegal MFDC MFDC 1995 1997 2
180 Senegal MFDC MFDC 1998 2000 2
180 Senegal MFDC MFDC 2001 2003 2
180 Senegal MFDC MFDC 2003 2
181 Russia Republic of Republic of 1991 14
182 Russia APF APF 1990 15
183 Trinidad and Tobago Jamaat al-Mu Jamaat al-Mu 1990 15
184 Djibouti FRUD FRUD 1994 1999 5
184 Djibouti FRUD AD FRUD AD 1999 6
185 Georgia National Gua National Gua 1993 12
186 Haiti Military fac Military fac 1989 1991 2
186 Haiti Military fac Military fac 1991 2004 13
186 Haiti FLRN, OP Lav FLRN, OP Lav 2004 1
187 Sierra Leone RUF, AFRC, K RUF, AFRC, K 2000 5
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188 Turkey Devrimci Sol Devrimci Sol 1992 2005 13
189 Yugoslavia Republic of Republic of 1991 1991 0
190 Yugoslavia Republic of Republic of 1991 14
192 Angola FLEC-R FLEC-R 1991 1994 3
192 Angola FLEC-R, FLEC FLEC-R, FLEC 1994 1996 2
192 Angola FLEC-FAC, FL FLEC-FAC, FL 1998 2002 4
192 Angola FLEC-R, FLEC FLEC-R, FLEC 2002 2004 2
192 Angola FLEC-FAC FLEC-FAC 2004 1
193 Azerbaijan Republic of Republic of 1994 2005 11
194 Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbian Repu Serbian Repu 1995 10
195 Croatia Serbian Repu Serbian Repu 1993 12
195 Croatia Serbian Repu Serbian Repu 1995 10
196 Egypt al-Gamaa al- al-Gamaa al- 1998 7
197 Georgia Republic of Republic of 1993 12
198 Georgia Republic of Republic of 1992 2004 12
198 Georgia Republic of Republic of 2004 1
199 Moldova PMR PMR 1992 13
200 Tajikistan UTO UTO 1996 1998 2
200 Tajikistan UTO, Movemen UTO, Movemen 1998 7
201 Azerbaijan Military fac Military fac 1993 1995 2
201 Azerbaijan OPON forces OPON forces 1995 10
202 Bosnia and Herzegovina Autonomous P Autonomous P 1995 10
203 Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatian Rep Croatian Rep 1994 11
204 Russia Parliamentar Parliamentar 1993 12
205 Mexico EZLN EZLN 1994 1996 2
205 Mexico EPR EPR 1996 9
206 Russia Republic of Republic of 1996 1999 3
207 Yemen Arab Republic Democratic R Democratic R 1994 11
209 Pakistan MQM MQM 1990 1995 5
209 Pakistan MQM MQM 1996 9
211 Ethiopia al-Itahad al al-Itahad al 1996 1999 3
211 Ethiopia al-Itahad al al-Itahad al 1999 6
212 Niger FDR FDR 1995 1997 2
212 Niger FARS FARS 1997 8
213 Comoros MPA/Republic MPA/Republic 1997 8
214 Congo Ninjas Ninjas 1994 1997 3
214 Congo Cobras, Coco Cobras, Coco 1999 2002 3
214 Congo Ntsiloulous Ntsiloulous 2002 3
216 Guinea-Bissau Military Jun Military Jun 1999 6
217 Lesotho Military fac Military fac 1998 7
218 Yugoslavia UCK UCK 1999 6
219 Ethiopia OLF OLF 1978 1980 2
219 Ethiopia OLF OLF 1981 1983 2
219 Ethiopia OLF OLF 1985 1987 2
219 Ethiopia OLF OLF 1992 1994 2
219 Ethiopia OLF OLF 1995 1998 3
220 Russia Wahhabi move Wahhabi move 1999 6
221 Uzbekistan IMU IMU 2000 2004 4
221 Uzbekistan JIG JIG 2004 1
222 Central African Republic Military fac Military fac 2002 3
223 Macedonia UCK UCK 2001 4
224 USA al-Qaida (Th al-Qaida (Th 2002 2004 2
225 Ivory Coast MPCI, MPIGO, MPCI, MPIGO, 2004 1
227 India ABSU ABSU 1990 1993 3
227 India NDFB NDFB 2004 1
228 Myanmar UWSA UWSA 1997 8
249 Nigeria Ahlul Sunnah Ahlul Sunnah 2004 1
250 Nigeria NDPVF NDPVF 2004 1
251 Israel Hezbollah Hezbollah 1999 6
253 Mauritania POLISARIO POLISARIO 1978 27
255 Niger FLAA FLAA 1992 1997 5
255 Niger UFRA UFRA 1997 8
261 Ethiopia SALF SALF 1980 25
262 Ethiopia SLM SLM 1983 22
263 India KNF KNF 1997 8
265 Myanmar LNUP LNUP 1981 24
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Appendix C
Transitionary Periods
Table C.1: List of Transitionary Periods
Conflict ID Country End of conflict Trans. year Recurrence Imputed XCONST
62 Iraq 1996 2004 2004 2.226
63 Lebanon 1976 1977 1982 2.748
63 Lebanon 1976 1978 1982 2.864
63 Lebanon 1976 1979 1982 2.510
63 Lebanon 1976 1980 1982 2.539
63 Lebanon 1976 1981 1982 2.033
63 Lebanon 1976 1982 1982 1.598
63 Lebanon 1986 1987 1989 2.362
63 Lebanon 1986 1988 1989 3.215
63 Lebanon 1986 1989 1989 2.275
63 Lebanon 1990 1991 2.023
63 Lebanon 1990 1992 1.435
63 Lebanon 1990 1993 5.634
63 Lebanon 1990 1994 5.205
63 Lebanon 1990 1995 2.954
63 Lebanon 1990 1996 4.356
63 Lebanon 1990 1997 4.956
63 Lebanon 1990 1998 4.213
63 Lebanon 1990 1999 4.372
63 Lebanon 1990 2000 5.760
63 Lebanon 1990 2001 5.383
63 Lebanon 1990 2002 4.235
63 Lebanon 1990 2003 5.568
63 Lebanon 1990 2004 5.682
63 Lebanon 1990 2005 4.855
65 Laos 1973 1974 1989 2.438
65 Laos 1973 1975 1989 2.183
70 Ethiopia 1991 1992 3.197
70 Ethiopia 1991 1993 2.263
70 Ethiopia 1991 1994 2.355
74 Iraq 1996 2004 2.732
74 Iraq 1996 2005 1.838
78 Ethiopia 1991 1992 2.062
78 Ethiopia 1991 1993 2.080
78 Ethiopia 1991 1994 2.258
85 Sudan 1972 1986 1.281
86 Democratic Republic of the Congo 1978 1993 1996 2.367
86 Democratic Republic of the Congo 1978 1994 1996 1.551
86 Democratic Republic of the Congo 1978 1995 1996 1.686
86 Democratic Republic of the Congo 1978 1996 1996 1.400
86 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2001 2002 2006 1.462
86 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2001 2003 2006 1.283
86 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2001 2004 2006 1.358
86 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2001 2005 2006 1.092
95 Peru 1999 2001 2007 5.252
98 Ghana 1983 1992 1.787
101 South Africa 1988 1993 3.330
101 South Africa 1988 1994 6.223
103 Cambodia 1975 1976 1978 1.583
122 Zimbabwe 1979 1980 4.472
123 Uruguay 1972 1973 5.983
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131 Angola 1995 1996 1998 4.276
131 Angola 1995 1997 1998 2.970
133 Ethiopia 1983 1992 1994 1.946
133 Ethiopia 1983 1993 1994 1.645
133 Ethiopia 1983 1994 1994 1.196
140 Nicaragua 1979 1980 1982 3.505
140 Nicaragua 1979 1981 1982 2.452
141 Somalia 1996 1997 2001 1.722
141 Somalia 1996 1998 2001 1.019
141 Somalia 1996 1999 2001 1.706
141 Somalia 1996 2000 2001 1.744
141 Somalia 1996 2001 2001 1.233
141 Somalia 2002 2003 2006 1.214
141 Somalia 2002 2004 2006 1.021
141 Somalia 2002 2005 2006 2.309
144 Iran 1980 1981 3.491
144 Iran 1980 1982 4.241
146 Liberia 1990 1991 2000 1.728
146 Liberia 1990 1992 2000 1.673
146 Liberia 1990 1993 2000 2.153
146 Liberia 1990 1994 2000 1.260
146 Liberia 1990 1995 2000 1.091
146 Liberia 1990 1996 2000 1.717
146 Liberia 1990 1997 2000 2.374
146 Liberia 2003 2004 1.303
146 Liberia 2003 2005 1.000
150 South Africa 1988 1993 4.768
150 South Africa 1988 1994 6.671
163 Togo 1986 1992 1.416
163 Togo 1986 1993 1.211
167 Comoros 1989 1996 4.518
168 Ethiopia 1976 1992 1996 2.237
168 Ethiopia 1976 1993 1996 2.821
168 Ethiopia 1976 1994 1996 3.905
175 Romania 1989 1990 4.121
177 Mali 1990 1992 1994 1.537
186 Haiti 1991 2000 2004 2.853
186 Haiti 2004 2005 1.437
187 Sierra Leone 2000 2001 3.190
187 Sierra Leone 2000 2002 3.078
192 Angola 1991 1992 1994 2.520
192 Angola 1991 1993 1994 3.399
192 Angola 1991 1994 1994 3.483
194 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 1996 1.149
194 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 1997 4.063
194 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 1998 2.241
194 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 1999 4.014
194 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 2000 5.098
194 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 2001 3.301
194 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 2002 4.665
194 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 2003 4.638
194 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 2004 5.656
194 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 2005 5.014
195 Croatia 1993 2000 3.473
195 Croatia 1995 2000 3.394
202 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 1996 1.406
202 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 1997 2.821
202 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 1998 4.523
202 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 1999 3.753
202 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 2000 5.484
202 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 2001 3.743
202 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 2002 3.793
202 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 2003 5.484
202 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 2004 6.214
202 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 2005 5.123
203 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 1995 1.144
203 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 1996 1.082
203 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 1997 3.287
203 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 1998 3.755
203 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 1999 4.079
203 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 2000 4.857
203 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 2001 3.946
203 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 2002 4.817
203 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 2003 5.913
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203 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 2004 5.226
203 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 2005 5.048
216 Guinea-Bissau 1999 2000 4.614
217 Lesotho 1998 1999 6.569
217 Lesotho 1998 2000 5.529
217 Lesotho 1998 2001 6.754
217 Lesotho 1998 2002 6.533
225 Ivory Coast 2004 2005 1.243
261 Ethiopia 1980 1992 1.749
261 Ethiopia 1980 1993 2.623
261 Ethiopia 1980 1994 2.485
262 Ethiopia 1983 1992 2.126
262 Ethiopia 1983 1993 3.478
262 Ethiopia 1983 1994 2.824




Table D.1: Alternative Operationalizations of election proximity
Baseline After Election Until Election Missing set to mean Half-life
log (election proximity) 1.28 1.77**
(0.901,1.811) (1.057,2.964)
Executive constraints 1.66*** 1.42** 1.66*** 1.33* 1.77**
(1.172,2.361) (1.083,1.867) (1.165,2.365) (0.998,1.771) (1.057,2.964)
log (election proximity) 0.89** 0.82**
*executive constraints (0.802,0.976) (0.697,0.962)
log (time after election) 1.45**
(1.019,2.071)
log (time after election) 0.88**
*executive constraints (0.796,0.972)
log (time prior to election) 1.29
(0.906,1.825)
log (time prior to election) 0.89**
*executive constraints (0.801,0.979)
Election proximity, half-life 1.33*
(0.998,1.771)
Election proximity, half-life 0.82**
*executive constraints (0.697,0.962)
Victory 2.68** 2.73*** 2.69** 2.65** 2.65**
(1.223,5.859) (1.282,5.799) (1.237,5.863) (1.254,5.588) (1.254,5.588)
log (population) 0.76** 0.74*** 0.75** 0.73*** 0.73***
(0.607,0.943) (0.604,0.911) (0.604,0.939) (0.584,0.906) (0.584,0.906)
log (gdp per capita) 1.1 1.13 1.11 1.16 1.16
(0.763,1.6) (0.784,1.627) (0.767,1.605) (0.815,1.645) (0.815,1.645)
log (battle deaths) 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.8 0.8
(0.571,1.065) (0.578,1.076) (0.573,1.066) (0.591,1.087) (0.591,1.087)
PKO 80.66 47.76 77.11 50.58 50.58
(0.194,33593.812) (0.153,14883.937) (0.193,30731.027) (0.175,14577.973) (0.175,14577.973)
Territorial conflict 1.38 1.35 1.37 1.34 1.34
(0.815,2.335) (0.792,2.285) (0.813,2.321) (0.801,2.242) (0.801,2.242)
Executive recruitment 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
(0.727,1.289) (0.741,1.265) (0.73,1.29) (0.737,1.268) (0.737,1.268)
Political participation 0.85 0.93 0.86 0.92 0.92
(0.643,1.133) (0.701,1.221) (0.648,1.139) (0.695,1.226) (0.695,1.226)
log (battle deaths) 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.18 1.18
*log (time) (0.964,1.467) (0.964,1.472) (0.965,1.467) (0.96,1.458) (0.96,1.458)
PKO 0.08* 0.11 0.09* 0.1* 0.1*
*log (time) (0.005,1.563) (0.007,1.712) (0.005,1.552) (0.006,1.557) (0.006,1.557)
log-likelihood null -306.71 -306.71 -306.71 -306.71 -306.71
log-likelihood -280.82 -284.29 -281.4 -283.75 -283.75
AIC 587.63 594.59 588.79 593.49 593.49
N 1454 1454 1454 1454 1454
Number of events 67 67 67 67 67
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Estimates in survival ratioes.
95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
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Appendix E
Log-logistic model
Table E.1: Log-logistic regression 1972-2005. Interaction between time to nearest post-






























Number of events 67
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Estimates in survival ratioes.
95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
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